Date: Tue, 15 Dec 92 05:00:04 From: Space Digest maintainer Reply-To: Space-request@isu.isunet.edu Subject: Space Digest V15 #546 To: Space Digest Readers Precedence: bulk Space Digest Tue, 15 Dec 92 Volume 15 : Issue 546 Today's Topics: absolutely, positively overnight DC vs Shuttle capabilities (2 msgs) DoD launcher use fast-track failures Mach 8+ Space/Spy Plane? Sea Dragon? Space Tourism SSF Progress SSF Progress 1 of 2 (Was: One small step Space Activist) Terminal Velocity of DCX? (was Re: Shuttle ...) Titan IV Titan IV Costs (2 msgs) What is a VSAT? what the little bird told Henry (2 msgs) Welcome to the Space Digest!! Please send your messages to "space@isu.isunet.edu", and (un)subscription requests of the form "Subscribe Space " to one of these addresses: listserv@uga (BITNET), rice::boyle (SPAN/NSInet), utadnx::utspan::rice::boyle (THENET), or space-REQUEST@isu.isunet.edu (Internet). ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Date: 14 Dec 92 17:22:52 GMT From: "Edward V. Wright" Subject: absolutely, positively overnight Newsgroups: sci.space In henry@zoo.toronto.edu (Henry Spencer) writes: >I don't seriously expect that a DC-1 would ever become Air Force One, >actually. Not because it's dangerous, but because it's too *small*, >and because servicing facilities for it won't be nearly as common as >those for 747s for a long time. But I rather suspect it would be rather >less than twenty years before the president rides in one. He *is* the >boss, after all... "Air Force One" is just a call sign for whatever plane the President happens to be riding in. The Air Force has an entire squadron of planes which, at one time or another, may be Air Force One. The big 707 (now 747) is the most famous, but not every trip requires something that large. A DC-type vehicle would probably find use because it would allow certain types of diplomatic missions that are impossible today. Remember shuttle diplomacy? If the President, or one of his advisors, can fly halfway across the globe, attend a top-level meeting, and return to Washington, all in one afternoon, I think that's a capability that would be used. If nothing else, it would allow short-notice meetings to be held before the press figured out what was going on. ------------------------------ Date: 14 Dec 92 17:33:48 GMT From: "Edward V. Wright" Subject: DC vs Shuttle capabilities Newsgroups: sci.space In <3kf2v=-@rpi.edu> kentm@aix.rpi.edu (Michael V. Kent) writes: >Delta Clipper's projected 2-day on-orbit time is too short for Spacehab >work, especially if you have a space station. The two-day endurance is based on consumables. You could extend it considerably by carrying extra consumables in lieu of some cargo (or docking with a second DC acting in a consumables-tanker role). ------------------------------ Date: 14 Dec 92 17:59:34 GMT From: "Allen W. Sherzer" Subject: DC vs Shuttle capabilities Newsgroups: sci.space In article strider@clotho.acm.rpi.edu (Greg Moore) writes: > You missed my point. If your crew compartment is in the cargo >bay, where do you put the satellite? First of all, which crew? The flight crew rides in the cockpit which is above the cargo bay. If more crew are needed, then the satellite can ride in the part of the cargo bay not used by the extra crew. If it turns out that this isn't roomy enough, then you use the technology developed under DC to build a larger vehicle. After all, DC will be a usefull piece of technology but it isn't the only spaceship which will ever be built. > I eliminated some stuff above, but wanted to add some stuff here. >Actually, plummeting launch costs may contribute to lower payload costs >since people will be willing to build a less fault tolerant system >knowing that if it fails, they can launch another cheaply. Exactly. >As for on-site repair, for now DC-? fails for the same reason that >the Shuttle normally does, it can't get up to GEO, you need a OTV... Although a DC with a robot arm and some avionics changes may be the OTV. Certainly the engines for a DC will be just what an OTV needs. >>> Also, as for retrieval, the Shuttle has shown that it ain't >>>easy to do. Will a two day on-orbit time be enough? >>It may take modifications to the DC. At the very least you need to add >>a robot arm and an airlock. > Granted, but that's not what I meant. Will you have enough time >to rendevous and capture the satelite? It took what 3 days