Date: Sat, 9 Jan 93 05:03:23 From: Space Digest maintainer Reply-To: Space-request@isu.isunet.edu Subject: Space Digest V16 #025 To: Space Digest Readers Precedence: bulk Space Digest Sat, 9 Jan 93 Volume 16 : Issue 025 Today's Topics: *** BUSSARD RAMSCOOP *** Commercial Space News #19 Contacting Pete Conrad Stupid Shut Cost arguements (was Re: Terminal Velocity Welcome to the Space Digest!! Please send your messages to "space@isu.isunet.edu", and (un)subscription requests of the form "Subscribe Space " to one of these addresses: listserv@uga (BITNET), rice::boyle (SPAN/NSInet), utadnx::utspan::rice::boyle (THENET), or space-REQUEST@isu.isunet.edu (Internet). ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Date: Fri, 8 Jan 1993 12:12:37 MST From: "Richard Schroeppel" Subject: *** BUSSARD RAMSCOOP *** Since fusing protons is so hard, why not use deuterons? They fuse at a lower temperature, and the reaction only requires regrouping the nucleons, rather than invoking the weak force to transmute p->n. The Earth's d/p ratio is ~.0001. Perhaps the ramscoop collector could selectively enrich d, by selecting for atoms having a magnetic moment. Rich Schroeppel rcs@cs.arizona.edu ------------------------------ Date: 08 Jan 93 01:46:29 From: Wales.Larrison@ofa123.fidonet.org Subject: Commercial Space News #19 Newsgroups: sci.space COMMERCIAL SPACE NEWS 19 This is number nineteen in an irregular series on developments in commercial space activities. The commentaries included are my thoughts on these developments. This is a short column in number of articles, but still fairly long. I should be able to follow this with another issue fairly quickly, since those articles are just about ready to go as well. In contrast to the last column primarily dealing with Russian market moves, this one's more of mixed bag. A lot of restructuring news, with two articles on changes in US government organizations which may have a large influence on future US commercial space market developments ... Contents - 1- NEC RESTRUCTURES TO ENTER COMMERCIAL SATELLITE MARKET 2- NASA RESTRUCTURES COMMERCIAL SPACE SUPPORT ORGANIZATION 3- RIMSAT GOES TO RUSSIA FOR TONGAN SATS 4- MEXICAN FIRM PLANS LATIN AMERICAN LEO CONSTELLATION 5- ECHOSTAR BETS BIG ON DIRECT BROADCAST SATELLITE TV 6- THERE'S GOLD IN 'THAR IMAGES; ESSI ANNOUNCES NEW TECHNIQUE 7- COMMERCIAL LAUNCHES USED AS JUSTIFICATION FOR NEW US LAUNCHER FINAL NOTES - ARTICLES ---------------------------------------------------------------- 1- NEC RESTRUCTURES TO ENTER COMMERCIAL SATELLITE MARKET The Japanese corporation NEC (Nippon Electric Company) restructured in mid-November to establish itself as a player in the commercial satellite market. Two divisions were consolidated into a single division that could compete for up-coming commercial communications satellite orders and other commercial satellites. The NEC Space Laser Division (which is a leading manufacturer of communications satellite transponders) and the Space Development Division (which manufactures satellite structures and integrates total satellite hardware) were combined into one operational division. [Commentary: For the past decade I've been watching Japanese aerospace firms move towards establishing a commercial market presence for satellite construction. This announcement is probably the last step needed to establish a competitive player. While Japanese firms are building sophisticated satellites to be launched for Japanese government programs, they have not yet entered into open commercial competition. Part of this has been from trade pressure brought to bear by the US and Europe, who have forced the Japanese government ministries to open up Japanese 'commercial' satellite bidding to all entrants, without having 'favored son' clauses in the bid releases. In the view of many in the industry, such clauses would have favored Japanese satellite manufacturers, and would have forced the contracts to "Buy Japanese". However, even in current competitive Japanese commercial bids (virtually all which been won by US firms), a large amount of subcontract work and business "offsets" have gone back to the Japanese satellite component manufacturers. This is not uncommon in international trade, and it provides a basis for Japanese firms to develop and hone their skills for entry into the commercial market. Plus the Japanese government contracts for Japanese satellites provide a base of work to maintain a trained and experienced satellite construction team. The new NEC reorganization sets up a structure which now can bid as prime on upcoming communications satellite contracts in close to full organizational parity to Loral, Hughes, Alcatel, Aerospatiale, Matra, BAe, and GE. Whether or not this will be enough to provide a competitive edge, will be a different story. It still remains to be seen if NEC will subsidize the initial bid to gain market entry, or if there will be a round of "learning" before winning a prime contract, or even what the competitive counter moves from other established players will be. Since the area of most rapid growth in satellite communications service demand is the East Asia area where Japanese firms might have a "home court" advantage, I expect to see some interesting market moves in the next communications satellite competition in this market sector.] 