


Corporate Network Spying



Andrew Whitaker

Director of Enterprise InfoSec

InfoSec Academy / Training Camp

<http://www.infosecacademy.com> / <http://www.trainingcamp.com>

Who is this guy?

- Director of security course offerings for InfoSec Academy (division of Training Camp)
- Teaches ethical hacking / pentesting courses
- Co-author of Penetration Testing and Network Defense (Cisco Press, 2005)
- Author of other books/articles relating to security / networking
- Pentester of numerous financial and healthcare institutions
- M.Sc., Computer Science; CISSP, CEH, CCSP, CCNP, CCNA, CCDA, MCSE, CNE, A+, Network+, Security+, CTP, et al.

Training Camp

- InfoSec Academy division is world leader in teaching information security
 - Authorized CISSP
 - Certified Ethical Hacker
 - Licensed Penetration Tester
 - Sarbanes Oxley
 - HIPAA Compliance Training
 - Certified Information Systems Auditor (CISA)
 - Much, much more...

What this is / What this is not

- **What this is**

- Training on corporate network spying
- Designed for those with beginner to intermediate skills

- **What this is not**

- Discussion of hot new exploit (which may only be theoretical or work in a lab environment)
- An overly technical discussion that only 1% of the techie world can understand

Agenda

- What the heck is this network spying thing?
- Who does it?
- Legal cases (to scare the bejeezes out of ya)
- How to get past those darn switches
- General tools of the trade: Windump / TCPdump, Ethereal
- Analyzing common protocols
 - FTP, MSN IM, Web, SMTP/POP
- Demos to make you druel

What is Network Spying?

- Wiretapping
- Targeted packet capturing

Who Spies on Networks?

- Legitimate: Law enforcement
 - FBI
 - NSA
- Legitimate: Corporations with consent
 - Admins
 - Your boss
- Illegitimate: The "bad" guys
 - Hacker hobbyists
 - Corporate espionage

Who Spies on Networks?

- Law Enforcement
 - Patent #5,937,422 "Semantic Forests"
 - NSA solution
 - Captures voice conversation
 - Automatic speech transcription
 - Carnivore
 - Abandoned in 2005
 - Part of DragonWare suite
 - Carnivore – packet capturing
 - Packeteer – reassembles packets
 - Coolminer – searching captured packets

Who Spies on Networks?

- Corporations
 - PC Magazine reported 77% of companies spy on employees
 - Typically e-mail and web surfing
 - Justifications:
 - To ensure employee productivity
 - To ensure company is void of illegal activity
 - To protect trade secrets

Who Spies on Networks?

- Hacker hobbyists
 - Hey, look Ma, a wireless network!
- Corporate espionage
 - Tech companies especially at risk
 - Example: Oracle & Microsoft

Legal and Ethical Considerations

- 4th Amendment
- 1994 Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement
- Federal Electronic Communications Privacy Act (18 U.S.C. § 2511)
- PATRIOT Act

Cases


- Katz vs. United States, 1967
- 2004 Nicodemo Scarfo ("Little Nicky")

What You Need To Begin

- Commercial: Network Forensics Analysis Tools (NFAT)
- Packet capturing tool
 - Open-source vs. commercial
 - General vs. targeted
 - remote-vs. local
 - switched vs. shared


Sniffing on Switched Networks

Hubs...mmm...good




Frame from UserA is always propagated to UserB & UserC

How Switches Work




How Switches Work



<u>MAC Table</u>	
FA 0/1	01C9:44BB:00A1 (USER A)
FA 0/2	???
FA0/3	???

User A sends a frame to user B.


How Switches Work



FA 0/1	01C9:44BB:00A1 (USER A)
FA 0/2	???
FA0/3	???


Frame is duplicated out to UserB and UserC.

How Switches Work



FA 0/1	01C9:44BB:00A1 (USER A)
FA 0/2	0BB0:0E44:2221 (USER B)
FA0/3	???

How Switches Work



FA 0/1	01C9:44BB:00A1 (USER A)
FA 0/2	0BB0:0E44:2221 (USER B)
FA0/3	???


How To Get Around This Problem

- Five Solutions:
 1. ARP Poisoning method 1
 2. ARP Poisoning method 2
 3. MAC Duplicating
 4. MAC Flooding
 5. Port Mirroring

ARP Poisoning Method 1

- A.K.A. ARP spoofing
- Sending crafted replies to ARP requests


MAC Table	
FA 0/1	01C9:44BB:00A1 (USER A)
FA 0/2	0BB0:0E44:2221 (USER B)
FA0/3	0BB0:0E44:2221 (spoofed)



ARP Poisoning Method 2


MAC Table

FA 0/1	01C9:44BB:00A1 (USER A)
FA 0/2	0BB0:0E44:2221 (USER B)
FA0/3	0040:5B50:387E (spoofed)
Fa0/4	0040:5B50:387E (Router)




MAC Duplicating

- Used to target traffic sent to a single host (such as a server)
- ARP for a host you want to target to get its MAC address



MAC Flooding

- MAC addresses are stored in CAM table
- Content Addressable Memory (CAM) table
 - Switch must find an exact binary match
 - Information to do a lookup is called a key
 - Key is fed into a hashing algorithm to produce a pointer into the table




MAC Flooding

- CAM is limited on switches (typically 64k)
- If filled up, switch can no longer store new addresses
- Switch effectively turns into a hub

MAC Flooding

- MACOF (part of Dsniff)
- <http://www.monkey.org/~dugsong/dsniff/>

```
:c1:3b:50:d6:b8 fa:df:26:69:99:14 0.0.0.0.22550 > 0.0.0.0.48523: S 11596
97:95:82:1d:37:d0 7b:fa:dd:4c:75:61 0.0.0.0.38087 > 0.0.0.0.12386: S 53798
29:f8:c4:9:32:da ca:8d:f6:2:c8:87 0.0.0.0.59437 > 0.0.0.0.13066: S 1696046
d9:5a:ac:4f:ad:94 23:80:ac:8:a7:73 0.0.0.0.53446 > 0.0.0.0.33117: S 203989
b0:20:36:3:9c:fe 22:8d:59:45:3f:6b 0.0.0.0.14769 > 0.0.0.0.29914: S 144713
7a:27:a7:3:15:33 8a:7f:81:24:e1:bb 0.0.0.0.41373 > 0.0.0.0.8971: S 1279569
75:ef:8e:3:c5:26 f0:6b:e5:4c:d3:7b 0.0.0.0.35276 > 0.0.0.0.27444: S 197695
bc:f:bc:5d:60:87 49:67:a4:6c:f3:bf 0.0.0.0.49335 > 0.0.0.0.11344: S 889549
26:ad:2:49:fc:d3 53:e6:a0:3e:35:9a 0.0.0.0.25451 > 0.0.0.0.12668: S 187689
4e:cc:56:9:e2:75 a0:ca:cf:3b:7a:8e 0.0.0.0.61590 > 0.0.0.0.64385: S 121963
a8:1f:2a:31:89:79 f3:e6:7d:74:bf:a4 0.0.0.0.22720 > 0.0.0.0.31284: S 19906
26:14:ee:57:89:f0 4b:e9:4b:6c:8:11 0.0.0.0.28890 > 0.0.0.0.60969: S 492501
2e:ad:a6:20:96:ec e0:37:ba:31:45:d4 0.0.0.0.62754 > 0.0.0.0.60328: S 21825
bf:c1:fb:7d:a4:a7 6c:a1:50:59:2c:1b 0.0.0.0.59708 > 0.0.0.0.9508: S 219783
8a:18:34:e:82:1a bf:6d:68:66:56:7c 0.0.0.0.25036 > 0.0.0.0.7269: S 3417192
cd:7:50:8:e7:1a 33:fb:22:6a:b7:79 0.0.0.0.21768 > 0.0.0.0.25679: S 1771758
ad:72:d5:72:cc:b e2:9c:9c:36:3f:60 0.0.0.0.38008 > 0.0.0.0.4149: S 1831622
3:aF:9b:3b:96:26 c7:74:e5:2a:98:7b 0.0.0.0.48303 > 0.0.0.0.49658: S 808997953:808997953(0) win 512
bf:F9:46:4:e8:a5 63:3f:1c:4a:b6:7a 0.0.0.0.42767 > 0.0.0.0.24624: S 1622503690:1622503690(0) win 512
99:27:c9:54:5d:80 4d:6c:5a:
```