for the >shuttle to capture Intelsat VI? That's aday more than DC-?. Load the pallet with some extra power sources, add some solar cells and your all set. >Also, what type of fuel margin would DC-1 have for IN-orbit >manevours? DC-Y has a fair amount of fuel for on orbit delta V but I don't remember the exact numbers. How much DC has will depend on the design requirements and who pays the bills. But note that on a DC-Y you can power the fuel cells, main engines, and RCS from the same source. This allows you some very powerful tradeoffs. >(I realize it has enough for landing, and of course >you don't wnt to cut into that for safety reasons.) At least enough to get back to the orbital fuel dump. > Use it yes, but use it for what it can be used for economically. >Let's see, we've added an airlock, an arm, additional on-orbit capacity. >Hmm, that adds up, and add complexity. Yes, let's ok at possibilities, >but not claim t they are definites. Agreed. But they don't look all that hard given a working DC. >>My view is that we use the basic DC as a 'bus' which can be modified in >>small ways to meet diverse missions. Costs are cut because the same assembly >>lines are used to make DC1-EOT (Earth orbit transfer), DC1-OMV, and DC1-LM. > I have a question about this. EOT and LM should require roughly >the same amount of fuel, no? Pretty much. >But how economical is it to transport that fuel TO orbit? Am I correct in >remembering you saying about 10 DC-1 flights? Yes it would take roughly 10 DC flights to carry up the fuel. Soon however the availability of lunar oxygen and perhaps hydrogen will greatly reduce that cost. The bottom line however is that it is still a lot cheaper than the current plans. > Also, does it make sense for the DC1-EOT and OMV and LM the same. Not 100% the same. For an OMV I would strip off the thermal protection system, add attach points outside for additional fuel and hardware (like arms), I might look at lining it with solar cells for more power. For a LM I think you would need to provide better insulation to reduce fuel boil off, replace the landing gear to give it a larger footprint (like the Apollo LM), and beef up the TPS for aerobreaking. This will allow us to use the same core vehicle for multiple applications which will allow development to be amortized over more vehicles and reduce construction costs since we are building more core vehicles. Allen -- +---------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | Allen W. Sherzer | "A great man is one who does nothing but leaves | | aws@iti.org | nothing undone" | +----------------------131 DAYS TO FIRST FLIGHT OF DCX----------------------+ ------------------------------ Date: 14 Dec 92 14:41:35 GMT From: Gary Coffman Subject: DoD launcher use Newsgroups: sci.space In article <1992Dec13.212814.14887@iti.org> aws@iti.org (Allen W. Sherzer) writes: >In article <1992Dec13.183545.9958@ke4zv.uucp> gary@ke4zv.UUCP (Gary Coffman) writes: >>We're talking about Iraq right? No air opposition right? Complete Coalition >>domination of the airspace right? > >I would hate to base all US defense donctrine on the assumption that ALL air >wars will be just like Iraq. BTW, despite our domination of the air, coalition >aircraft WHERE shot down. I agree that not all conflicts will be as easy as the Gulf War and that satellite recon is very valuable, especially for strategic recon. But the origninal message that I questioned said that the Space Command commander during *Desert Storm* said he needed tactical satellite recon *for that conflict*. And yes, A10s and Tornados doing low level attacks were lost to ground fire in Desert Storm as well as a few other operational type aircraft like an AC130, but as far as I know, no recon aircraft were lost. >For many applications satellites are more productive. They provide faster >responce and allow scarse aricraft to be better utilized. see below >>What can a satellite do for tactical recon that a SR71 can't? > >Updates of the tactical situation with SR-71 would take about 6 to 8 hours >to get and would be several hours old by the time they get to the local >commanders. Satellite images take seconds to get and are fresh. In the Gulf >war, images just a few hours old would have been useless. But this was exactly my point. LEO satellites pass over the same ground track twice a day. So if you need pictures of a given battlefield, you wait for