Return-path: X-Andrew-Authenticated-as: 7997;andrew.cmu.edu;Ted Anderson Received: from beak.andrew.cmu.edu via trymail for +dist+/afs/andrew.cmu.edu/usr11/tm2b/space/space.dl@andrew.cmu.edu (->+dist+/afs/andrew.cmu.edu/usr11/tm2b/space/space.dl) (->ota+space.digests) ID ; Wed, 9 Jan 1991 03:07:51 -0500 (EST) Message-ID: <0bWgwni00VcJID5U4m@andrew.cmu.edu> Precedence: junk Reply-To: space+@Andrew.CMU.EDU From: space-request+@Andrew.CMU.EDU To: space+@Andrew.CMU.EDU Date: Wed, 9 Jan 1991 03:07:17 -0500 (EST) Subject: SPACE Digest V13 #034 SPACE Digest Volume 13 : Issue 34 Today's Topics: Electronic Journal of the ASA - January 1991 Administrivia: Submissions to the SPACE Digest/sci.space should be mailed to space+@andrew.cmu.edu. Other mail, esp. [un]subscription requests, should be sent to space-request+@andrew.cmu.edu, or, if urgent, to tm2b+@andrew.cmu.edu ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Date: 7 Jan 91 20:03:57 GMT From: pa.dec.com!rust.zso.dec.com!shlump.nac.dec.com!advax.enet.dec.com!klaes@decwrl.dec.com (Larry Klaes) Subject: Electronic Journal of the ASA - January 1991 THE ELECTRONIC JOURNAL OF THE ASTRONOMICAL SOCIETY OF THE ATLANTIC Volume 2, Number 6 - January 1991 ########################### TABLE OF CONTENTS ########################### * ASA Membership/Article Submission Information * The Great Moon Race: The Soviet Story, Part Two - Andrew J. LePage ########################### ASA MEMBERSHIP INFORMATION The Electronic Journal of the Astronomical Society of the Atlantic (EJASA) is published monthly by the Astronomical Society of the Atlantic, Inc. The ASA is a non-profit organization dedicated to the advancement of amateur and professional astronomy and space exploration, and to the social and educational needs of its members. Membership application is open to all with an interest in astronomy and space exploration. Members receive the ASA Journal (hardcopy sent through U.S. Mail), the Astronomical League's REFLECTOR magazine, and may additionally purchase discount subscriptions to ASTRONOMY, DEEP SKY, SKY & TELESCOPE, and TELESCOPE MAKING magazines. For information on membership, contact the Society at: Astronomical Society of the Atlantic (ASA) c/o Center for High Angular Resolution Astronomy (CHARA) Georgia State University (GSU) Atlanta, Georgia 30303 U.S.A. asa%chara@gatech.edu or asa@chara.uucp ASA BBS: (404) 985-0408, 300/1200 Baud. or telephone the Society recording at (404) 264-0451 to leave your address and/or receive the latest Society news. ASA Officers and Council - President - Don Barry Vice President - Bill Bagnuolo Secretary - Ken Poshedly Treasurer - Alan Fleming Board of Advisors - Edward Albin, Jim Bitsko, Bill Hartkopf Council - Jim Bitsko, Bill Crane, Toni Douglas, Eric Greene, Larry Klaes, Paul Pirillo, Tano Scigliano, Michael Wiggs ARTICLE SUBMISSIONS - Article submissions to the EJASA on astronomy and space exploration are most welcome. Please send your on-line articles in ASCII format to Larry Klaes, EJASA Editor, at the following net addresses or the above Society addresses: klaes@advax.enet.dec.com or - ...!decwrl!advax.enet.dec.com!klaes or - klaes%advax.dec@decwrl.enet.dec.com or - klaes%advax.enet.dec.com@uunet.uu.net You may also use the above net addresses for EJASA backissue requests, letters to the editor, and ASA membership information. Please be certain to include either a network or regular mail address where you can be reached, a telephone number, and a brief biographical sketch. DISCLAIMER - Submissions are welcome for consideration. Articles submitted, unless otherwise stated, become the property of the Astronomical Society of the Atlantic, Inc. Though the articles will not be used for profit, they are subject to editing, abridgment, and other changes. Copying or reprinting of the EJASA, in part or in whole, is encouraged, provided clear attribution is made to the Astronomical Society of the Atlantic, the Electronic Journal, and the author(s). This Journal is Copyright (c) 1991 by the Astronomical Society of the Atlantic, Inc. THE GREAT MOON RACE: THE SOVIET STORY, PART TWO Copyright (c) 1991 by Andrew J. LePage The author gives permission to any group or individual wishing to distribute this article, so long as proper credit is given and the article is reproduced in its entirety. During the re-evaluation that followed the tragic failure of the first manned L-2 flight, SOYUZ 1, the lunar test program took a slight- ly different track: Flight testing of other components would begin. On May 17, 1967, KOSMOS 159 was launched into orbit aboard a MOLNIYA booster. The MOLNIYA was essentially a