Port Mirroring

- Port mirroring is a legitimate method of mirroring one port to another port
- Cisco calls this *switched port analyzer* (SPAN)
 - Remote SPAN (RSPAN) can send traffic from one or more ports or an entire VLAN to another port on a different switch
 - There can be more than one source and more than one destination (up to 64 destination ports!)
- SPAN can copy traffic in one of three ways:
 - Rx SPAN
 - Tx SPAN
 - Rx/Tx SPAN

Port Mirroring

1) Specify source

```
monitor session session_number source  
  {interface interface-id | vlan vlan-id} [, |  
  -] [both | rx | tx]
```


2) Specify destination

```
monitor session session_number destination  
  {interface interface-id [, | -]  
  [encapsulation replicate]
```

Port Mirroring

```
Switch(config)#monitor session 1 source interface  
fastethernet 0/1 , 0/2 both
```

```
Switch(config)#monitor session 1 destination fastethernet  
0/3
```



Packet Capturing Software

- Tons!!!
- PacketStorm Security (<http://packetstormsecurity.org/sniffers/>) has almost 200 different sniffers
- Most popular freeware utilities:
 - Windump / Tcpdump
 - Ethereal (Now Wireshark)

Windump / TCPDump

- Developed by Loris Degioanni, Gianluca Varenni, Fulvio Rizzo, John Bruno, Piero Viano
- [Http://www.tcpdump.org](http://www.tcpdump.org) & <http://www.winpcap.org/windump/default.htm>
- Requires winpcap / libpcap library

Using WinDump / TCPDump

- `tcpdump [-ABdDeflLnNOpqRStuUvxX] [-c count]`

`[-C file_size] [-F file]`

`[-i interface] [-m module] [-M secret]`

`[-r file] [-s snaplen] [-T type] [-w file]`

`[-W filecount]`

`[-E spi@ipaddr algo:secret,...]`

`[-y datalinktype] [-Z user]`
`[expression]`

Using WinDump / tcpdump

- Display interfaces: windump -D
- Use interface: windump -i <interface # or identifier>
- Print out in Ascii: windump -A
- Log to file: windump -w *file.log*
- Read from log: windump -r *file.log*
- Verbose output: windump -vvv

Windump Example

```
23:23:52.991879 IP (tos 0x0, ttl 128, id 11231, offset 0, flags [DF], proto: TCP (6), length: 48)
    A152B.2436 > www.defcon.org.80: S, cksum 0x86d6 (correct), 916679930:916679930(0) win
    16384 <mss 1460,nop,nop,sackOK>
```

```
E..0+.@.....
```

```
..9..(.      ..P6.l.....p.@.....
```

```
23:23:53.116681 IP (tos 0x0, ttl 47, id 35735, offset 0, flags [none], proto: TCP (6), length: 44)
    www.defcon.org.80 > A152B.2436: S, cksum 0x2304 (correct), 451321314:451321314(0) ack
    916679931 win 65535 <mss 1460>
```

```
E.,.../..]..(.
```

```
..9.P      .....6.l`...#.....
```

```
23:23:53.116738 IP (tos 0x0, ttl 128, id 11232, offset 0, flags [DF], proto: TCP (6), length: 40)
    A152B.2436 > www.defcon.org.80: ., cksum 0xf650 (correct), 1:1(0) ack 1 win 17520
```

```
E..(+.@.....
```

```
..9..(.      ..P6.l.....P.Dp.P..
```

```
23:23:53.117616 IP (tos 0x0, ttl 128, id 11233, offset 0, flags [DF], proto: TCP (6), length: 495)
    A152B.2436 > www.defcon.org.80: P 1:456(455) ack 1 win 17520
```

```
E...+.@....P
```

```
..9..(.      ..P6.l.....P.Dp1/..GET /html/defcon-14/html/dc-css/defconblue
```

Ethereal / Wireshark

- Packet analyzer
- Original author was Gerald Combs
- Now supported by over 100 programmers
- Can 'dissect' 759 protocols
- Linux & Windows friendly
- Now licensed through CACE Technologies

<http://www.wireshark.org/>

Ethereal / Wirehshark

The screenshot displays the Wireshark interface with a list of captured packets. The top pane shows the packet list, and the middle pane shows the packet details for the selected packet (Frame 2). The bottom pane shows the packet bytes and their corresponding ASCII representation.

```
GET SNMPV2-SMI::mib-2.25.3.2.1.5.1 SNMPV2-SMI::mib-2.25.3.5.1.1.1 SNMPV
Standard query A www.defcon.org
Standard query response A 216.231.40.180
Standard query A mirror.toolbar.netcraft.com
2552 > http [SYN] Seq=0 Len=0 MSS=1460
Standard query response CNAME p.mii.instacontent.net A 64.191.208.114
2553 > http [SYN] Seq=0 Len=0 MSS=1460
http > 2552 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 win=65535 Len=0 MSS=1460
2552 > http [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 win=17520 Len=0
GET /html/defcon-14/html/dc-css/defconbluestyles.css HTTP/1.1
http > 2553 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 win=6144 Len=0 MSS=1460
2553 > http [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 win=17520 Len=0
GET /check_url/http://www.defcon.org/3639027892 HTTP/1.1
HTTP/1.1 302 Redirect (text/html)
```


Frame 2 (74 bytes on wire, 74 bytes captured)
Ethernet II, Src: GemtekTe_5b:1e:c9 (00:90:4b:5b:1e:c9), Dst: Cisco_ca:b3:80 (00:0a:b7:ca:b3:80)
Internet Protocol, Src: 10.3.3.57 (10.3.3.57), Dst: 10.10.10.1 (10.10.10.1)
User Datagram Protocol, Src Port: 1314 (1314), Dst Port: domain (53)
Domain Name System (query)

```
0000  00 0a b7 ca b3 80 00 90 4b 5b 1e c9 08 00 45 00  .....K[.....E.
0010  00 3c 43 87 00 00 80 11 d5 e3 0a 03 03 39 0a 0a  .<C.....9..
0020  0a 01 05 22 00 35 00 28 42 ad 06 b2 01 00 00 01  ..".5.(B.....
0030  00 00 00 00 00 00 03 77 77 77 06 64 65 66 63 6f  .....w ww.defco
0040  6e 03 6f 72 67 00 00 01 00 01                    n.org... ..
```

File: "C:\DOCUME~1\Andrew\LOCALS~1\Temp\etherXXXXLCBRCT" 6853 Bytes 00:00:06 | P: 31 D: 31 M: 0 Drops: 0

