The following paper was translated by the CIA's Foreign Broadcast Information Service. It is an analysis -- said to be taken by the author from popular sources in the open "foreign press" -- of the U.S. Department of Defense's efforts in information warfare as of February 1996. The information in this article on American views was re-used in a 1997 research paper published by the Hudson Institute think tank which purported to be about "Russian" views on electronic and information warfare, not American.
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Article Id: druma026__s96017 Document Id: 0dmhls102fvufh Insert Date: 02/08/96 Purge Date: 02/21/98 Publish Date: 02/07/96 Publish Region: Undetermined Lines: 447 Title: Russia: Information War Document Number: FBIS-UMA-96-026-S Document Type: Daily Report Document Date: 7 February 1996 Division: RUSSIAN MILITARY Subdivision: NAVAL FORCES Sourceline: 96UM0128G Moscow MORSKOY SBORNIK in Russian, Oct 19 No 10, 95 pp 69-73 AFS Number: 96UM0128G Citysource: Moscow MORSKOY SBORNIK Language: Russian Article Type: CSO Subslug: [Article by Major M. Boytsov under rubric "In Foreign Navies"] [FBIS Translated Text] The development of science and technology in recent decades engendered discussions about the use of robots, psychotronic means, antimatter, and also plasma, laser, beam, electronic and other varieties of lethal and nonlethal weapons in future wars. Some of these ideas already are materializing, and among them a new quality of information opposition. In general, information is information on people, objects, facts, events, phenomena and processes. Information opposition is the struggle of sides to win supremacy in the quantity, quality and rate of collection of information and in its timely analysis and use. It envisages a constant upgrading of information processes, information systems and information resources simultaneously with the fulfillment of measures for improving their protection against enemy effect. Many examples can be given, and from the most ancient times, of the sides' information opposition in various spheres. Here is a little-known fact from recent history. In 1945 the victors over fascist Germany, above all the United States, took as war trophies around 350,000 patents and over one million inventions, the content of which was determined by 40,000 new terms in all fields of science and engineering. Later they called that the operation to "carve out the brain of the German nation," which allowed the United States to increase the competitiveness of its commodities and assert its economic leadership in a war- weakened world. Even today the United States applies greatest efforts in this area, openly laying claim to the role of world leader and striving to consolidate the order which now has formed. Therefore it is advisable to examine the situation involving military kinds of information opposition practiced and planned specifically by the United States of America.1 It should be noted that new directions of information opposition in military affairs appeared in the United States in the last one or two decades. They are based first of all on historically formed features of Americans' military thinking; secondly, on their traditional concept of intimidation; and thirdly, on the latest achievements of science and engineering. All this can be reduced to the following propositions: reliance on force and on military and military- technical superiority; use of intimidation based on force and military superiority to keep an enemy from a war not needed by the United States (it is more advantageous not to allow a war than to wage it); imposition of one's own rules of waging war on a probable enemy in peacetime and on the enemy in wartime, and hitting him in vulnerable and critically important places; a war must be brief, with little blood, and victorious for the United States and must be waged as far as possible from its own territory; the profit from victory must be considerably higher than the cost of winning it. The American concept of intimidation has been undergoing changes over time. Thus, because of its inherent shortcomings (answering nuclear intimidation by an enemy equal in might), nuclear intimidation was supplemented by a more flexible and effective intimidation with conventional weapons, above all precision weapons. Intimidation by conventional weapons in turn began to be supplemented by intimidation by nonlethal weapons, particularly electronic weapons. Now we have seen progress toward war in the intellectual sphere, toward a war of machines and electronic equipment without a direct involvement in combat operations of friendly soldiers, whose losses, to the merit of American taxpayers and electors, are taken very painfully. The circumstance that, as specialists believe, over half of the world population will be living in cities in the first third of the 21st century and can especially suffer in case of wars began to play a role of no small importance here. Therefore it is believed that to win victory with minimum victims among the civilian population and minimum property damage, it will be necessary to employ very precise lethal and nonlethal kinds of weapons in order to exert sufficient pressure on the opposing country's leadership directly or through the population masses of cities. Electronic weapons in particular can prove to be specifically such a means. Achievements in spheres of communications, cybernetics and information science as applied to new methods of collecting, processing and rapidly