SOYUZ launch vehicle with an extra stage attached, usually used to launch communication satellites or lunar and planetary probes. The spacecraft sent into a 203 by 431-kilometer (126 by 268-mile) orbit was the first test of a fully fueled L-2 service module. No other modules were carried. Soon after reaching orbit, the craft made a single burn that placed it into a 350 by 60,637-kilometer (218 by 37,686-mile) orbit. This simulated the burn the L-2 would have to make to leave lunar orbit and return to Earth. The test appeared to have been a success. Later that year, testing of the L-2 resumed, but this time in a much more conservative manner. On October 27, an L-2 test vehicle named KOSMOS 186 was launched unmanned into orbit. Three days later, a second L-2 named KOSMOS 188 was also launched unmanned to within 24 kilometers (fifteen miles) of KOSMOS 186. The first vehicle acted quickly and in less than one orbit the two spacecraft automatically docked for three hours, thirty minutes. The two craft then separated to follow independent missions. KOSMOS 186 returned to Earth the next day, followed by KOSMOS 188 two days later. The original SOYUZ 1/2 mission had finally been accomplished (except for the two-day launch delay of KOSMOS 188) the way Mishin and the other program managers originally intended it: Without a human crew. As a further test, KOSMOS 212 was launched on April 14, 1968. KOSMOS 213 followed it the next day. The two machines repeated the previous test mission faultlessly, clearing the way for manned L-2 flights to begin - this time, hopefully, at a more careful pace. In the meantime, unmanned test flights of the L-1 resumed. On November 21, 1967, a PROTON booster lifted off to attempt yet another deep space test of the L-1. Unfortunately, bad luck struck even earlier than before: The first stage of the PROTON malfunctioned and exploded in mid-flight. By comparison, the United States was having much better luck with their lunar program. On November 9, 1967, APOLLO 4 lifted off the launch pad with the first of the redesigned APOLLO spacecraft. That in itself was an accomplishment, but what set this flight apart was that it was the first test of the SATURN 5 rocket. The SATURN 5 worked well, but did experience some minor problems. It lofted the unmanned APOLLO 4 into space, where its own propulsion systems were tested. The final burn sent the spacecraft back towards Earth at the speeds it would encounter during a return from the Moon. All went well and the APOLLO Command Module was recovered in the Pacific Ocean. On January 22, 1968, APOLLO 5 was lofted into space. This time a SATURN IB was used to orbit a prototype of the Lunar Module. All the tests went well. The United States' luck had turned and they were well on their way towards a manned landing on the Moon sometime in 1969. All was not well in the Soviet Union. The Soviet's N-1 Moon rocket, originally scheduled for a test flight in March of 1968, was slipping further behind schedule. May was the earliest first flight date. One of the major problems was with the first and second stage engines. Kuznetsov and his Kuibyshev factory were in over their heads. It would be difficult enough to assemble and synchronize thirty engines for experts in the rocket field, but for builders of aircraft engines it was proving to be virtually impossible. Chief Designer Mishin had no choice: Glushko continued to refuse any participation of his bureau in the N-1 project and instead concentrated on the development efforts of the PROTON, which was having problems of its own. Similarly, the Soviet's L-3 lunar cabin was far behind schedule. The earliest first test flight of the L-3 in Earth orbit was at least mid-1969. The Soviets were falling behind. Still, they were moving along with other aspects of their project: Eighteen cosmonauts had begun lunar landing training in January of 1968. Plans and tests of drills to obtain sample cores, equipment carts, and other lunar tools were proceeding. Their unmanned lunar exploration program had so far succeeded in placing two unmanned landers on the lunar surface and four spacecraft in orbit to photograph landing sites, observe the near lunar environment, and map the Moon's slightly irregular gravitational field. Despite all this progress, the earliest a lunar landing attempt could be made was perhaps 1970 or 1971. If the Soviets wanted to be first on the Moon, all they could do was work harder and hope that the United States' schedule would also begin to slip. In the meantime, there was still the alternate plan: The L-1 circumlunar mission to beat the United States to the