Ethereal / Wireshark

- To view entire conversation, right-click and choose **Follow TCP Stream**



Ethereal / Wireshark

The screenshot shows the 'Follow TCP stream' window in Wireshark. The window title is 'Follow TCP stream'. The main content area displays the following text:

```
Stream Content
GET /html/defcon-14/html/dc-css/defconbluestyles.css HTTP/1.1
Host: www.defcon.org
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (windows; U; windows NT 5.1; en-US; rv:1.8.0.4) Gecko/20060508
Firefox/1.5.0.4
Accept: text/css,*/*;q=0.1
Accept-Language: en-us,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.7
Keep-Alive: 300
Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://www.defcon.org/
If-Modified-Since: Fri, 26 Mar 2004 16:31:58 GMT

HTTP/1.1 404 file does not exist
X-xxx:xxxxxxxxxxx
Date: Sun, 09 Jul 2006 04:15:41 GMT
Last-Modified: Fri, 26 Mar 2004 16:31:58 GMT
Content-Type: text/html
Transfer-Encoding: chunked

564
<!doctype html public "-//w3c//dtd html 4.0 transitional//en">
<html>
<head>

.<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=iso-8859-1">
.<meta name="GENERATOR" content="vi">
.<meta name="Author" content="web master">
.<meta name="Description" content="html error 404 code">
.<meta name="keywords" content="html error 404 code">
.<meta name="copyright" content="Copyright . 1996-2004 by DatAmerica. All rights
reserved." />
.<meta name="robots" content="index, follow, noarchive" />
```

At the bottom of the window, there are several controls:

- Buttons: Save As, Print
- Text field: Entire conversation (2039 bytes)
- Dropdown menu: (empty)
- Radio buttons: ASCII, EBCDIC, Hex Dump, C Arrays, Raw
- Buttons: Filter out this stream, Close

Password Capturing

- The following protocols send passwords in plain text
 - Telnet
 - FTP
 - POP
 - SMTP
 - Just to name a few!
- Even if password is not in plain text, it is often easily cracked

Tool: Cain and Abel

- Developed by Massimiliano Montoro
- <http://www.oxid.it/index.html>
- Password recovery tool that supports packet capturing
- Can even capture & replay voice conversations

Cain and Abel

The screenshot displays the main interface of Cain and Abel. On the left, a tree view shows various protocols under the 'Passwords' category, including FTP, HTTP, IMAP, POP3 (2), SMB, Telnet, VNC, TDS, SMTP, NNTP, MSKerb5-PreAuth, Radius-Keys, Radius-Users, ICQ, IKE-PSK, MySQL, SNMP, and SIP. The main window shows a table of captured passwords with columns: Timestamp, POP3 server, Client, Username, Password, AuthType, Hash, challenge, and Domain. Two entries are visible, both for POP3 server 38.113.3.22 and client 10.4.1.19, with username 'victim14' and password 'defcon14' in ClearText format. A black arrow points from the 'Client' column of the first entry to a detailed view window below. This window shows a table with columns: POP3 server, Client, Username, Password, and AuthType, containing the same two entries. The bottom status bar shows 'Lost packets: 0%' and a taskbar with icons for Hosts, APR, Routing, Passwords, and VoIP.

Timestamp	POP3 server	Client	Username	Password	AuthType	Hash	challenge	Domain
08/07/2006 - 23:51:17	38.113.3.22	10.4.1.19	victim14	defcon14	ClearText			
08/07/2006 - 23:51:18	38.113.3.22	10.4.1.19	victim14	defcon14	ClearText			

POP3 server	Client	Username	Password	AuthType
38.113.3.22	10.4.1.19	victim14	defcon14	ClearText
38.113.3.22	10.4.1.19	victim14	defcon14	ClearText

Cain and Abel

The screenshot shows the main interface of Cain and Abel. The top menu bar includes File, View, Configure, Tools, and Help. Below the menu is a toolbar with various icons. A secondary toolbar contains tabs for Protected Storage, Network, Sniffer, LSA Secrets, Cracker, Traceroute, CCDU, and Wireless. The main area is a table with columns: SMB server, Client, Username, Domain, Password, AuthType, LM Hash, NT Hash, NT Serv-Chall, LM Cli-Chall, and NT C. The table contains one row of data: SMB server (10.4.1.28), Client (10.4.1.19), Username (Administrator), Domain (TTC-Q...), Password (empty), AuthType (NTLM Sessi...), LM Hash (C5F0A6B5806A8D05...), NT Hash (DC79B4CF118A...), NT Serv-Chall (87A2DED68D50...), LM Cli-Chall (000000000000...), and NT C (55D). An arrow points to the 'AuthType' cell of this row. Below the main table is a detailed view of the selected row, showing columns: Username (Administrator), Domain (TTC-Q...), Password (empty), AuthType (NTLM Sessi...), LM Hash (C5F0A6B5806A8D05...), NT Hash (DC79B4CF118A...), and NT Serv-Chall (87A2DED68D50...). At the bottom, there are tabs for Hosts, APR, Routing, Passwords, and VoIP, and a status bar showing 'Lost packets: 0%'.

SMB server	Client	Username	Domain	Password	AuthType	LM Hash	NT Hash	NT Serv-Chall	LM Cli-Chall	NT C
10.4.1.28	10.4.1.19	Administrator	TTC-Q...		NTLM Sessi...	C5F0A6B5806A8D05...	DC79B4CF118A...	87A2DED68D50...	000000000000...	55D

Username	Domain	Password	AuthType	LM Hash	NT Hash	NT Serv-Chall
Administrator	TTC-Q...		NTLM Sessi...	C5F0A6B5806A8D05...	DC79B4CF118A...	87A2DED68D50...

Cain and Abel

The screenshot shows the main interface of Cain and Abel. On the left is a tree view of protocols, with 'SMB (1)' selected. The main area is a table of captured passwords. A context menu is open over the first row, showing options: 'Send to Cracker', 'Send All to Cracker', 'Remove', 'Delete', and 'Remove All'. A large black arrow points from the 'Send to Cracker' option in the menu to a larger, semi-transparent box on the right that contains the text 'Send to Cracker', 'Send All to Cracker', 'Remove', and 'Delete'.

SMB server	Client	Username	Domain	Password	AuthType	LM Hash	NT Hash	NT Serv-Chall	LM Cli-Chall	NT C
10.4.1.28	10.4.1.19	Administrator	TTC-D		NTLM Sessi...	C5F0A6B5806A8D05...	DC79B4CF118A...	87A2DED68D50...	000000000000...	55D

Send to Cracker
Send All to Cracker

Remove Delete
Remove All

Cain and Abel

Telnet-20067935348859-1912 - Notepad

File Edit Format View Help

=====
User Access Verification

=====
User Access Verification

Password:
welcome to the Defcon Router
Authorized access only
Defcon>

- ICQ (0)
- IKE-PSK (0)
- MySQL (0)
- SNMP (0)
- SIP (0)

Started

Close

08/07/2006 - 23:53:48

08/07

View

Remove

Delete

Remove All

Sta

1.19

Clo

Telnet

Hosts APR Routing Passwords VoIP

Lost packets: 0%

Cain and Abel

The screenshot shows the main window of Cain and Abel. On the left is a tree view of protocols, with 'HTTP (2)' selected. The main area is a table of captured data. A black arrow points to the second row of the table.