the satellite to pass over the spot, up to 24 hours if you need a daylight picture, up to 12 hours if you'll take any picture. Then, unless you have realtime downlink in the footprint of the satellite, very close to your target, you wait for the satellite to pass over your downlink station and download the image. This can take up to another 12 hours. You can launch ramp ready recon aircraft in 10 minutes if necessary, though normally you'd schedule recon as part of an operational timetable. You can get back immediate Mark I eyeball reports during the mission and photos as soon as the aircraft returns. To return tactical target data, like a damage report on a bridge, you need fairly high resolution. With a satellite, that's KH-11 or KH-12 class optics. That's still too expensive to toss up on whim for a one shot look. Aircraft with mounted optics of much less precision and cost, due to the lower altitude, can get a picture and come back to base to be used again and again. Now if the threat level over the target is *really* high so that not even a SR71 or F117 has a chance of survival, and the information is vital, then you could expend a KH-12 class satellite to gather it. Seems that if DC-1 works, you'd just use *it* so you could get your expensive optics back instead of expending a satellite. I know there's lots of interest in lightsats and microsats for intelligence gathering, but to date none have flown with the level of optics needed for damage assessment on a tactical level. I'm guessing they *can't* because the optical platform has to be too large. But that kind of information is classified so I can't say that for sure. A GEO satellite with superb optics might be able to give you realtime data, but that's not a DC-1 payload. That's at least a Titan IV payload and a large ground support center to operate the satellite and process the data. It's certainly not something you throw up on whim for tactical data gathering, it's a major national resource costing at least as much as Hubble. Even if the launch were free, it would still be very expensive. Gary ------------------------------ Date: 14 Dec 92 14:53:51 GMT From: Gary Coffman Subject: fast-track failures Newsgroups: sci.space In article henry@zoo.toronto.edu (Henry Spencer) writes: > >Just which aircraft were you thinking of, Gary? I can think of one >aircraft that had a bad performance shortfall but was redesigned and >continued into a successful program (the F-102). I can't think of >*any* F-series "gap" in the last 40 years that fits your description. Yeah, bad line of argument, most of the systems that made it as far as being assigned a number weren't technical failures even if they were market failures. Actually I was thinking of the P-39 when I wrote that. That aircraft made it into production, but was a dismal failure at meeting it's procurement goals. It started out as a 5,000 pound turbosupercharged high performance all altitude fighter and was sold to the Air Corps as such. But by the time it was delivered, it was 50% overweight, had the turbosupercharger deleted, had poor rate of climb, and a low service ceiling. This was an example of fast tracking from a prototype to production without working out all the bugs required to make it a practical fighter. Gary ------------------------------ Date: 14 Dec 92 15:58:06 GMT From: Kenneth D Rolt Subject: Mach 8+ Space/Spy Plane? Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics,sci.space Rich Silva [rich@locus.com] wrote: >I was in Joshua Tree national forest last May when I saw a plane in the upper >atmosphere fly across the sky about as fast as metors do I didn't here any >sonic booms but I't couldn't have been a jet airliner it was moving too fast >I did notice it's contrail was lumpy like -+-+-+-+-+-+ like a pulse. a possible reason why you didn't hear anything {i.e. no sonic boom, and no thrust noise} was that the sound from the mach cone and from the jet was refracted too much away from the ground due to a sound speed profile in the atmosphere: the sound speed for the *aircraft* altitude was slower than the speed of sound on the ground, so the sound waves refracted enough for you to be in an acoustical shadow zone. the same phenomenon exists in the ocean. of course, maybe you really didn't see anything at all :) -ken ----------------------------------------------------------------- | R 2 Real Monza kdrolt@athena.mit.edu | | |__| grad student !! | | | | '64 Corvair Convertible mit ocean engineering | | 1 3 underwater sound | ----------------------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------ Date: 14 Dec 92 16:18:11 GMT From: Thomas Clarke Subject: Sea Dragon? Newsgroups: sci.space I see many references to Bob Truax's Sea Dragon design. Can anyone point me at a reference, or post a summary of the Sea Dragon? Thanks. -- Thomas Clarke Institute for Simulation and Training, University of Central FL 12424 Research Parkway, Suite 300, Orlando, FL 32826 (407)658-5030, FAX: (407)658-5059, clarke@acme.ucf.edu ------------------------------ Date: Mon, 14 Dec 1992 16:54:44 GMT From: Nick Haines Subject: Space Tourism Newsgroups: sci.space A bloke called (hmm, something like Drunken Loony, ah, I remember) Duncan Lunan did a presentation on space tourism (the economics and practicalities) at the Brighton Worldcon in 87. He had figures showing that at $1 million a head you could get at least $100 million for an orbital hotel (maybe it was $200m), without having to push the advertising too hard. If you can get the price down to $10000 you can get several $bn. Think it was Duncan Lunan (from Imperial (?) College, London). Ask around on the .sf. groups, I bet there are others there who remember the talk. Nick Haines nickh@cmu.edu ------------------------------ Date: Mon, 14 Dec 92 09:14:44 -0800 From: ganderson@force.decnet.lockheed.com Subject: SSF Progress I have to comment on the dialog between Allan S. and L.W. on the relative progress of MacDonnell Douglas' WP-02. I have missed some of the conversation but having read many of Alan's past missives and can't surmize the general bent of his comments. First of all, I agree with the rebultal that the Space Station budget and design has been enything but stable. NASA received "almost" full funding this year for the first time in about 4 years. The pertinent point is that "full" funding is determined AFTER NASA has squeezed their contractors to the wall as to schedule and budget. So, ANY reduction in the proposed budget value will have some effect (there is no breathing room). As an example, WP-04 was asked to quote (right after restructure) to a "Just in Time" building schedule. To anyone who knows anything about designing and building a spacecraft, JIT principles do not mean anything except that you are accepting more schedule risk. In the case of the Solar Arrays, of which I have very intimate knowledge, this has meant implementing a very cost ineffecient subcontractor delivery schedule of solar cells, bypass diodes, motor drive assemblies, etc. It has also meant greater and greater schedule risk as the design process has been delayed by relatively minor glitches in the development test process as can be expected with any development program (but which Alan tends to ignore when he cites costs of developing new launch systems.) Second, I would like to comment on the question of CDR design maturity. It is true that it is a guideline that 90% of all drawings be complete by the time of the CDR but, at least in the case of WP-04, there is nothing written into LMSC's subcontract requiring this value. The 90% is an industry rule of thumb that must be tempered by two factors; 1) Customer restraint in changing requirements and 2) the relative number of structural vs. mechanism drawings. The second item is common sense. You can sketch the cross-sections of major structural elements and describe their material make-up and most engineers and analysts can verify the strcture will do what is required (and of course, the fastening methods), however, mechanisms must be scrutinized carefully for lubricants, surface finishes, tolerances, meterial compatablity, etc. Therefore, a mechanisms intense program will need to have a greater number of design drawings complete by CDR to "adequately disclose the design" as the phrase usually is place into contracts says. Customer restraint in changing requirements is where NASA is falling down very heavily (the bigger they are, the harder they fall.) It is not that NASA is changing their minds as to what they want, it is that NASA is just now getting together to find out whatthey require. As an example, take plume loading on the Solar Arrays (again, a subject that I am very familiar with.) The actual loads due to pluming were formally placed on out contract in January.....of 