vicinity of the Moon. On March 2, 1968, another attempt to place an L-1 spacecraft into deep space using the PROTON lifted off the pad. This time the rocket succeeded in placing the L-1 named ZOND 4 (Zond is the Russian word for probe) into a 200 by 400,000-kilometer (124 by 250,000-mile) orbit. But as before, there was a failure in an onboard system which made controlling the unmanned ZOND 4 difficult or impossible. After one week in space, the craft re-entered Earth's atmosphere and made an uncontrolled landing. The ultimate outcome of the mission is yet un- known in the West, but it was undoubtedly less than successful. Yet another L-1 deep space test flight was launched on April 22, 1968. This time the PROTON booster's second stage failed at an altitude of about forty kilometers (about 130,000 feet), effectively ending the mission. Over the course of thirteen months, the four- stage version of the PROTON failed four times and succeeded only once. If a human was going to fly on this rocket, it had to be made much more reliable. At the same time, manned missions using the L-2 were about to begin. As a prelude to the twin L-2 flights with a crew exchange, it was decided to try a simple manned docking first. An unmanned L-2 would be launched into orbit, followed the next day by an L-2 carrying a single cosmonaut. The two spacecraft would first rendezvous and then dock. After a couple of orbits the two would separate and continue on separate missions, returning to Earth after about three days in orbit. On August 28, what would have been SOYUZ 2 was launched into Earth orbit. Days passed and the manned L-2 was never launched. The unmanned L-2, now named KOSMOS 238, returned from orbit after almost four days in space. On October 25, the Soviets tried again with the launch of another L-2 into orbit. The next day, SOYUZ 2 was joined in orbit by SOYUZ 3, piloted by cosmonaut Georgi Beregovoi. During the first orbit, SOYUZ 3 came to within 180 meters (590 feet) of SOYUZ 2 using automatic sys- tems. Beregovoi then manually took the two spacecraft to within a few meters but never actually docked. The two spacecraft drifted 565 kilometers (351 miles) apart by the next day before SOYUZ 3 closed in on SOYUZ 2 again: And again they did not dock. Afterwards, the spacecraft entered separate orbits. After four days in space both vehicles successfully landed. The L-2 design had proved to be human- worthy, but it appeared that there was still more to be learned about docking. As the L-1 circumlunar program was gearing up for its final push, U.S. intelligence learned about the Soviet mission to send a manned spacecraft around the Moon. As a result of this information, American officials changed their plans: Originally, the first flight to the Moon was not planned until early to mid-1969, when the Lunar Module would be tested in lunar orbit. It was now clear that the Soviets planned to send a man on a circumlunar mission as soon as they had at least two successful tests of the L-1. This could happen any time during the last quarter of 1968. During this time a manned test of the Lunar Module would be out of the question; it simply was not yet ready. Sending just the APOLLO Command/Service Modules on a circum- lunar or better yet a true lunar orbit mission was possible. APOLLO 6, which used a SATURN 5 in a test flight on April 6, 1968, had experi- enced some technical problems, but they seemed to be under control. If those problems could be solved and the upcoming APOLLO 7 manned Earth orbit test was successful, it would be decided that NASA (Nat- ional Aeronautics and Space Administration) could send APOLLO 8 to the Moon in late December. The race was on! On September 15, 1968, the Soviets launched ZOND 5 on the first unmanned circumlunar flight of a spacecraft. The PROTON launch vehicle worked flawlessly. The ZOND 5 capsule carried a biological payload of plants, turtles, flies, and meal worms, as well as a camera to take high-resolution photographs of the Moon's "farside" for later develo- ping on Earth. On its outward journey, ZOND 5 made a course correc- tion at a distance of 325,000 kilometers (202,000 miles). On September 18, it passed within 1,950 kilometers (1,210 miles) of the Moon and headed back to Earth. ZOND 5 made one more course refinement at a distance of 143,000 kilometers (89,000 miles) on its long fall home. Once the spacecraft reached Earth, it would fly over the continent of Antarctica and skip off the atmosphere over the Indian Ocean, losing just enough speed to enter a suborbital trajectory that would result in a final re-entry and landing over Soviet