communicating intelligence to forces, in the methodology and methods of computer simulation of the situation and operations, in the field of cryptanalysis and so on permit speaking of the appearance of a new concept in modern military affairs such as "information war." It is noted that already today the United States uses three terms in interpreting component parts of information opposition: command and control warfare--C2W; information warfare--IW; information war. The first term began to be used in the 1970's and the second and third ones in the 1990's after the war against Iraq of the coalition headed by the United States. Information war even has been elevated to the rank of U.S. national strategy, as is evident from the special mission: "Win the information war." It appears that the concept of information war is to show a potential enemy the U.S. Armed Forces superiority in intelligence and in the capability of blinding, deafening, demoralizing and decapitating the command and control system of its armed forces and of the state as a whole, and in the ability to neutralize his computer equipment and communications assets, disrupt information processes and destroy information systems and resources "at global distances and with the speed of light." This is supposed to induce a probable enemy to reject war, having understood its lack of prospect for himself. If intimidation does not work, use all available means en masse for victory. In other words, achieve your goals: in peacetime by electronic intimidation; in a period of threat by use of electronic means against military and civilian information and command and control structures that is selective in terms of targets but massive in terms of intensity; during a military conflict by massive use both of electronic as well as of fire-delivery means against all systems of the aforementioned targets. A particular kind of information war is the destruction by "nonlethal weapons" (read: electronic weapons) of the most important elements of military industry and the civilian regional infrastructure by disabling, for example, power supply, communications, transportation and other installations. But if we are speaking about information warfare, and above all about warfare against command and control systems (IW/C2W), it has two main goals: offensive--to deceive, disorganize or destroy the enemy information infrastructure; to confuse, disorganize or totally disrupt the process of operational command and control of his forces and assets for rapid neutralization of resistance; defensive--to protect the friendly information infrastructure and the command and control process against enemy effect. The essence of IW/C2W is to take advantage of vulnerable places in the enemy system of command and control, communications, computer support and intelligence in order to diminish the effectiveness of their work, to create a false picture or a distorted impression of the situation in the enemy, and under conditions of a scarcity of time to force him to take incorrect and disadvantageous actions. This will permit friendly command and control entities, using the advantage of time and reliability of information, to preempt the enemy in estimating the situation, making a decision, planning, communicating orders to those responsible for execution, checking plans of action by running them on automated systems for modeling combat operations and, finally, to preempt him in final organization of combat employment of troops and forces. Superiority in IW/C2W permits ensuring surprise and the possibility of delivering a knock-out blow even before a formal announcement of the beginning of combat operations (and such blows already have been legitimized), and it will permit seizing and holding the initiative and concluding the crisis or military conflict as fast as possible on terms most favorable to yourself. As of today the organization of IW/C2W in the United States includes the following aspects: 1. Deception, 2. Operations security, 3. Psychological operations, 4. Electronic warfare, 5. Destruction. Making simultaneous and maximum possible use of all means and methods of warfare in their close interaction for achieving highest results and concentrating main efforts on destroying the most important vulnerable links of the enemy information infrastructure and command and control system are a guarantee of success here. Radars, surveillance and reconnaissance equipment, communications centers and lines, transmitting and receiving components of communications centers, radio-relay stations, fixed navigational equipment, television and radio broadcasting stations and so on can be included among vulnerable links of the information infrastructure. Other vulnerable links are elements of the support infrastructure--electrical power stations, power supply lines and so on. And critically important vulnerable links include the most important components of the command and control system, destruction or annihilation of which will entail an immediate decrease in capabilities for command and control of troops and forces and for effective conduct of combat operations. They are military and civilian command and control entities at all levels with their electronic equipment (electronic computers, automated control systems, electronic data bases, communications systems, situation display systems and so on), and satellite surveillance, reconnaissance, communications and navigation systems. Try to imagine the chaos that would arise as a result of a shutdown of computers and