1992!!! This is 3 years into the design process and after ALL the PDRs and some of the subcontract CDRs. It is not that no one knew that plume loads were going to happen (we'd been screaming about not having a requirement for years) but it took that long for Mission Ops, (JSC) and Power Systems (NASA Lewis) to come up with numbers. I have often heard the arguement that designers should have "put more margin" into the design to envelope this load case. If you really want to be flamed, state that arguement.... Anyway, the bottom line is, when you are faced with multiple redesigns that effect most of the design drawings that are required, the number of drawings that are "complete" at CDR can be compromised if the schedule of the CDR (and first element launch) is critical. Again, it just assumes more risk to schedule when problems are discovered downstream of the CDR and after production has begun. A final comment to my second point: NASA has still not settled requirements. At the Soalr Array Wing CDR which took place December 1-4, 1992, NASA Lewis and NASA JSC and Rocketdyne (WP-04 prime contractor) were still in disagree- ment over the plume loading and other shuttle induced loads on the array (docking, berthing, Asronaut induced truss oscillations...) The "on contract" solution is to retract the arrays during all early mission (pre- permanently manned capability: PMC) shuttle docking proceedures. NASA JSC is very much against this approach and I believe NASA REston is in agreement with them, for obvious reasons of practicality. As of today, there are NO contractural requirements for dockingor bething loads on the solar arrays but there are studies going on about how to make the array mast withstand these loading scenarios. My third and final point is about the integration of the station. A very telling point was a converstation that accured during the Solar Array Wing CDR. During discussions about what configuration the station is in during the second shuttle assembly flight, it was revealed that both arrays are deployed partially in what is called a "ready to deploy" configuration. Unfortunately this is not how the thermal analysis was done as both Rocketdyne and LMSC had a different configuration in which one array was fully stowed and the other in this "ready to deploy" configuration. When asked by Rocketdyne how NASA intended to flow down this requirement to its contractors, NASA's response was that the new configuration was in the TOS (I later found out that this is a Technical Operation Support document). Unfortunately the TOS is not on Rcoketdyne's contract. When I enquired of JSC representatives as to who had juresdiction over this TOS, he said that it was not an official document buut something that a few concerned JSC engineers put together because they did not see the needed work being down as to the piece by piece analyssis of the on orbit configuration as the buildup progresses (remember, every element left up there has to act like a controllable spacecraft.) So the bottom line is that their seems to be a very large lack of "big picture" work fromthe station system design standpoint. If consolidating everything at JSC will fix this, then more power to it all. Now that I have provided more fodder to Allan to call for the concellation of space Station, I might as well sign off. Feel free to respond to my address below. Grant Anderson Ganderson@jedi.decnet.lockheed.com Design Project Leader Space Station WP-04 Lockheed Missiles and Space Co. Sunnyvale, CA All oppinions expressed are my own. Facts speak for themselves. Fools speak for each other. ------------------------------ Date: 14 Dec 92 18:24:23 GMT From: "Allen W. Sherzer" Subject: SSF Progress 1 of 2 (Was: One small step Space Activist) Newsgroups: sci.space In article Wales.Larrison@ofa123.fidonet.org writes: >>... Four years later, as a result of cost >>overruns, Work Package 02 now weighs in at $4.9 billion -- A 250%... > Hmm.... I'm not going to dispute these numbers, but there's a >distinct difference between "cost overruns" and "customer directed >changes". Not from my point of view. Most of this happened AFTER the redesign. Wether it is the result of NASA changing its mind or MD not up to the task we have a project out of control. Either way we have a station which is taking longer and longer to build and costing more and more. The process being used simply doesn't