territory. Sometime before this maneuver, failure struck again: The astro-orientation system, which was essential to steer the re-entry module during this skip-glide re-entry, malfunctioned. As a result of this error, ZOND 5 made an unplanned ballistic re-entry, which resulted in ten to sixteen G-loads, much higher than the four to seven G-loads in the skip-glide re-entry. The result was that ZOND 5 landed on September 21 in the southern Indian Ocean far off course. Despite the rough re-entry, ZOND 5 survived intact and was soon picked up by the tracking ship BOROVICHIY. The craft was then transferred to the Soviet oceanography ship VASILIY GOLOVIN, which had it in Bombay Harbor by October 4. ZOND 5 was then transferred to an An-12. The aircraft then finished the trip to the Soviet Union. On October 11, 1968, APOLLO 7 was successfully launched into Earth orbit. After a virtually flawless eleven-day flight, the way was clear for the launch of APOLLO 8 on December 21 for a lunar orbit mission. After examining the results of the ZOND 5 mission, the Soviets launched one last unmanned test. ZOND 6 was successfully placed into a lunar trajectory on November 10. Its mission and payload were virtually identical to that of ZOND 5. On November 12, ZOND 6 came within 2,420 kilometers (1,500 miles) of the Moon and successfully executed a skip-glide re-entry, resulting in a landing in the Soviet Union on November 17. Finally, the way was clear for a manned L-1 circumlunar flight. The race would be close: The launch window for the American mission opened on December 21. For the Soviets, celestial mechanics dictated an earlier launch window between December 7 and 9 for the L-1 mission. The spacecraft and its PROTON booster were rolled out of the assembly building on December 1. Cosmonaut Valeriy Bykovsky was chosen to pilot what was planned to be humanity's first flight to the Moon. Out on the launch pad, problems developed with the L-1. The launch was scrubbed twice before time ran out. The problem with the L-1 could not be fixed before the window closed. On December 21, APOLLO 8 lifted off to a flawless mission into lunar orbit, carrying astronauts Frank Borman, James Lovell, and William Anders. The Soviets lost the first goal in the race to the Moon. Since a simple manned circumlunar mission would look second-rate compared to APOLLO 8's ten orbits of the Moon, future manned L-1 flights were dropped. The program would instead be used as develop- ment flights for future L-2 lunar missions. In late December of 1968, the now repaired L-1 was rolled back out onto the launch pad, this time for an unmanned mission. On January 5, 1969, the L-1 lifted off on top of its PROTON booster. Upon the ignition of the second stage, the PROTON unexpectedly exploded. The L-1's launch escape system failed to function and the rocket and spacecraft were destroyed. If there had been a pilot on board, he would have undoubtedly been killed. Progress on L-2 flights was stepped up. The Soviets needed more experience in space with the L-2 and quickly. For the first time the Soviets launched a manned mission in the midst of the Central Asian winter. On January 14, 1969, SOYUZ 4 was launched with cosmonaut Vladimir Shatalov on board. The next day, SOYUZ 5, with Boris Volynov, Yevgeniy Khrunov, and Aleksey Yeliseyev, joined Shatalov in orbit. Moving slowly, the two spacecraft came closer. The next day, on live Soviet television, the two spacecraft docked. After waiting almost two years since the original SOYUZ 1/2 mission, Khrunov and Yeliseyev doned their space suits, depressurized SOYUZ 5's orbital module, and made an EVA to transfer to SOYUZ 4. In thirty-seven min- utes, they had safely transferred. After spending four and one-half hours docked, the two SOYUZ spacecraft separated. SOYUZ 4 landed the next day, followed by SOYUZ 5 the day after. After almost a year and one-half delay, the N-1 Moon rocket was ready for its first test flight. A successful test flight would put the Soviets in the running again for a Moon landing. The most power- ful rocket ever built smoothly lifted off from its pad at the Baika- nour Cosmodrome (Tyuratam Space Center) on February 3, 1969. One minute into the flight all looked well, but trouble soon developed. Ten seconds later, a fire broke out in the first stage's tail compart- ment, resulting in the engines shutting down. The now powerless rocket was destroyed by range safety officers. Along with the first N-1, the chances of beating the Americans to a manned Moon landing were all but destroyed. After the successful flight of APOLLO 8, the United States set up a rapid