Timestamp	HTTP server	Client	Username	Password	URL
09/07/2006 - 00:00:26	38.113.3.122	10.4.1.19	aWBgtLLqW-c6w5mCrX	defcon14	http://www.hotpop.com/login.jsp
09/07/2006 - 00:01:15	208.45.133.16	10.4.1.19	victim14	xxxxxxx	http://registration.excite.com/excitereg/login.jsp?ref=email&retu

Username	Password	URL
aWBgtLLqW-c6w5mCrX	defcon14	http://www.hotpop.com/login.jsp
victim14	xxxxxxxxxx	http://registration.excite.com/excitereg/login.jsp?ref=email&retu

This screenshot shows the 'Filter' dialog box in Cain and Abel. The 'Hosts' tab is active, and the 'Filter' field is empty. The 'Protocol' dropdown is set to 'HTTP'. Below the dialog, the status bar shows 'Lost packets: 0%'.

Cain and Abel

The screenshot shows the main interface of Cain and Abel. On the left, a tree view lists various protocols: FTP (1), HTTP (2), IMAP (0), POP3 (2), SMB (1), Telnet (1), VNC (0), TDS (0), SMTP (0), NNTP (0), MSKerberos-PreA, Radius-Keys (1), Radius-Users (1), ICQ (0), IKE-PSK, MySQL, SNMP (0), and SIP (0). The main window displays a table of captured passwords with the following data:

Timestamp	FTP server	Client	Username	Password
09/07/2006 - 00:04:20	207.46.236.102	10.4.1.19	anonymous	victim14@PunkAss.com

A black arrow points from the highlighted row in the main table to a magnified inset table below. The inset table shows the same data in a larger font:


FTP server	Client	Username	Password
207.46.236.102	10.4.1.19	anonymous	victim14@PunkAss.com

At the bottom of the interface, there are tabs for Hosts, APR, Routing, Passwords, and VoIP. The status bar at the very bottom indicates "Lost packets: 0%".

Tool: Dsniff

- <http://www.monkey.org/~dugsong/dsniff/>
- Dsniff can be used to listen only for passwords


```
07/09/06 14:52:59 tcp 10.0.1.3.53364 -> 10.0.1.5.3 (pop)
USER defcon14
PASS 37337h@xor
```



Tool: Ettercap

- <http://ettercap.sourceforge.net/>
- Can be used to sniff passwords
- Active and passive capturing capabilities
- Content filtering

Tool: Ettercap



The screenshot shows the Ettercap NG-0.7.2 interface. The 'Host List' tab is active, displaying a table with the following data:

Host	Port	Host	Port	Proto	State	Bytes
10.0.1.5	3	10.0.1.3	53286	T	killed	510
10.0.1.3	53232		143	T	idle	123
10.0.1.3	53232		21	T	closed	252

GROUP 1 : ANY (all the hosts in the list)


GROUP 2 : ANY (all the hosts in the list)

Starting Unified sniffing...

POP : [REDACTED]:110 -> USER: quiksir PASS: [REDACTED]

IMAP : [REDACTED]:143 -> USER: dcwilliams PASS: [REDACTED]

FTP : [REDACTED]:21 -> USER: dwilliams2 PASS: [REDACTED]



The screenshot shows the configuration details in the Ettercap interface, including:

- GROUP 1 : ANY (all the hosts in the list)
- GROUP 2 : ANY (all the hosts in the list)
- Starting Unified sniffing...
- POP : [REDACTED]:110 -> USER: quiksir PASS: [REDACTED]
- IMAP : [REDACTED]:143 -> USER: dcwilliams PASS: [REDACTED]
- FTP : [REDACTED]:21 -> USER: dwilliams2 PASS: [REDACTED]

Analysis of E-mail Traffic

SMTP Commands

HELO	Used to initiate communication to an SMTP server
EHLO	Same as HELO
MAIL FROM:	Address you are sending e-mail from (easy to spoof!)
RCPT TO:	Destination of e-mail
SIZE=# of bytes	Not necessary. Specifies size of e-mail in bytes.
DATA	The message body. Terminated with a single period (.) on a line by itself.
QUIT	Terminates the SMTP session
VRFY <i>username</i>	Verify that a username is valid. Excellent way to enumerate users.
EXPN <i>name</i>	Like VRFY, can verify a username. EXPN can also list out all usernames in a distribution list.

Analysis of E-mail Traffic

- POP Commands (RFC 1225)
 - USER
 - PASS
 - QUIT
 - STAT
 - LIST
 - RETR
 - DELE
 - LAST
 - RSET

Analysis of E-mail Traffic

The screenshot displays the Wireshark interface with a list of captured packets. A large blue box highlights a sequence of POP3 protocol messages:

- Response: +OK
- Request: USER victim14
- pop3 > 1819 [ACK] seq=6 Ack
- Response: +OK
- Request: PASS defcon14
- Response: +OK
- Request: STAT

The background shows the Wireshark packet list and details pane. The packet list shows the following entries:

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Info
1	0.000000	Cisco_ca:b3:8e	Spanning-tree-(for	STP	Conf. Root = 32778/00:0a:b7:ca:b3:80 Cost = 0 Port = 0x800
2	2.000935	Cisco_ca:b3:8e	Spanning-tree-(for	STP	Conf. Root = 32778/00:0a:b7:ca:b3:80 Cost = 0 Port = 0x800
3	2.269252	10.4.1.25	10.4.1.255	NBNS	Name query NB WORKGROUP<1b>
4	3.017846	10.4.1.25	10.4.1.255	NBNS	Name query NB WORKGROUP<1b>
5	3.134571	10.4.1.19	38.113.3.22	TCP	1819 > pop3 [SYN] Seq=0 Len=0 MSS=1460
6	3.177158	38.113.3.22	10.4.1.19	TCP	pop3 > 1819 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 win=5840 Len=0 MSS=1460
7	3.177213	10.4.1.19	38.113.3.22	TCP	1819 > pop3 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 win=64240 Len=0
8	3.214147	38.113.3.22	10.4.1.19	POP	Response: +OK
9	3.218106	10.4.1.19	38.113.3.22	POP	Request: USER victim14
10	3.253581	38.113.3.22	10.4.1.19	TCP	pop3 > 1819 [ACK] Seq=6 Ack=16 win=5840 Len=0
11	3.255319	38.113.3.22	10.4.1.19	POP	Response: +OK
12	3.255732	10.4.1.19	38.113.3.22	POP	Request: PASS defcon14
13	3.303600	38.113.3.22	10.4.1.19	POP	Response: +OK

The details pane shows the following information for the selected packet (No. 8):

```
Response: +OK
```

The status bar at the bottom indicates: File: "C:\DOCUME~1\ADMINI~1\LOCAL5~1\Temp\etherXXXXT5ECT" 3478 Bytes 00:00:12 | P: 44 D: 44 M: 0 Drops: 0

Analysis of E-mail Traffic

(Untitled) - Ethereal

File Edit View Go Capture Analyze Statistics Help

Filter: (ip.addr eq 38.113.3.22 and ip.addr eq 10.4.1.19) and (tcp.port eq 110 and ...)