work. >Furthermore, a large chunk of these overrun costs seem >to be in General & Administrative cost categories (G&A), not in the >technical work performed. So what? > Now, funding and design for the SSF has not been rock stable >either for the past 4 years. I seem to remember at least 3 of the 4 >budget requests being cut, funding restrictions placed on a couple, >and a major Congressional-directed redesign of the SSF. Cuts have been minor and shouldn't have resulted in these sort of increases and delays. Also, the redesign was well over two years ago. Plenty of time to produce a good schedule. > I'm not apologising for MD, but I would like to present some data >from the other side of the story. Fair enough but I should point out that the SN article was not the only source I used. A source at NASA provided the rest. > What Allen didn't report, and what I see just as significant, >was that SN reported the NASA Inspector General had started a >separate audit to see if the restructuring of the Work Package 2 >contract was done properly by NASA JSC. Also, so what? This problem has been brewing for years. It looks like this audit only began when SN started looking around. Why the delay? Also, the real problems aren't going to appear in any audit. The NASA auditor will consider $10,000 to deliver a pound to LEO a fair price. He won't blink at overhead rates which would give most CEO's a heart attack. He won't give a second thought to the effort and cost associated with a 1,000 page proposal when the equivaltnt commercial proposal would be 60 pages. Auditors audit the process. When it is the process which doesn't work, they won't find it. >>Worse yet, Work Package 02 is as much as 18 months behind schedule... > "The company informed NASA earlier this year that it could > provide 700 drawings before a design review begins next year, > but under NASA pressure agreed to provide 2700, NASA officials > said. Only 1100 are needed for the design review, according to > Parkinson [The MD general manager for space station project > control], so MD will exceed that target." They provide 700 drawings where 1100 is the minimum and they agreed to 2700. How can that be said to exceed any target? > "Aaron [The space station program manager at JSC] said that some > aspects of the work package are about a month behind, but > denied there is any lag on the order of 18 months in his > portion of the program. Sources have confirmed the 18 month behind schedule number. I stand by it. I believe their status on drawings (see above) also tends to confirm that they are a lot more than a month behind schedule. > In my opinion the real make or break for MD will be how MD >conducts itself at the work package 2 Critical Design Review (CDR) >this coming year. Except that under the JVIT system it will be much easier for the people responsible (JSC and MD) to cover up lack of progress since there will be no independent program office. Allen -- +---------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | Allen W. Sherzer | "A great man is one who does nothing but leaves | | aws@iti.org | nothing undone" | +----------------------131 DAYS TO FIRST FLIGHT OF DCX----------------------+ ------------------------------ Date: 14 Dec 92 18:28:20 GMT From: "Allen W. Sherzer" Subject: Terminal Velocity of DCX? (was Re: Shuttle ...) Newsgroups: sci.space In article ewright@convex.com (Edward V. Wright) writes: >Also note that the cost of one Shuttle flight is about the same >as the entire DC development program. Not quite. It wold take about 1.5 years of Shuttle funding to develop DC. Now for the cost of a Shuttle flight, you could run a program to answer all the open technical questions and have enough left over to buy a Titan IV to launch the payload which would have gone up in the Shuttle. Allen -- +---------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | Allen W. Sherzer | "A great man is one who does nothing but leaves | | aws@iti.org | nothing undone" | +----------------------131 DAYS TO FIRST FLIGHT OF DCX----------------------+ ------------------------------ Date: 13 Dec 92 20:40:48 GMT From: Bruce Watson Subject: Titan IV Newsgroups: sci.space In article <71519@cup.portal.com| BrianT@cup.portal.com (Brian Stuart Thorn) writes: | |That was Number 6. I never heard anything about it, and was mildly |surprised to read about it in this weeks AVLeak and Space News. It |got no