fire series of test flights to reach the Moon. No doubt they knew how close the Soviets really were in the race. In the first quarter of 1969, the U.S. would test the Lunar Module in Earth orbit. In the second quarter, they would test the Lunar Module in lunar orbit. Finally, in the third quarter, they would land on the Moon. The Soviets knew that the earliest they could land on the Moon while still adequately testing their hardware was 1971. If any one of the American test flights failed, they might still be in the running. Just in case they did succeed, a new plan was devised. It was decided that for the time being all manned activities using the SOYUZ would be geared towards the development of an Earth-orbiting space station. This experience, when needed, would still be useful for a lunar mission. Development and unmanned testing of lunar hard- ware would continue in the hope that the American effort would fail or at least falter. Finally, there was the Soviets' ace in the hole: An unmanned lunar sample return mission. The Babakin Design Bureau, which designed and built the previous generation of Soviet lunar spacecraft, had been developing a series of new unmanned lunar spacecraft to be used in conjunction with a manned lunar exploration effort, or as its replacement if schedules slipped by many years. The hardware for an unmanned sample return mission was ready by the beginning of 1969. If the Soviets could not be the ones to place the first man on the Moon, perhaps they could return the first soil samples from the Moon, robbing the Americans of one of their lunar mission justifications. This would be an important propaganda vic- tory for the Soviets and could also help slow down the American Moon landing program. On January 19, 1969, the first of the new LUNA spacecraft was launched by the same four stage version of the PROTON as was used by the L-1. Unfortunately, LUNA had the same results that the L-1 often had: The PROTON failed to reach even an Earth parking orbit. In March, regional politics began to take its toll on the Soviet Moon program. On March 3, Soviet and Chinese troops clashed on the Ussuri River. By March 9, Soviet forces in the Far East were put on full alert; on March 14, the Chinese assumed a similar posture. Five days later, the two sides clashed again along the Ussuri River. As a result of this emergency, the Soviet military took control of many civilian space facilities and personnel, including those involved with the now faltering Moon program. Over the course of four months, over one dozen photoreconnaissance satellites were launched to observe Chinese troop and equipment movements. By early May, both the Soviets and Chinese were moving in their nuclear weapons. All this had a severe impact on the Soviets' efforts to send a spacecraft of any sort to the Moon. Meanwhile, on March 3, NASA successfully launched APOLLO 9 into Earth orbit to test the Lunar Module. On April 15, a second attempt by the Soviets to launch an unmanned lunar sample return mission failed as a result of a PROTON vehicle failure. On May 18, APOLLO 10 was launched and successfully tested the Lunar Module in lunar orbit. On June 12, yet another Soviet sample return mission was launched and failed. The Soviet effort was weakening miserably. The United States set a mid-July launch date for their first manned lunar landing attempt. The Soviets had just one more chance to upstage it. The second N-1 Moon rocket was brought out to the launch pad in June of 1969. It may have been yet another simple test of the booster, but for years rumors circulated about an impending Soviet space spectacular that would have upstaged the Americans. According to the rumors, this N-1 would carry the first L-3 lunar cabin into Earth orbit, where it would be joined by a fully manned L-2. The launch window would allow for a course to the Moon two weeks before the American mission. The L-2/L-3 combination would then leave for the Moon, where the L-3 would be tested in a similar fashion as the American Lunar Module was tested in lunar orbit during the APOLLO 10 mission. The L-3 test, like APOLLO 10, would bring the lunar cabin close to the surface but no landing would be made. Meanwhile, just a few days before the launch of APOLLO 11 on July 16, an unmanned lunar sample return mission window would open and another unmanned spacecraft would be launched as the L-2 was return- ing home. This mission would pick up a lunar sample and return it to Earth just before APOLLO 11 arrived home with its precious cargo. If the APOLLO mission was successful, the full details of the two missions could be kept