2- NASA RESTRUCTURES COMMERCIAL SPACE SUPPORT ORGANIZATION During October's shakeup of NASA's organizational structure, NASA reorganized its commercial space activities support office. In the reorganization, a new Office of Advanced Concepts and Technology (OACT) was created, combining the previous Office of Commercial Programs with the technology development activities of the previous Office of Aeronautics and Space Technology. The OACT is now chartered to specifically develop advanced technologies which have commercial as well as governmental uses, and which enhance US business competitiveness. In later statements about the new office, NASA Administrator Dan Goldin identified the office as specifically addressing 4 areas which were not adequately covered in previous NASA organizations: - systems engineering and integration for advanced space systems concepts - providing NASA access for outsiders with innovative technology - establishing technology transfer into the commercial sector; and - commercializing space activities. Goldin stated there was an imbalance within NASA between scientific and business needs in setting NASA program requirements. Using the Mission to Planet Earth as an example, Goldin said ""We've got to bring American industry into NASA's program...NASA must be weaned from being a jobs program into being a program that will get America number one in competitiveness." In his strategy, Goldin split commercialization activities into near-term, mid-term, and long-term. Near-term commercial experiments are those opportunities which might provide technological advances which could be quickly translated into near term commercial benefits (in specific, the Wake Shield experiments were seen as providing some crucial data for the semiconductor industry). In the mid-term, development programs like Space Station Freedom and Mission to Planet Earth must, in Goldin's strategy, be integrally involved with American industry outside the usual cadre of NASA contractors. And in the long term, industrial applications and concerns would be included in new programs, and potential long- term industrial benefits must be included in their assessments. Greg Reck, currently director for space technology, becomes acting associate administrator to head up the new Advanced Concepts and Technology office. Courtney Stadd, from the National Space Council staff, becomes Reck's acting deputy. Jack Mannix, who was Assistant Administrator for the Office of Commercial Programs, will become Associate General Counsel for Intellectual Property. [Commentary: In general, I think this reorganization seems to be a step in the right direction. I normally don't include NASA organizational issues in this columns, but in this area NASA activities can and do have a large impact on commercial space activities. Over the past several years, NASA has been acting as more and more of a facilitator for commercial space ventures, and less and less as a competitor. While there is still a long way to go, NASA is no longer a competitor in many areas of commercial space activities. This NASA reorganization should elevate the synergistic role between NASA and industry in developing and using technology outside of NASA's limited internal purview. Over the past two decades, commercial and industrial considerations almost always have had a lower priority than NASA's internal considerations. This caused problems with technology transfer and serious problems in the development and use of technologies desired and needed by the commercial space sector. This organizational restructuring should help emphasize the policy that commercial and industrial considerations have more weight in NASA decision making. A reorganization should not be seen as a panacea, but this is a very visible sign that folks are trying to change the NASA culture. I have also seen some actions being taken at lower levels within NASA in order to carry out this policy, but there is still much to be done. The biggest remaining problems in NASA's decision process to bring in industrial and commercial participation are in space transportation, infrastructure development, and day-to-day center operations. While NASA activities have been opened up for commercial bidding for ELV launch of suitable payloads (as required by the Presidential Space Policy and the LSPA), routine operations of other NASA space transportation systems still needs to be transferred to commercial operations. These include sounding rockets and the Space Shuttle. I have heard of some efforts underway in these areas, but have seen little action to implement a transition to commercial operators. Infrastructure development by NASA is also an area in which more commercial and industrial considerations need considered. There have been some abortive attempts to encourage commercial development of infrastructure to be used by NASA, but these have primarily come to naught due to the uncertainty of multi-year government usage and cost considerations. Bills currently proposed in the House and Senate would greatly encourage commercial participation in this area as they would allow NASA to negotiate multi-year contracts with termination liability clauses. And again, routine operation and maintenance of NASA infrastructure elements should be turned over commercial operators -- including such facilities as the KC-135 microgravity aircraft (commercial alternatives have been proposed), the WETF weightlessness water tanks training facilities, the deep space tracking system, and even Space Station Freedom. However, the biggest problem remaining is within the day-to-day NASA field center operations. Day-to-day NASA operations are still very much focused inwards and commercial or industrial entities are seen as "competitors" and not as "partners" or "customers". The NASA culture still needs to take a