Date: Mon, 14 Dec 92 05:10:55 From: Space Digest maintainer Reply-To: Space-request@isu.isunet.edu Subject: Space Digest V15 #545 To: Space Digest Readers Precedence: bulk Space Digest Mon, 14 Dec 92 Volume 15 : Issue 545 Today's Topics: SSF Progress 1 of 2 (Was: One small step Space Activist) SSF Progress 2 of 2 (Was: One small step Space Activist) Welcome to the Space Digest!! Please send your messages to "space@isu.isunet.edu", and (un)subscription requests of the form "Subscribe Space " to one of these addresses: listserv@uga (BITNET), rice::boyle (SPAN/NSInet), utadnx::utspan::rice::boyle (THENET), or space-REQUEST@isu.isunet.edu (Internet). ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Date: 13 Dec 92 21:21:54 From: Wales.Larrison@ofa123.fidonet.org Subject: SSF Progress 1 of 2 (Was: One small step Space Activist) Newsgroups: sci.space Allen Sherzer writes: >First, is a Space News story about the progress (or lack thereof) >in Work Package 02 (the truss structure) of SS Freedom. In Dec. >1987 NASA awarded a $1.8 billion contract to McDonnell Douglas. >Nine months later when the final contract was signed, the price had >gone up to $2.6 billion. Four years later, as a result of cost >overruns, Work Package 02 now weighs in at $4.9 billion -- A 250% >increase during a time when funding and design for Freedom was >relatively stable. Hmm.... I'm not going to dispute these numbers, but there's a distinct difference between "cost overruns" and "customer directed changes". If you go back to that Space News Article (Dec 7-13, 1992), it should be noted of that increase, only about $216 M is actually in dispute between NASA and McDonnell Douglas. That's only about 4.5 %. Furthermore, a large chunk of these overrun costs seem to be in General & Administrative cost categories (G&A), not in the technical work performed. Now, funding and design for the SSF has not been rock stable either for the past 4 years. I seem to remember at least 3 of the 4 budget requests being cut, funding restrictions placed on a couple, and a major Congressional-directed redesign of the SSF. As part of that redesign, the truss structure which MD was re-designing was totally changed to meet the Congressional redesign. I'm not apologising for MD, but I would like to present some data from the other side of the story. What Allen didn't report, and what I see just as significant, was that SN reported the NASA Inspector General had started a separate audit to see if the restructuring of the Work Package 2 contract was done properly by NASA JSC. >Worse yet, Work Package 02 is as much as 18 months behind schedule. >McDonnell Douglas recently informed NASA that it can provide only >700 of the 2,700 drawings promised before the next design review. >This action (or lack) will ripple down the PERT charts and could >add up to billions more in cost overruns as other contractors are >forced to mark time waiting for Work package 02's outputs. Actually, the wording in the SN article is "The company informed NASA earlier this year that it could provide 700 drawings before a design review begins next year, but under NASA pressure agreed to provide 2700, NASA officials said. Only 1100 are needed for the design review, according to Parkinson [The MD general manager for space station project control], so MD will exceed that target." Later on, the SN article sez "Aaron [The space station program manager at JSC] said that some aspects of the work package are about a month behind, but denied there is any lag on the order of 18 months in his portion of the program. 'I'm very upbeat", he added. "McDonnell Douglas is coming along well." Within the article, there are two conflicting sets of data reported -- and I'd like to point out there is another side of this situation to what Allen reported. In my opinion the real make or break for MD will be how MD conducts itself at the work package 2 Critical Design Review (CDR) this coming year. At CDR, they are contractually required to have for review 90% of all detailed drawings, and this CDR is the primary go/nogo gate for full gohead on manufacturing of flight articles. I've organized and run CDRs for NASA contracts, and it's not a simple task to organize the data and run the design review. MD also should have completed all their subcontract CDRs before that date. From my limited contacts with their subcontractors -- I have seem subcontract CDRs underway, including one this month. >Congresses' fault? Not this time. Most of the overruns and delays >have happened at a time when Freedom has seen very stable funding >and little design interference. See my comments above. A Congressionally-mandated major redesign and annual funding holds and restrictions don't seem to be "very stable funding and little design interference." (Continued in next message) --- Maximus 2.00 ------------------------------ Date: 13 Dec 92 21:23:28 From: Wales.Larrison@ofa123.fidonet.org Subject: SSF Progress 2 of 2 (Was: One small step Space Activist) Newsgroups: sci.space >The second problem looming is more ominous and insidious. For a >long time the Johnson Spaceflight Center (JSC) has been trying to >shut down the Reston Virginia Space Station Program Office and move >it to Houston. The recent creation of a contractor-led integration >team at Johnson called the Joint Vehicle Integration Team (we never >knew Freedom was a vehicle - did you?) may accomplish keeping the >Reston office in existence, but doing nothing, and moving all other >space station efforts to Johnson. > >JVIT, like many things, sounds like a great idea -- at first. It >would make the contractors responsible for the overall space >station project which is something many space activists have always >felt was needed. It would also tie fees to contractor performance, >which is also something desperately needed inside NASA. On the >other hand, is it appropriate for THIS project? The last time the >integration task was moved (for the creation of the Reston office) >it resulted in massive program slips. How can moving the >integration task to Johnson be anything but disruptive? Can the >program afford disruption now? One of the problems in the SSF program has been a lack of centralized coordination between the work packages. Reston was supposed to have accomplished that job, but has never been able to pull it off, for whatever reason. I've seen several press reports that NASA/Reston and their contractor Grumman have been chewed out several times over the past several years for not being able to do their job. Now, it appears that NASA has given up on Reston, and is moving the integration responsibilities directly to the folks doing the work -- the contractors -- rather than having integration and verification activities be funnelled through NASA contracts and centers up to Reston, and then back down to another NASA center and contractor. In general, this is the way it should have been done in the first place -- through a prime contractor or industrial consortium. Is it appropriate for this project? Hell yes. The only alternative was Reston, and they've shown they couldn't hack the job. Among other things, the SN article Allen was using said some amount of the MD Work Package 2 overrun was due to setting up a WP2 facility for verifying hardware. With a joint vehicle integration team, one of the things that can be reduced is the need for every workpackage to set up integration and verification facilities for each separate workpackage. That should reduce cost and help control some of these overruns by eliminating duplication of effort and help produce a better product. Is this joint integration and verification activity a disruption? Heck no. What is the alternative? Having separate pieces not be put together and not verified or integrated until they get on orbit? THAT is a recipe for disaster. Will the integration and verification team find problems? Yes, undoubtedly -- that's their job to find where hardware, software, and procedures don't match, and to try to figure out the best way the program parts will come together before launch, and to make sure they continue to work once launched. I think I ought to end this by pointing out that the management model used for SSF was the Hubble Space Telescope program. Besides problems with the mirror verification tests, there were serious integration problems between the GSFC and the MSFC work packages. I've also thought that the work package structure for SSF was a recipe for technical disaster. The JVIT is a step in the right direction. I just hope it's enough to prevent a piece of hardware from one work package showing up on orbit, and then not finding it works with a piece of hardware already on orbit from another work package. I would have preferred a single prime contractor and a single prime lead center. I was hoping this would be Reston, but that didn't happen. ---------------------------------------------------------------- Wales Larrison Space Technology Investor --- Maximus 2.00 ------------------------------ End of Space Digest Volume 15 : Issue 545 ------------------------------