ambiguous and humanity could be led to think that the Soviets had landed men on the Moon first and had the genuine lunar samples to prove it. If the APOLLO 11 mission failed, they could be more candid: Their manned lunar mission put them at par with the Americans and their unmanned program was able to obtain lunar sam- ples until the Soviets were ready for a manned landing. Either way, the Soviets would end up with the first lunar soil samples and upstage the Americans. At least that was the rumor. On July 3, the thirty engines of the giant N-1 were started. Before it could lift itself off the pad, a liquid oxygen pump on one of the engines broke. The N-1 exploded with the force of a small nuclear bomb, destroying the rocket, whatever payload it carried, and its launch pad. In addition, the powerful explosion heavily cratered a second N-1 pad some distance away. It was a devastating loss. It would take at least eighteen months to two years to rebuild the N-1 launch facilities. Barring a catastrophe of similar proportions in the American program, the U.S. would almost surely be the first to place a human on the Moon. Meanwhile, several kilometers away from the N-1 disaster, another unmanned sample return spacecraft was being prepared. On July 13, just three days before the launch of APOLLO 11, LUNA 15 was success- fully placed on course to the Moon. It entered a 55 by 203-kilometer (34 by 126-mile) orbit around the Moon on July 17, just as APOLLO 11 was nearing its halfway point to Earth's natural satellite. Over the next four days, LUNA 15 was carefully maneuvered into a lower and lower orbit in preparation for its landing. Finally, just after APOLLO 11 landed on the Moon on July 20, LUNA 15's engines ignited and the probe began its long descent to the lunar surface. Four minutes later, LUNA 15 crashed into Mare Crisium (Sea of Crises) at a speed of 480 kilo- meters per hour (300 miles per hour). The final Soviet attempt to literally "scoop" the United States had failed. That night in 1969 almost every country on Earth televised astronauts Neil Armstrong and Edwin "Buzz" Aldrin's first steps on the Moon, the exceptions being China and the Soviet Union. By July 24, the crew of APOLLO 11 had safely returned to Earth. The Americans had won the race to the Moon. Having lost the race to the Moon, the Soviets shifted the emphasis of their space program. All future manned flights of the L-2 would be in support of the space station program, known as SALYUT. Future flights of the L-1 and L-3 were to be used solely as technology demonstration flights. There could still be an opportunity to use this hardware for a manned lunar landing, if the Kremlin saw some sort of political advantage in such a mission. All future flights to the Moon by the Soviets would otherwise be unmanned. Efforts would con- tinue to get the unmanned lunar sample return hardware to work. In addition, this same hardware would be modified for future flights so that not only could sample return missions be flown, but also missions to land an unmanned, long-duration rover on the lunar surface, and for placing payloads in lunar orbit. Development of the N-1 would continue. Such a heavy lift capability could be used not only for a possible Moon mission, but also to orbit a one hundred-ton space station that could compete with the U.S. space station, SKYLAB. Two additional flights of the L-1 were flown after the successful APOLLO 11 mission. ZOND 7 was launched on August 8, 1969, where it flew by the Moon and landed on Soviet soil after a skip-glide re-entry one week later. ZOND 8 was launched over one year later on October 27, 1970. It followed a mission profile similar that of its predecessors, but made its re-entry over the Arctic, so that it could be monitored from the Soviet Union. As a result, ZOND 8 made a landing in the In- dian Ocean. Unlike ZOND 5, this landing was planned. Unknown to the West at the time (and possibly many of the Soviet scientists and engi- neers as well), this was to be the last flight of the L-1. The L-3 lunar cabin was finally ready for flight testing in late 1969. The first L-3 was to be delivered on a PROTON launch vehicle and tested in Earth orbit. The first attempt, on November 16, 1969, failed due to yet another PROTON malfunction. A second attempt on February 6, 1970, failed for the same reason. Hoping to get at least some flight testing done, Soviet engineers switched to the more re- liable SOYUZ launch vehicle. Because of its lower lift capability, only the L-3 ascent stage could be carried into Earth orbit. On November 24, 1970, an L-3 ascent stage, named KOSMOS 