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Info
5	3.1345				
6	3.1771				
7	3.1772				
8	3.2141				
9	3.2181				
10	3.2535				
11	3.2553				
12	3.2557				
13	3.3036				
14	3.3039				
15	3.3392				
16	3.3399				
17	3.3762				
18	3.3763				
19	3.3780				
20	3.3780				
21	3.4132				

Follow TCP stream

Stream Content

```
+OK
USER victim14
+OK
PASS defcon14
+OK
STAT
+OK 0 0
QUIT
+OK
```

Save As Print Entire conversation (71 bytes) ASCII EBCDIC Hex Dump C Arrays Raw

Filter out this stream Close

File: "C:\DOCUME~1

Analysis of E-mail Traffic

The screenshot displays the Wireshark interface with the following details:

- Filter:** (ip.addr)
- Packet List:**

No.	Time
75	48
76	48
77	48
78	48
79	48
80	48
81	48
82	48
83	48
84	48
85	48
86	48
87	48
88	48
89	48
90	48
91	48
92	48
- Packet Details (Frame 75):**
 - smtp > 1815 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=5840 Len=0
 - 1815 > smtp [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=64240 Len=0
 - Response: 220 smtp-2.hotpop.com ESMTP Postfix
 - Command: HELO TTCQ7VTFQEOBOC
 - smtp > 1815 [ACK] Seq=38 Ack=22 Win=5840 Len=0
 - Response: 250 smtp-2.hotpop.com
 - Command: MAIL FROM: <victim14@PunkAss.com>
 - Response: 250 ok
 - Command: RCPT TO: <attacker14@PunkAss.com>
 - smtp > 1815 [ACK] Seq=69 Ack=92 Win=5840 Len=0
 - Response: 250 ok
 - Command: DATA
 - smtp > 1815 [ACK] Seq=77 Ack=98 Win=5840 Len=0
 - Response: 354 End data with <CR><LF>. <CR><LF>
 - Message Body
 - Message Body
 - smtp > 1815 [ACK] Seq=114 Ack=1558 Win=8760 Len=0
- Packet Bytes:**

0000	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00		
0010	00 30 0f 88 40 00 80 06	b6 72 0a 04 01 13 26 71	.0..@...r...&d
0020	03 46 07 17 00 19 6e 1d	5a 7f 00 00 00 00 70 02	.F...n.Z....p.
0030	fa f0 83 94 00 00 02 04	05 b4 01 01 04 02

Frame (frame), 62 bytes | P: 121 D: 28 M: 0 Drops: 0

Analysis of E-mail Traffic

Follow TCP stream

Stream Content

```
220 smtp-2.hot
HELO TTCQ7VTFQ
250 smtp-2.hot
MAIL FROM: <vi
250 ok
RCPT TO: <atta
250 ok
DATA
354 End data with <CR><LF>.<CR><LF>
Message-ID: <000b01c6a2ca$e5651ba0$1301040a@TTCQ7VTFQEBOBC>
From: "victim14" <victim14@PunkAss.com>
To: <attacker14@PunkAss.com>
Subject: Hi There!
Date: Sat, 8 Jul 2006 16:12:53 -0400
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
    .boundary="-----_NextPart_000_0008_01C6A2A9.5E09A160"
X-Priority: 3
X-MSMail-Priority: Normal
X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook Express 6.00.2800.1158
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.00.2800.1165

This is a multi-part message in MIME format.

-----_NextPart_000_0008_01C6A2A9.5E09A160
Content-Type: text/plain;
    .charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

The DefCon conference is coming up. Can we send some feds to it?

Sincerely,
Victim14@PunkAss.com
-----_NextPart_000_0008_01C6A2A9.5E09A160
Content-Type: text/html;
    .charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable


<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN">
<HTML><HEAD>
<META http-equiv=3DContent-Type content=3D"text/html"; =
    charset=3Diso-8859-1">
<META content=3D"MSHTML 6.00.2800.1276" name=3DGENERATOR>
<STYLE></STYLE>
</HEAD>
<BODY bgcolor=3D#ffffff>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>The DefCon conference is coming =
    up. When? Can we=3D
```

The DefCon conference is coming up. Can we send some feds to it?

Save As Print Entire conversation (1793 bytes) ASCII EBCDIC Hex Dump C Arrays Raw

Filter out this stream Close

Analysis of E-mail Traffic:Ettercap



Tool: Mailsnarf

- Part of Dsniff: <http://www.monkey.org/~dugsong/dsniff/>
- Dug Song
- Listens only for e-mail

Tool: Mailsnarf

```
root@1[ettercap]# mailsnarf  
mailsnarf: listening on eth0
```

```
Mime-Version: 1.0 (Apple Message framework v752.2)  
To: David Williams  
Message-Id: <E7819150-0632-42A5-B70B-F447CF313500@trainingcamp.net>  
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=Apple-Mail-4-218664851  
From: David Williams  
Subject: Defcon 14 Mailsnarf  
Date: Sun, 9 Jul 2006 15:07:20 -0400  
X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.752.2)
```

```
Testing Mail Snarf
```

```
David Williams  
Information Systems Support Specialist
```

```
Tech Train | The Training Camp | Infosec Academy  
Visit our website at http://www.trainingcamp.net
```

Analysis of FTP Traffic

File Edit View Go Capture Analyze Statistics Help

Filter: + Expression... Clear Apply

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Info
1	0.000000	10.0.1.2	10.0.1.4	TCP	54890 > compressnet [SYN] Seq=0 Ack=0 Win=65535 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=3 TSV=394312420 TSER=0
2	0.014835	10.0.1.4	10.0.1.2	TCP	compressnet > 54890 [S
3	0.014990	10.0.1.2	10.0.1.4	TCP	54890 > compressnet [A
4	0.015894	10.0.1.4	10.0.1.2	TCP	compressnet > 54890 [P
5	0.015998	10.0.1.2	10.0.1.4	TCP	54890 > compressnet [A
6	0.139052	10.0.1.2	10.0.1.4	TCP	54890 > compressnet [P
7	0.140186	10.0.1.4	10.0.1.2	TCP	compressnet > 54890 [P
8	0.140331	10.0.1.2	10.0.1.4	TCP	54890 > compressnet [A
9	0.140771	10.0.1.2	10.0.1.4	TCP	54890 > compressnet [P
10	0.147176	10.0.1.4	10.0.1.2	TCP	compressnet > 54890 [P
11	0.147335	10.0.1.2	10.0.1.4	TCP	54890 > compressnet [A
12	0.147796	10.0.1.2	10.0.1.4	TCP	54890 > compressnet [P
13	0.152160	10.0.1.4	10.0.1.2	TCP	compressnet > 54890 [P
14	0.152327	10.0.1.2	10.0.1.4	TCP	54890 > compressnet [A

Frame 6 (81 bytes on wire, 81 bytes captured)

- Ethernet II, Src: AppleCom_81:df:72 (00:0d:93:81:df:72), Dst: 3com_29:a2:b7 (00:07:09:29:a2:b7)
- Internet Protocol, Src: 10.0.1.2 (10.0.1.2), Dst: 10.0.1.4 (10.0.1.4)
- Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 54890 (54890), Dst Port: compressnet (3)
- Data (15 bytes)

```
0000 00 10 5a 29 a2 b7 00 0d 93 81 df 72 08 00 45 00 ..Z)... ..r..E.
0010 00 43 2a 5b 40 00 40 06 fa 54 0a 00 01 02 0a 00 .C*[@.@. .T.....
0020 01 04 d6 6a 00 03 86 b8 59 d0 84 2e 69 cb 80 18 ..j.... Y...i...
0030 af 58 e9 8e 00 00 01 01 08 0a 17 80 ba e5 00 00 .X.....
0040 20 45 55 53 45 52 20 64 65 66 63 6f 6e 31 34 0d EUSER d efcon14.
0050 0a
```

File: "/var/tmp/etherjtcHy4lust" 3755 Bytes 00:00:00 P: 40 D: 40 M: 1 Drops: 0

Analysis of FTP Traffic

The screenshot displays the Wireshark interface with a packet capture of FTP traffic. The packet list pane shows several TCP segments between 10.0.1.2 and 10.0.1.4. Packet 7 is selected, and its details pane shows the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) and Data (37 bytes) sections. A blue box highlights the ASCII representation of the data, which is a password prompt: ".331 Password required for defcon14...".