attention from the media (to the USAF's delight, no doubt), not |even with the last military shuttle mission launched a few days later. It made our media. Denver Post: _Titan IV Carries Secret Payload Into Space_, Vandeberg AFB, CA -- At Titan IV rocket carrying a secret government payload was launched yesterday from this central coast base, officials said...etc. -- Bruce Watson (wats@scicom) Bulletin 629-49 Item 6700 Extract 75,131 ------------------------------ Date: 14 Dec 92 13:53:14 GMT From: "Allen W. Sherzer" Subject: Titan IV Costs Newsgroups: sci.space In article Wales.Larrison@ofa123.fidonet.org writes: >... > Titan IV $ 360 M (w/ Centaur upper stage) > Titan IV $ 315 M (no upper stage) Interesting number. We have two government developed launchers (Shuttle and Titan IV) and both cost about $8,000 to $10,000 to put a pound into LEO. Yet commercial providers only cost half to a third of that even though they only launch smaller payloads and don't get advantages of economy of scale. Even the now defunct Titan III (same basic design and even made on the same production line as Titan IV) costs less than half the Titan IV. Supporters of NLS and Spacelift I take note. Allen -- +---------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | Allen W. Sherzer | "A great man is one who does nothing but leaves | | aws@iti.org | nothing undone" | +----------------------131 DAYS TO FIRST FLIGHT OF DCX----------------------+ ------------------------------ Date: 14 Dec 92 15:02:05 GMT From: Gary Coffman Subject: Titan IV Costs Newsgroups: sci.space In article Wales.Larrison@ofa123.fidonet.org writes: > > Titan IV $ 360 M (w/ Centaur upper stage) > Titan IV $ 315 M (no upper stage) Do these costs include support costs at Vandenburg and Canaveral? Or are they just purchase costs? Gary ------------------------------ Date: 14 Dec 92 14:25:57 GMT From: Dave Rogers Subject: What is a VSAT? Newsgroups: sci.space,sci.astro In article <1992Dec11.175249.21479@athena.mit.edu>, mock@space.mit.edu (Patrick C. Mock) writes: |> |> Does anyone know what does VSAT (Very Small Aperature Terminal) mean |> in the context of satellite communications? |> A VSAT is a C-band system which provides one-way, two-way and broadcast capabilities for audio, video and data. Data rates up to DS-1 (1.5 M bits per second) are available. Dishes are typically 1-3 meters in diameter. Complete systems (one-end) sell for $6-15K. You must lease time on a transponder from one of the many companies which do this (AT&T Spacenet, GTE Skynet, Comstream, Vitacom). =============================================================================== Dave Rogers M & R Software, Inc. Internet: dave@rsd.dl.nec.com On contract to: NEC America, Radio Software Dept Don't take life too seriously; you're not going to get out of it alive anyway. ------------------------------ Date: 14 Dec 92 02:59:45 GMT From: Matthew Thomas DeLuca Subject: what the little bird told Henry Newsgroups: sci.space In article <1gasfqINNkpa@transfer.stratus.com> dswartz@redondo.sw.stratus.com (Dan Swartzendruber) writes: >Look, it's pretty clear (at least to me, and going by some other recent >postings, to other people as well) that Gary has some kind of axe to >grind against the whole SSTO concept. I don't agree with many of the statements that Gary has made about the SSTO program, but it's refreshing to see someone who *doesn't* believe this will automatically be the salvation of the space program. -- Matthew Thomas DeLuca Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta Georgia, 30332 uucp: ...!{decvax,hplabs,ncar,purdue,rutgers}!gatech!prism!matthew Internet: matthew@prism.gatech.edu ------------------------------ Date: 14 Dec 92 13:44:23 GMT From: Gary Coffman Subject: what the little bird told Henry Newsgroups: sci.space In article <1gasfqINNkpa@transfer.stratus.com> dswartz@redondo.sw.stratus.com (Dan Swartzendruber) writes: > >Look, it's pretty clear (at least to me, and going by some other recent >postings, to other people as well) that Gary has some kind of axe to >grind against the whole SSTO concept. No, I don't have an axe to grind against the SSTO *concept*, or even against the DCX test program. What I do have an axe to grind about is people who say, "DC-1 is the answer. Now what was the question?" Gary ------------------------------ End of Space Digest Volume 15 : Issue 546 ------------------------------