379, was suc- cessfully placed into space. Over the next six days, the craft made a number of maneuvers to simulate a launch from the lunar surface and a series of communications tests using tape recorded voices. Eight days after the launch of KOSMOS 379, a complete L-3 was finally sent on a PROTON into Earth orbit. KOSMOS 382, as it was called, also made extensive maneuvers in Earth orbit, simulating a descent and ascent from the Moon. Two additional tests of the L-3 ascent stage were made: KOSMOS 398, launched on February 26, 1971, and KOSMOS 434, launched on August 12, 1971. Both test flights were successful, but like the L-1, the L-3 would never fly again. Efforts with the unmanned lunar soil sample return mission continued, at first with little success. KOSMOS 300 was launched on September 23, 1969, but the PROTON's escape stage failed to boost the probe to the Moon. KOSMOS 305, launched on October 22, suffered a similar fate. A third attempt, launched on February 19, 1970, never made it to Earth orbit. Finally, on September 12, 1970, LUNA 16 was placed on a trajectory to the Moon. It safely landed on the Moon in the Sea of Fertility eight days later, where it recovered a small sample of soil. After a smooth liftoff from the lunar surface, the return capsule of LUNA 16 landed in Soviet territory on September 20. The probe had made the first automated soil return from another world in history. The Soviet unmanned lunar exploration effort was finally under way again. During this same time, rebuilding of the N-1 launch facilities and modifications to the N-1 itself continued. On June 24, 1971, the booster was ready for another test flight. All thirty first-stage engines ignited and the rocket slowly lifted off the pad. Unexpectedly, the giant rocket began to roll. The radio guidance link with the still climbing N-1 was severed. Its guidance input now gone, the N-1 toppled over after only seven seconds of flight. The N-1 pad and facilities were once again damaged but not destroyed, as in the last flight. As before, the Soviet launch facilities were repaired and the new problems with the N-1 were corrected. On November 23, 1972, the fourth N-1 lifted off from its pad at Baikonur. This time the rocket passed the seventy second mark when the first N-1 was destroyed. All finally seemed to be going well. About one hundred seconds into the 150-second first-stage burn, the engines began to throttle back as programmed to keep the rocket from shaking itself apart. Then, just seven seconds later, a malfunction occurred in the rocket's tail section and the N-1 was destroyed. While the N-1 failures were dis- heartening, the engineers were not surprised by them. It was all too common for the first few flights of a new rocket to fail. All one could do was learn from these failures, correct the problems, and try again. Everyone involved was confident that the N-1 would finally operate as desired. Two more N-1 rockets were prepared, one to be tested in August of 1974, the other by the end of the same year. Even the most pessimistic engineers and managers felt certain that the N-1 would be operational by 1976. Politics were to interfere again. The Kremlin slowly began to squeeze the funding for the N-1 program. At first, Mishin was forced to slow down, then freeze work on the giant rocket. Finally, in May of 1974, Brezhnev removed Mishin from his post with no explanation. The new head of the Korolev Design Bureau was the nemesis of the N-1 project, Glushko. One of his first actions was to cancel the entire N-1 project. The two assembled N-1 rockets were dismantled and sold for scrap. By this time, as a result of the American success with high-energy cryogenic propellants, Glushko changed his mind about the usefulness of liquid hydrogen as a fuel. He set about a new develop- ment program to build a heavy lift rocket, not only to replace the N-1, but also launch the Soviet's version of a space shuttle. This new launch vehicle ultimately was called ENERGIA, but it was not to make its first flight until 1987. This marked change in policy left Kuznetsov in a bad position. He desperately wanted to prove that his engines could do the job. Anxious to regain prestige for himself and his design bureau, Kuznetsov continued static testing of the N-1 engines through 1976. By the end of the test program, the engines had accumulated almost four hours of successful operation, one hundred times more than they needed to operate in a typical N-1 flight. While Kuznetsov may have proved that he could develop the engines, the N-1 project was nevertheless dead. Today, very little of the Soviet