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Info
1	0.000000	10.0.1.2	10.0.1.4	TCP	54890 > compressnet [S
2	0.014835	10.0.1.4	10.0.1.2	TCP	compressnet > 54890 [S
3	0.014990	10.0.1.2	10.0.1.4	TCP	54890 > compressnet [A
4	0.015894	10.0.1.4	10.0.1.2	TCP	compressnet > 54890 [S
5	0.015998	10.0.1.2	10.0.1.4	TCP	54890 > compressnet [A
6	0.139052	10.0.1.2	10.0.1.4	TCP	54890 > compressnet [P
7	0.140186	10.0.1.4	10.0.1.2	TCP	compressnet > 54890 [A
8	0.140331	10.0.1.2	10.0.1.4	TCP	54890 > compressnet [P
9	0.140771	10.0.1.2	10.0.1.4	TCP	54890 > compressnet [P
10	0.147176	10.0.1.4	10.0.1.2	TCP	compressnet > 54890 [A
11	0.147335	10.0.1.2	10.0.1.4	TCP	54890 > compressnet [P
12	0.147796	10.0.1.2	10.0.1.4	TCP	54890 > compressnet [P
13	0.152160	10.0.1.4	10.0.1.2	TCP	compressnet > 54890 [A
14	0.152327	10.0.1.2	10.0.1.4	TCP	54890 > compressnet [P

```
.....r.. Z)..E.  
.Y.0@... .*.....  
.....j.. i...Y...  
..i..... ..F..  
..331 Pa ssword r  
equired for defc  
on14...
```

Frame 7 (103 bytes on wire, 103 bytes captured)
Ethernet II, Src: 3com_29:a2:b7 (00:10:5a:29:a2:b7), Dst: AppleCom_81:df:72 (00:0c:07:81:df:72)
Internet Protocol, Src: 10.0.1.4 (10.0.1.4), Dst: 10.0.1.2 (10.0.1.2)
Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: compressnet (3), Dst Port: 54890 (54890)
Data (37 bytes)

```
0000 00 0d 93 81 df 72 00 10 5a 29 a2 b7 08 00 45 00 .....r.. Z)..E.  
0010 00 59 1a 6f 40 00 80 06 ca 2a 0a 00 01 04 0a 00 .Y.0@... .*.....  
0020 01 02 00 03 d6 6a 84 2e 69 cb 86 b8 59 df 80 18 .....j.. i...Y...  
0030 ff f0 69 17 00 00 01 01 08 0a 00 00 20 46 17 80 ..i..... ..F..  
0040 ba e5 33 33 31 20 50 61 73 73 77 6f 72 64 20 72 ..331 Pa ssword r  
0050 65 71 75 69 72 65 64 20 66 6f 72 20 64 65 66 63 equired for defc  
0060 6f 6e 31 34 2e 0d 0a on14...
```

Analysis of FTP Traffic

File Edit View Go Capture Analyze Statistics Help

Filter: + Ex

No. .	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Info
1	0.000000	10.0.1.2	10.0.1.4	TCP	54890 > compressnet [S
2	0.014835	10.0.1.4	10.0.1.2	TCP	compressnet > 54890 [S
3	0.014990	10.0.1.2	10.0.1.4	TCP	54890 > compressnet [A
4	0.015894	10.0.1.4	10.0.1.2	TCP	compressnet > 54890 [F
5	0.015998	10.0.1.2	10.0.1.4	TCP	54890 > compressnet [F
6	0.139052	10.0.1.2	10.0.1.4	TCP	54890 > compressnet [R
7	0.140186	10.0.1.4	10.0.1.2	TCP	compressnet > 54890 [R
8	0.140331	10.0.1.2	10.0.1.4	TCP	54890 > compressnet [A
9	0.140771	10.0.1.2	10.0.1.4	TCP	54890 > compressnet [R
10	0.147176	10.0.1.4	10.0.1.2	TCP	compressnet > 54890 [R
11	0.147335	10.0.1.2	10.0.1.4	TCP	54890 > compressnet [A
12	0.147796	10.0.1.2	10.0.1.4	TCP	54890 > compressnet [R
13	0.152160	10.0.1.4	10.0.1.2	TCP	compressnet > 54890 [R
14	0.152327	10.0.1.2	10.0.1.4	TCP	54890 > compressnet [A

Frame 4 (93 bytes on wire, 93 bytes captured)

- Ethernet II, Src: 3com_29:a2:b7 (00:10:5a:29:a2:b7), Dst: AppleCom_81:df:72 (00:00:00:00:00:00)
- Internet Protocol, Src: 10.0.1.4 (10.0.1.4), Dst: 10.0.1.2 (10.0.1.2)
- Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: compressnet (3), Dst Port: 54890 (54890)

Data (27 bytes)

```
0000 00 0d 93 81 df 72 00 10 5a 29 a2 b7 08 00 45 00  . . . . . r . . Z ) . . . . E .
0010 00 4f 1a 6e 40 00 80 06 ca 35 0a 00 01 04 0a 00  . 0 . n g . . . . 5 . . . . .
0020 01 02 00 03 d6 6a 84 2e 69 b0 86 b8 59 d0 80 18  . . . . . j . . i . . Y . . .
0030 ff ff 2e 2c 00 00 01 01 08 0a 00 00 20 45 17 80  . . . . . . . . . . E . .
0040 ba e4 32 32 30 20 4d 69 63 72 6f 73 6f 66 74 20  . . 220 M i c r o s o f t . .
0050 46 54 50 20 53 65 72 76 69 63 65 0d 0a          F T P S e r v i c e . . . . .
```

File: "/var/tmp/etherjtcHy4lust" 3755 Bytes 00:00:00 P: 40 D: 40 M: 1 Drops: 0

Analysis

The image shows a Wireshark network traffic analysis interface. The top part displays a list of captured packets. The bottom part shows a detailed view of frame 9, which is a TCP segment. A blue box highlights the hex data of frame 9, and a blue arrow points from the hex data to the packet list.