technical and information systems serving, for example, a city's municipal economy. Now briefly about the five aspects of IW/C2W. Deception is an element of stratagem which "controls" the enemy by creating a false impression in him of the actual situation and status of forces opposing him and about the concept, time periods and nature of their operations, forcing him to act in a predictable manner unfavorable to himself. Here are examples: in preparation for and during the 1944 Normandy Operation, the Allies used simulated assets to create a situation which forced the Germans to hold 19 divisions on a diversionary axis at the Strait of Dover; feints with a similar concept by U.S. amphibious groups with only one Marine brigade, and also disinformation and a false electronic situation created in the Persian Gulf in 1991 forced the Iraqis to divert 7 divisions for an antilanding defense. Electronic means of deception now are used, first of all, by introducing to enemy systems one's own emissions that simulate his; secondly, by changing friendly emissions or simulating them. In the first instance enemy disinformation is achieved by penetrating (intruding) into his unclassified and classified information networks and channels for transmitting false information in them. In the second instance this is, for example, the creation of dummy ship groups which divert enemy forces and assets to themselves and allow the main body to act covertly and suddenly. Operations security is a disruption of enemy efforts to diminish the effectiveness of operations by opposing forces. Added here to various methods of protecting friendly information systems are measures for countering enemy intelligence, maskirovka [lit. "camouflage", however, includes "concealment" and "deception" -- FBIS], secrecy of the operational concept, electronic countermeasures, delivery of fire and so on. Methods of psychological operations in information warfare include praising one's own way of life, intimidating servicemen and the population of the enemy country by the might of one's war machine, undermining their faith in their own military and civilian leaders, sowing dissatisfaction and psychosis, inciting to disobedience, desertion and surrender, and fanning defeatist and capitulationist sentiments. For example, such an effect was accomplished during the war against Iraq by disseminating appropriate video materials inside the country and by radio and television broadcasts from outside. The Iraqi command even went so far as to confiscate radio receivers from its servicemen. As it turned out, around 60 percent of Iraqis who surrendered had listened to foreign broadcasts and largely gave them credence. The U.S. Voice of the Gulf radio, which broadcast for the Iraqis 18 hours a day, achieved such authority among them that by transmitting a message about the approach of coalition forces to the capital of Kuwait, it contributed to the beginning of mass flight of Iraqi troops from the city. Electronic warfare envisages accomplishing EW suppression by jamming enemy communications equipment, detection and position finding equipment, navigation equipment, and space-based, airborne, ground-based and sea- based computer support equipment in order to make him blind, deaf and dumb. The success of operations by U.S. forces for EW suppression of Iraqi radar and communications equipment in the 70 MHZ-18 GHz band is generally known. It seemed that new electronic warfare tactics also were tried out in combat operations against Iraq. For example, one cannot exclude the use of software inserts [programmnyye zakladki] in imported gear used in the Iraqi air defense system for blocking it at the beginning of the war. And in general, EW suppression methods are becoming more and more refined and effective. Already by 2000 one can expect the appearance of a so-called remote virus weapon against computers. This computer virus, such as in the form of automatic and controlled software inserts and interference, will be introduced via radio channels and laser communications links between central computers and user terminals. One hardly can overestimate the danger of a remote virus weapon (computer virus weapon--CVW) to automated control systems and above all to command and control of strategic missile complexes. While destruction is achieved for now basically by fire-delivery weapons, in the near future it will begin to be done more and more also with the help of electronic means. A few words about the scenario or dynamics of the beginning of combat operations. Based on the experience of the war against Iraq, the blinding of its command and control system began at H minus 22 minutes by the destruction of air defense radars, which by the end of the first 24 hours of the war permitted disrupting the operation of 95 percent of radars by massive employment of antiradar missiles and by missile and bombing strikes. Decapitation of the Iraqi military command and control system began at H minus 9 minutes to H plus 5 minutes by the delivery of air strikes and Tomahawk sea-launched cruise missile strikes against Armed Forces and National Air Defense command and control entities. As a result, in the first two weeks of war 60-75 percent of command and control facilities of the highest and middle echelons had been destroyed or damaged. The delivery of air and missile strikes against civilian radio broadcasting and television stations, against radio-relay station masts, against bridges over which fiber-optic communications lines ran, and against telephone and