giant step to open up day-to-day center considerations to include commercial and industrial concerns. This will be the hardest step of all.] 3- RIMSAT GOES TO RUSSIA FOR TONGAN SATS It was recently announced a new firm, Rimsat Ltd. of Fort Wayne, Indiana, will operate up to 7 new communications satellites over the Pacific. At a 17 Nov press conference in Washington DC, the firm revealed it had received formal approval from the Russian Space Agency for a $ 150 M deal to use 7 Russian satellites to provide communications services across the Pacific, and has also negotiated terms with the Kingdom of Tonga to use at least 2 GEO slots already set aside for Tonga. According to Michael A. Sternber, Rimsat's Chief Operating Officer, Pacific region telecommunications service could begin as early as Jan 1993, since 2 of the Russian satellites are already in orbit. Under an agreement with Tonga, 2 GEO slots at 130 and 134 deg East have been leased, and they will be filled as soon as final negotiations are completed and a Russian satellite can be drifted into at one slot. Options to use two more Tongan slots have been exercised, and Rimsat has placed a further option to use any other unused, abandoned, or yet-to-be-acquired Tongan GEO positions. Satellite services to and from Tonga could begin as early as January, and Rimsat expects additional satellites to be launched between Sep 1993 and Mar 1996. Current agreements provide for the lease to Rimsat for 3 'Gorizont' satellites (each with 6 C-band and 1 K-band transponders) and 4 'Express' satellites (10 C-band and 2 K-band transponders, each). Rimsat also holds a long-term option for Rimsat to buy 10 more 'Express' satellites or any other 'Express' satellites not planned for use by the Russian government. [Commentary: This is an interesting deal from several angles. First, the use existing older satellites for fast entry into a fast developing, dynamic market area. The two satellites that can be used by Rimsat only have a couple of years worth of expected life left, but allow a quick and cheap market entry. Secondly, the use of Tongan slots to provide regional communications services, exploits existing regulatory structures. The Republic of Tonga, through their communications agency Tongasat, has been very proactive in requesting and reserving GEO slot allocations. At one time, Tongasat had requested over a dozen slots. Tonga currently has several slots already allocated through the International Telecommunications Union. It was highly unlikely the small island nation of Tonga could have used all of the slots they requested for domestic or even international telecommunications links, but through this deal they will gain lease fees for an international regional telecommunications provider to use their unused allocation. Furthermore, by 'doubling up' 2 satellites into each slot, Rimsat can get a higher capacity when needed, without having to buy more expensive higher capacity satellites up front. Lastly, this is the one of the first real deals to specifically call out use of Russian satellites and launchers on the basis of cost. According to Rimsat, building and launching the 7 planned satellites is about 40% cheaper than Western alternative systems. And while the cost or putting the system in place is less, Rimsat will be serving a region including Australia, China, Hong Kong, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Indonesia, Singapore, and Thailand where communications demand is very high with a high growth rate, and can charge market rates for their services. The two sticky points which have yet to be resolved are the completion of financing for the deal and signing up the first set of customers. Customers are not expected to be a problem due to the current market demand, but Rimsat is still in the process of looking for financing. They have a commitment letter from Triquest Group in Stanford, Connecticut but have not yet lined up full financing for the deal. I don't expect this to be a problem, other than perhaps some schedule slippage.] 4- MEXICAN FIRM PLANS LATIN AMERICAN LEO CONSTELLATION Mexico City-based Leo One Panamericana has announced plans to build and launch a LEO satellite constellation to provide communications services to Latin America. Leo One is a subsidiary of Tecelmex, a cellular phone service provider in Mexico, and will initially concentrate upon the markets they know best - Mexico and Latin America. The planned satellite system will not provide real time services (such as voice telephony), but will provide monitoring, tracking, paging, messaging, electronic mail, faxing, security, emergency notification, and positioning information. Leo One's system is initially planned to be 12 satellites in an 80 degree circular orbits at 1,400 km altitude, with each satellite covering users in a 2,500 km radius. As demand grows, up to 36 satellites may eventually be launched into the constellation. Current plans are to use US satellite technology launched using a CIS rocket. James Stuart, Chief Technical Officer for the venture, recognizes several significant milestones the team must meet before the venture can be a success: 1) If Western technology power will allow such advanced satellite technology to be launched using CIS rockets, 2) if Mexico's Secretaria de Comunicaciones y Transportes will grant permission to to operate experimental ground terminals and eventually an independent satellite system, and 3) if other LEO ventures don't saturate the market. An experimental program to prove out the technology is underway using high altitude balloons