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Info
1	0.000000	10.0.1.2	10.0.1.4	TCP	54890 >
2	0.014835	10.0.1.4	10.0.1.2	TCP	compress
3	0.014990	10.0.1.2	10.0.1.4	TCP	54890 >
4	0.015894	10.0.1.4	10.0.1.2	TCP	compress
5	0.015998	10.0.1.2	10.0.1.4	TCP	54890 >
6	0.139052	10.0.1.2	10.0.1.4	TCP	54890 >
7	0.140186	10.0.1.4	10.0.1.2	TCP	compress
8	0.140331	10.0.1.2	10.0.1.4	TCP	54890 >
9	0.140771	10.0.1.2	10.0.1.4	TCP	54890 >
10	0.147176	10.0.1.4	10.0.1.2	TCP	compress
11	0.147335	10.0.1.2	10.0.1.4	TCP	54890 >
12	0.147796	10.0.1.2	10.0.1.4	TCP	54890 >
13	0.152160	10.0.1.4	10.0.1.2	TCP	compress
14	0.152327	10.0.1.2	10.0.1.4	TCP	54890 >

Frame 9 (83 bytes on wire, 83 bytes captured)
Ethernet II, Src: AppleCom_81:df:72 (00:0d:93:81:df:72), Dst: 3com_29:a2:b7 (00:10:5a:29:a2:b7)
Internet Protocol, Src: 10.0.1.2 (10.0.1.2), Dst: 10.0.1.4 (10.0.1.4)
Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 54890 (54890), Dst Port: compressnet (3), Seq: 16, Ack: 65, Len: 17
Data (17 bytes)

```
0000 00 10 5a 29 a2 b7 00 0d 93 81 df 72 08 00 45 00  ..Z).. .r..E.  
0010 00 45 2a 5d 40 00 40 06 fa 50 0a 00 01 02 0a 00  .E*]@.@. .P.....  
0020 01 04 d6 6a 00 03 86 b8 59 df 84 2e 69 f0 80 18  ...j.... Y...i...  
0030 af 58 8e 86 00 00 01 01 08 0a 17 80 ba e5 00 00  .X.....  
0040 20 46 50 41 53 53 20 33 37 33 33 37 68 40 78 6f  FPASS 3 7337h@xo  
0050 72 0d 0a                                     r..
```

Analysis of FTP Traffic

The image shows a Wireshark capture of FTP traffic. The main pane displays a list of packets, with packet 10 selected. The packet list table is as follows:

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Info
1	0.000000	10.0.1.2	10.0.1.4	TCP	54890 > compressnet
2	0.014835	10.0.1.4	10.0.1.2	TCP	compressnet > 54890
3	0.014990	10.0.1.2	10.0.1.4	TCP	54890 > compressnet
4	0.015894	10.0.1.4	10.0.1.2	TCP	compressnet > 54890
5	0.015998	10.0.1.2	10.0.1.4	TCP	54890 > compressnet
6	0.139052	10.0.1.2	10.0.1.4	TCP	54890 > compressnet
7	0.140186	10.0.1.4	10.0.1.2	TCP	compressnet > 54890
8	0.140331	10.0.1.2	10.0.1.4	TCP	54890 > compressnet
9	0.140771	10.0.1.2	10.0.1.4	TCP	54890 > compressnet
10	0.147176	10.0.1.4	10.0.1.2	TCP	compressnet > 54890
11	0.147335	10.0.1.2	10.0.1.4	TCP	54890 > compressnet
12	0.147796	10.0.1.2	10.0.1.4	TCP	54890 > compressnet
13	0.152160	10.0.1.4	10.0.1.2	TCP	compressnet > 54890
14	0.152327	10.0.1.2	10.0.1.4	TCP	54890 > compressnet

The packet details pane for packet 10 shows:

- Frame 10 (96 bytes on wire, 96 bytes captured)
- Ethernet II, Src: 3com_29:a2:b7 (00:10:5a:29:a2:b7), Dst: AppleCom_81:df:72 (00:00:00:00:00:00)
- Internet Protocol, Src: 10.0.1.4 (10.0.1.4), Dst: 10.0.1.2 (10.0.1.2)
- Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: compressnet (3), Dst Port: 54890 (54890), Seq: 65, Len: 33, Len: 30
- Data (30 bytes)

The packet bytes pane shows the raw data of the selected packet, with a blue arrow pointing to the ASCII representation of the data:

```
0000 00 0d 93 81 df 72 00 10 5a 29 a2 b7 08 00 45 00 .....r..Z)....E.  
0010 00 52 1a 70 40 00 80 06 ca 30 0a 00 01 04 0a 00 .R.p0... .0.....  
0020 01 02 00 03 d6 6a 84 2e 69 f0 86 b8 59 f0 80 18 .....j..i...Y...  
0030 ff df 4b 2f 00 00 01 01 08 0a 00 00 20 46 17 80 ..K/..... F..  
0040 ba e5 32 33 30 20 55 73 65 72 20 64 65 66 63 6f ..230 Us er defco  
0050 6e 31 34 20 6c 6f 67 67 65 64 20 69 6e 2e 0d 0a n14 Logg ed in...
```


Analysis of FTP Traffic

The screenshot displays the Wireshark network protocol analyzer interface. A context menu is open over a selected packet, with the option "Follow TCP Stream" highlighted. The packet list pane shows a list of packets, with the selected packet being a TCP segment (Seq=95, Ack=111, Win=359088, Len=0).

Context Menu Options:

- Mark Packet (toggle)
- Time Reference
- Apply as Filter
- Prepare a Filter
- Follow TCP Stream**
- Decode As...
- Print...
- Show Packet in New Window

Packet List Pane:

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
...	TCP	0	Seq=95 Ack=111 Win=359088 Len=0 TSV=394312421 TSER=8262

Packet Bytes Pane:

```
0000  00 10 5a 29 a2 b7 00 0d 93 81 df 72 08 00 45 00  ..Z)... ..r..E.
0010  00 3c 2a 58 40 00 40 06 fa 5e 0a 00 01 02 0a 00  .<*X@.@. .^.....
0020  01 04 d6 6a 00 03 86 b8 59 cf 00 00 00 00 a0 02  ...j....Y.....
0030  ff ff ab a5 00 00 02 04 05 b4 01 03 03 03 01 01  .....
0040  08 0a 17 80 ba e4 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  .....
```

Analysis of FTP Traffic


Stream Content:

```
220 Microsoft FTP Service
USER defcon14
331 Password required for defcon14.
PASS 37337h@xor
230 User defcon14 logged in.
SYST
215 Windows_NT
MACB ENABLE
500 'MACB ENAB
PWD
257 "/" is cur
FEAT
211 -FEAT
    SIZE
    HDTH
211 END
PASV
227 Entering P
LIST
125 Data connection already open; Transfer starting.
226 Transfer complete.
```

Save As Print Entire conversation (419 bytes) [Dropdown] ASCII EBCDIC Hex Dump C Arrays Raw

Filter out this stream Close

Analysis Of FTP Traffic: Ettercap



The screenshot displays the Ettercap NG-0.7.2 interface. The main window shows a log of an FTP session. The session starts with a connection to 216.113.232.131:21. The server responds with '220 ttcftp Microsoft FTP Service (Version 5.0)..'. The user requests a password ('331 Password required for seaport..'). The user logs in ('230 User [redacted] logged in..'). The user sends '215 Windows_NT version 5.0.'. The user sends '500 'MACB ENABLE': command not understood.'. The user sends '257 "/" is current directory..'. The user sends '500 'FEAT': command not understood.'. The user enters passive mode ('227 Entering Passive Mode [redacted],76)..'). The data connection is established ('125 Data connection already open; Transfer starting..'). The transfer is complete ('226 Transfer complete..').

At the bottom of the interface, there are four buttons: 'Join Views', 'Inject Data', 'Inject File', and 'Kill Connection'. The status bar at the bottom left shows 'FTP : 216.113.232.131:21 -> USER [redacted] PASS: [redacted]'.