telegraph stations and switching substations contributed to disruption of command and control. And destruction of the electrical power supply, achieved by analogous strikes against electric power stations or by using carbon fiber from air-launched cruise missiles against power transmission lines, led to disruptions in operations of military computers and to creation of an acute time shortage for command and control entities. As it is noted, SHF-generators ("microwave weapons"), intended for disabling space-based, airborne, ground-based and sea-based electronic gear by means of a powerful, directed-effect electromagnetic pulse, will become a new means of warfare against command and control, communications, computer support and intelligence systems by 2005-2010. It is expected that, depending on type and location, the effective casualty zone of such generators will vary from several hundreds of meters for a cruise missile to several tens of kilometers for heavier platforms. Figuratively speaking, such selective and massive electronic and fire strikes will achieve paralysis of the enemy nervous system--his brain, nerves and organs of sense, i.e., the command and control, communications, computer support and intelligence systems. Direction of offensive IW/C2W in the United States is assigned to information warfare sections and centers set up on staffs of branches of the Armed Forces and strategic formations. In the Navy they operate under the aegis of the Defense Department National Security Agency and the Navy Staff Space and Electronic Warfare Directorate. Vertical development of these agencies is expected. Direction of defensive information warfare evidently will become the prerogative of the Defense Information Systems Agency, since defensive information warfare is becoming very acute even now. Suffice it to say that every day one or two attempts at illegal penetration into U.S. Defense Department cyberspace are recorded, and for the country as a whole U.S. business circles suffer annual losses of up to $300-500 billion as a result of the penetration of electronic hackers into computers ... Intelligence agencies of branches of the Armed Forces and strategic formations are assigned to provide information warfare entities with a complete, timely and reliable data base with a determination of vulnerable and critically important elements of the command and control and information system of probable enemies and an assessment of their strong and weak sides, capabilities, disposition and intentions. Special importance is attached to the decryption service, which supports decisionmaking for "electronic attacks." Two propositions concerning weak protection of computers against actions of special services and potential capabilities of cryptanalysis are fully understood: there is no refuge in cybernetics; and today's computer equipment fundamentally simplified code-breaking. In the future of development of information warfare methods, the security of U.S. Armed Forces information structures will be substantially increased by 2001 and a unified global network of Defense Department information systems will be established by 2010. It will be possible to perform missions at a tactical, operational and strategic level in automated fashion and in real time with its help based on continuously updated, complete, reliable, timely data that is immediately communicated to users on the situation forming in the "combat space." Moreover, it is even expected that an opportunity will appear to reliably uncover the enemy operations concept, identify the information network he has activated to conduct an operation, and determine the purpose of forces and assets he is using, which will provide great chances to disrupt these operations. The Americans now believe the crown of the information war concept lies in creating a global U.S. Armed Forces combat information/control system which continuously monitors the status and activity of other countries' armed forces and which is intended for winning indisputable supremacy over scattered regional command and control and communications systems of probable enemies. In the opinion of U.S. specialists, capabilities of IW/C2W will be increased through the creation of new electronic weapons categorized as nonlethal, capable of conducting both electronic intimidation of the enemy as well as an electronic attack on him. Combining the three components--the latest means of surveillance, reconnaissance and means for their transmission of intelligence; an improved, integrated command and control, communications, computer support and intelligence system; and precision lethal and nonlethal weapons, including electronic weapons--into a single whole will create a powerful system of conventional weapons which will become the equivalent of nuclear weapons in capabilities for intimidation and destruction and will surpass them in flexibility of employment. And so information warfare, warfare against enemy command and control systems, has been put into full swing. A modern, flexible, versatile and global means of selective intimidation of regional enemies in peacetime and a powerful means of ensuring victory in a conventional military conflict is being born based on the U.S. Armed Forces global combat information/control system that is being established and on new kinds of lethal and nonlethal precision weapons. The race for victory in the information war is picking up speed. Footnotes 1. Based on foreign press materials.
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