from Utah State University and using technology expertise from JPL through JPL's technology affiliates program. If the program is executed, Leo One estimates the 150 Kg satellites will cost $2-4 M each, with another $1.5-2 M to launch each satellite. User communicators are expected to cost $300-500 each. The earliest estimated date for launch is in 1994, with commercial operations beginning in 1995. [Commentary: Another LEO satellite constellation tip-toes into the market. The most interesting thing about this venture is it is specifically ignoring the primary telecommunications markets of Europe, East Asia, and the US/Canada. I believe part of this is due to the experience the their parent company has had in the Mexican telecommunications market. From some limited examination I've done of the telecommunications market in Mexico, it has "leap frogged" the usual ground based infrastructure to a rapidly growing cellular-technology based market. Part of this has been due to the slow response to installing line-based infrastructure by the Mexican PT&T which has encouraged firms to look to wireless solutions, but this evolution has also been driven by the availability of relatively inexpensive cellular technology, a boom in demand for telecommunications as Mexico's economy grows, and he ability of capitalistic vendors to quickly supply cellular solutions to meet user's needs. From Leo One's perspective, providing the capability to allow a user in Argentina to quickly and reliability send faxes to Brazil for $1 a page, seems very attractive. Most of their strategy seems to be to provide quick, basic and reasonably priced data communications capability on a large-scale regional basis rather than accept the higher costs of providing full, real-time, seamless telecommunications through a more expensive and sophisticated constellation. Essentially, they are bi-passing the national PT&T nets which provide phone links and other real-time communications and going to after the market provide data transfer and other more business-related services. I think this is a good niche approach to the market, and I wish the Leo One folks good luck in their venture. But they are very vulnerable to lose their markets from the more expensive and sophisticated LEO constellations proposed in the US and Europe. Those systems can provide data communications like Leo One's merely as a sideline business to their very sophisticated global telecommunications constellations, and might be able to beat Leo One's user price. However, due to the higher level of sophistication such constellations will also be much more expensive and difficult to finance and get into the operational stage. That has been the most serious hurdle for "big LEO" constellations.] 5- ECHOSTAR BETS BIG ON DIRECT BROADCAST SATELLITE TV There are now three serious competitors lining up for the US direct broadcast satellite TV market -- Direct TV, US Satellite Broadcasting, and Echostar. The latest, Echostar Satellite Company, a subsidiary of Echosphere Corp, was announced last month. Echostar is very bullish on the direct broadcast satellite market -- they announced they had signed a firm contract for 7 high-powered broadcast satellites from General Electric. This contract is a big gamble and while the terms of the contract are firm, and there is some flexibility reported in the contractual delivery schedules, the contracts requires that the WILL be produced and paid for by Echostar in a firm money deal. As described as by the company's CEO, Charles Ergen as "If they [the satellites] don't happen, then we're chapter 11." As currently planned, EchoStar will broadcast several hundred channels of TV (including High Definition TV Broadcasts), high quality audio, and data services to households, businesses, and commercial companies. 18-inch receiving dishes will be used. [Commentary: I've been watching the DBS market for some years now. The last swell of interest in DBS died out, leaving several half-built satellites, and several business failures, but no DBS services over the US. Astra, in the European DBS market, has provided a good market model, as a profitable DBS venture which started small, proved out the technology and market, and has profitably expanded as their market grew. This second swell of ventures for direct to home satellite broadcasting in the US seems to be real. Several firms now think the time is ripe for a US market venture. Of these, the Echostar venture seems the most gutsy. If the market doesn't develop, or if they can't capture enough customers, they will have serious financial problems -- if the terms on the contracts are such as they have announced. Some reports claim Echostar has lined up about $200 M in capital to support the first phase of their venture. My estimates are this is not enough for them to complete their entire venture, but that amount of funding could provide them the financial muscle to enter the market in a big way. Evidently, Echostar thinks the gamble is good bet. In support of their logic, they offer some analyses which show they provide per- home information access for about $500 compared to $1200 for fiber optic cabling -- giving satellites a low-cost advantage in providing point-to-multipoint regional information distribution. But, while Echosphere has some experience in satellite dish installation and services, they still will be competing with the installed base of cable systems. By being second into the DBS market, Echostar may also have an advantage in they can learn from the market pioneer's expensive lessons learned. If the