lunar landing program remains. The L-1 and L-2 hardware has been significantly modified and upgraded over the passing years. It is still used today as the SOYUZ TM manned ferry and unmanned PROGRESS cargo ship for supporting the Soviets' manned space station program, now entering its third decade. The L-3 hardware, or what is left of it, sits in university labs for study by engineering students. The PROTON is still in use today and is even being offered for international commercial launchings. The N-1 launch facilities were extensively modified and are now being used to launch the ENERGIA - much as the old APOLLO launch facilities at Cape Canaveral in Florida were rebuilt to support the American Space Shuttle program. In a small town outside of the Baikonur Cosmodrome, there sits perhaps the saddest reminder of the Soviets' manned Moon program: A strange awning protects a dance floor in the middle of a park. It is part of a fuel tank from one of the two N-1 rockets scrapped in 1974. The unmanned LUNA program was scaled back in 1973, after support for all lunar missions evaporated. The last Soviet lunar flight to date, LUNA 24, was made in 1976. After one and one half decades of work and 4.5 billion rubles spent, this is all that remains of the Soviets' contribution to the race to the Moon. Soviet missions to Earth's satellite do not appear to be entire- ly at an end, however. There are currently plans to send a PHOBOS class probe to orbit the Moon in 1992, where it will map the lunar surface in detail and collect selenophysical information. Missions to return soil samples from the lunar farside, perhaps in tandem with advanced automated rovers - once discussed in the early 1970s - may be reactivated again. There has also been talk of the Soviets eventually sending cosmo- nauts to the Moon, perhaps with other nations to start the construction of permanent lunar bases. Should this come to pass, then the work done by those Soviet engineers in the race to place humans on the Moon will finally be completed, though more properly as a beneficial tie between the former contenders. Bibliography - Baker, David, THE HISTORY OF MANNED SPACE FLIGHT, 1981 Clark, Phillip S., THE SOVIET MANNED SPACE PROGRAM, 1988 Clark, Phillip S., "Correspondence: The PROTON Block D Stage and the N-1 Booster", SPACEFLIGHT (BIS), June 1990 Clark, Phillip S., "Soviet Rocket Engine Review", SPACEFLIGHT, July 1990 Gatland, Kenneth, THE ILLUSTRATED ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 1981 and 1988 Harvey, Brian, "Promise Unfulfilled: The Soviet Unmanned Moon Programme, 1969-1988", JOURNAL OF THE BRITISH INTERPLANETARY SOCIETY (JBIS), Volume 43, Number 9, 1990 Harvey, Brian, RACE INTO SPACE: THE SOVIET SPACE PROGRAM, 1988 Hendricks, Bart, "Correspondence: Soviet Moon Rocket's Sad Fate", SPACEFLIGHT, December 1989 Johnson, Nicholas L., HANDBOOK OF SOVIET LUNAR AND PLANETARY EXPLORATION, 1979 Johnson, Nicholas L., HANDBOOK OF SOVIET MANNED SPACE FLIGHT, 1980 Johnson, Nicholas L., SOVIET SPACE PROGRAMS 1980-85, 1987 Johnson, Nicholas L., THE SOVIET YEAR IN SPACE 1989, 1990 Kidger, Neville, "Glasnost and the Moon", SPACEFLIGHT, October 1989 Newkirk, Dennis, ALMANAC OF SOVIET MANNED SPACE FLIGHT, 1990 Oberg, James E., RED STAR IN ORBIT, 1981 Pesavento, Peter, "Soviets to the Moon: The Untold Story", ASTRONOMY, December 1984 Pesavento, Peter, "A Review of Rumored Launch Failures in the Soviet Manned Program, Part 2: The Lunar Project/1968-1969", JBIS, Volume 43, Number 9, 1990 Young, Steven, "Soviet Union Was Far Behind in 1960s Moon Race", SPACEFLIGHT, January 1990 "Designer Mishin Speaks on Early Soviet Space Programmes and the Manned Lunar Project", SPACEFLIGHT, March 1990 "Soviet Lunar Lander Revealed", SPACEFLIGHT, July 1990 "Soviet Manned Lunar Mission Used Modified SOYUZ Spacecraft" AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY, January 8, 1990 "Soviet Moon Flight Admission", SPACEFLIGHT, September 1989 "VOSKHOD 2 Flight Recalled", SPACEFLIGHT, June 1990 About the Author - Andrew J. LePage is a member of the Boston Group for the Study of the Soviet Space Program, Krasnaya Orbita. In addition to his interests in astronomical and space related topics, Andrew has been a serious observer of the Soviet space program for over one decade. Andrew is the author of the following EJASA articles: "Mars 1994", March 1990 "The Great Moon Race: The Soviet Story, Part One", December 1990 THE ELECTRONIC JOURNAL OF THE ASTRONOMICAL SOCIETY OF THE ATLANTIC January 1991 - Vol. 2, No. 6 Copyright (c) 1991 - ASA ------------------------------ End of SPACE Digest V13 #034 *******************