Analysis of FTP Traffic: Ettercap

The screenshot shows the Ettercap NG-0.7.2 interface. The main window displays a directory listing of an FTP server. A text box highlights the first few lines of the listing, which are: 'd----- 1 owner group 0 Jun 22 12:33 images.', 'd----- 1 owner group 0 Mar 17 14:26 Instruct', and 'ors.'. Below this, the listing continues with 'd----- 1 owner group 0 Sep 6 2004 Java.', '----- 1 owner group 17072239 Apr 7 2005 kernel-', and '2.6.10-1.770.EC3.i686.rpm'. The interface also shows a menu bar with options like Start, Targets, Hosts, View, Mitm, Filters, Logging, Plugins, and Help. At the bottom, there are buttons for 'Join Views', 'Inject Data', 'Inject File', and 'Kill Connection'.

Shows directory listing of FTP server

```
d----- 1 owner group 0 Jun 22 12:33 images.  
d----- 1 owner group 0 Mar 17 14:26 Instruct  
ors.  
d----- 1 owner group 0 Sep 6 2004 Java.  
----- 1 owner group 17072239 Apr 7 2005 kernel-  
2.6.10-1.770.EC3.i686.rpm  
  
d----- 1 owner group 0 Feb 26 2004 New Trai  
ner Kits.  
d----- 1 owner group 0 Apr 22 2004 Novell.  
d----- 1 owner group 0 Apr 18 2005 Oracle.  
d----- 1 owner group 0 Mar 3 13:33 Programs  
-Utilities.  
dr-xr-xr-x 1 owner group 0 Jun 23 13:43 Public.  
d----- 1 owner group 0 May 15 20:53 Rick.  
d----- 1 owner group 0 Jun 14 9:17 Solaris.  
d----- 1 owner group 0 Aug 10 2004 Test Mat  
erials.  
d----- 1 owner group 0 May 17 22:31 TestSit  
e Installation.  
d----- 1 owner group 0 Jun 19 12:07 Upload.  
----- 1 owner group 2925 May 4 12:07 upload.a  
sp.
```

Analysis of MS

Victim14@PunkAss.com: "We need to send feds to the Defcon conference. Hackers are bad...very bad."

Stream Content

```
TypingUser: victim14@punkass.com  
MSG 14 N 198  
MIME-Version: 1.0  
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8  
X-MMS-IM-Format: FN=MS%20shell%20dlg; EF=; CO=0; CS=0; PF=0  
We need to send feds to the Defcon conference. Hackers are bad...very bad.  
attacker14@punk  
MIME-Version: 1  
Content-Type: t  
TypingUser: att  
MSG attacker14@  
MIME-Version: 1  
Content-Type: t  
TypingUser: att  
MSG attacker14@  
MIME-Version: 1  
Content-Type: t  
TypingUser: attacker14@punkass.com  
MSG attacker14@punkass.com attacker14@  
MIME-Version: 1.0  
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8  
X-MMS-IM-Format: FN=MS%20shell%20dlg; EF=; CO=0; CS=0; PF=0  
No, there is no need to send a fed...i am sure nobody will do anything illegal there
```

Save As | Print | Entire conversation (38311 bytes) | ASCII | EBCDIC | Hex Dump | C Arrays | Raw

Filter out this stream | Close


File: "C:\DOCUME~1\ADMINI~1\LOCALS~1\Temp\etherXXX47HFCT" 79 KB 00:00:44 | P: 186 D: 83 M: 0 Drops: 0

Attacker14@PunkAss.com: "No, there is no need to send a fed...I am sure nobody will do anything illegal there."

Analysis of MSN Messenger Traffic

- MSN Sniffer
- www.ffetech.com
- Also have ICQ Sniffer, AIM Sniffer, HTTP Sniffer, ACE Password Sniffer, and much more

Analysis of MSN Messenger Traffic



#1, 2006-7-8 16:30:28

attacker14@punkass.com (attacker14@punkass.com) says:

No, you have nothing to worry about. Where do you live again?

#0, 2006-7-8 16:30:16

victim14@punkass.com (victim14@PunkAss.com) says:

Is it it ok to leave my wireless open? You don't think anyone will use it, do you?

Capturing..

Buffer Usage: 16 KB

Conversations: 1

Web Traffic:URLSnarf

- Part of dsniff, written by Dug Song
- <http://www.monkey.org/~dugsong/dsniff/>
- `urlsnarf [-n] [-i interface] [[-v] pattern [expression]]`
 - n Do not resolve IP to hostname
 - i Interface
 - v "versus mode" Invert the pattern you are matching
 - pattern Specify regular expression to match
 - Expression Specify a tcpdump filter expression to select traffic to dump

Web Traffic: URLSnarf

```
Shell - Konsole
Session Edit View Bookmarks Settings Help

root@[ettercap]# urlsnarf
urlsnarf: listening on eth0 [tcp port 80 or port 8080 or port 3128]
10.0.1.3 - - [09/Jul/2006:15:09:32 -0400] "GET http://www.apple.com/ HTTP/1.1" - - "-" "Mozilla/5.0
(Macintosh; U; PPC Mac OS X; en) AppleWebKit/418.8 (KHTML, like Gecko) Safari/419.3"
10.0.1.3 - - [09/Jul/2006:15:09:33 -0400] "GET http://www.apple.com/main/css/global.css HTTP/1.1" - -
"http://www.apple.com/" "Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; U; PPC Mac OS X; en) AppleWebKit/418.8 (KHTML,
like Gecko) Safari/419.3"
10.0.1.3 - - [09/Jul/2006:15:09:49 -0400] "GET http://images.apple.com/t/2006/us/en/i/7.gif HTTP/1.
1" - - "http://www.apple.com/" "Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; U; PPC Mac OS X; en) AppleWebKit/418.8 (KHT
ML, like Gecko) Safari/419.3"
10.0.1.3 - - [09/Jul/2006:15:09:49 -0400] "GET http://images.apple.com/t/2006/us/en/i/1.12g.gif HTT
P/1.1" - - "http://www.apple.com/" "Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; U; PPC Mac OS X; en) AppleWebKit/418.8
```

Tool: Ettercap

The screenshot displays the Ettercap NG-0.7.2 interface. The main window shows a network capture with a selected packet containing HTML content. The HTML content is as follows:

```
>....D.(m*..7.....  
1.....`SP.R....Y.....D.E4....text/aolrtf;  
charset="us-ascii"....<html><body bgcolor="#ffffff"><font lang="0">  
on the shitty computer<br>.<br>.<br>.<br>.<br>.<br>.<br>.</fon  
t></body></html>.  
..D.....text/aolrtf; charset="us-ascii"....<html><body bgcolor="#  
ffffff"><font lang="0">down in scranton<br>.<br>.<br>.momma is buyi  
ng stuff for my condo!! </font></body></html>....D.Eq*..8.P.....J  
s.....AOLYellowPages.....$.D.....H#.....  
a.....<font face="Times new roman" size="  
2">Sorry, I couldn't find any matching listings for <b>"Testing Def  
con"</b> in East Stroudsburg, PA 18301. To start a new search, jus  
t enter the search term or "<b>cl</b>" to change your location.
```

Below the main window, there are two buttons: "Inject File" and "Kill Connection". The "Inject File" button is highlighted. Below these buttons, there are four more buttons: "Join Views", "Inject Data", "Inject File", and "Kill Connection". The "Inject File" button is also highlighted.

At the bottom of the interface, there is a log showing network traffic:

```
DHCP: [00:0A:95:DA:F9:3C] REQUEST 10.0.1.3  
DHCP: [10.0.1.1] ACK : 10.0.1.3 255.255.255.0 GW 10.0.1.1 DNS 10.0.1.1 "cmts.sth.ptd.net"
```

Countermeasures

- Port Security
- IPSec

Demo Time