market pioneer demonstrates a viable market approach, Echostar can quickly move to tailor their product to the most profitable and cost-effective approach without having to spend millions in testing products and markets. For example, DirecTV has to pick a signal compression technique now and make it work -- while Echostar can wait a little while until the technology is more proven. Similarly, the market leader must go through the expense of educating the public about direct satellite broadcasts, but Echostar can build upon that base of public awareness. There is still big market risk here -- being first into a market can be a substantial advantage, particularly if the market doesn't turn out to be as large as expected, or if the first firm entering can lock up the market base. Echostar's gamble of accepting the challenge of being second into the DBS market is pretty gutsy. And I still haven't hear how Echostar will attack the achilles heel of DBS systems - programming. Offering several hundred channels of service also means there must be several hundred different sets of programming. There are only so many times one can send reruns of Gilligan's Island or Wheel of Fortune, without having customers turn away. Quality and quantity of programming will be critical to making any DBS system marketable. DirecTV is teamed with Sony, which has access through a major motion picture studio for video, and through a record firm for music and other forms of entertainment. I believe Echostar must establish a strategic partnership to provide programming to make their venture a complete success.] 6- THERE'S GOLD IN 'THAR IMAGES; ESSI ANNOUNCES NEW TECHNIQUE A small remote sensing firm, Earth Search Sciences, Inc. announced in late November it had development a new technique to use space technology to find precious metal deposits. Working with NASA and Sverdrup scientists through the NASA CCDS at Stennis Space Center in Mississippi, ESSI has developed a mineral exploration technique that integrates satellite remote sensing data with a new Australian portable spectrometer that identifies minerals associated with precious metal deposits at rock exposures. ESSI's technique uses survey data from the Landsat satellite Thematic Mapper instrument to locate and classify potential targets over a large area. When a target is identified, it is overflown with the NASA Airborne Visible/ Infrared Imaging Spectrometer for greater detail, and maps showing areas with highest probability for valuable mineral deposits are constructed from the merged sensor data. Ground verification of the data is using a PIMA-II spectrometer, manufactured by Integrated Spectronics Party Ltd., of Sydney, Australia. This instrument can instantly identify many of the minerals associated with precious metal deposits, shortcutting a process which previously took weeks of analytical laboratory time. To prove out this technique, ESSI recently completed a test series at Cuprite, Nevada in an area which has been extensively studied by remote sensing techniques, and which is located just south of the famous Goldfield mining district in southern Nevada. During the tests, ESSI geologists were able to detect a previously unknown major detachment fault associated with the mineralization at Cuprite and quickly and accurately identified minerals associated with potential economic mineral deposits, finding a previously unknown outcropping of gold ore. According to ESSI, the technique has numerous other applications including petroleum exploration, environmental assessment, mineral exploration, pollution and water quality monitoring, wild life and forest management and agriculture administration. Larry Vance, ESSI company chief executive officer, was reported as stating: "This technology allows our exploration company to identify and evaluate economic targets more rapidly and reliably than conventional methods, thus giving us a definite edge in the marketplace." [Commentary: This is an example of some of the new remote sensing techniques coming onto the market. ESSI has apparently developed a very fast technique -- capable of getting ground verification of space-derived data apparently within a few days of gathering the remote sensing data (and those few days are primarily in data crank and travel time). IF it can be proved out, then ESSI might have developed a good, valuable commercial product. It is also interesting to note that as better and better remote sensing data satellite data is available with the new generation of satellites, and as GIS data bases are built up from this data, the ability to rapidly survey and evaluate data for marketable products should also greatly improve. But remember, this data came from ESSI... Since this column is to focus on commercial space opportunities for investors, it should be noted that Earth Search Sciences Inc. is a publicly traded company, and is listed as '3EDII' in the Pink Sheets which cover small, thinly traded companies. I should also note, that coverage in this column is neither a solicitation or advice to buy this stock. It is only provided as information for interested parties. Before making any investment, research the investment and be aware of the risks associated with it. If you are interested in ESSI, call or write for their prospectus and their annual report and read them, crank the financials, and look at the company and its market before investing your money. Be aware of the risks involved with any investment.] 7- COMMERCIAL LAUNCHES USED AS JUSTIFICATION FOR NEW US LAUNCHER [Regardless of political philosophy, current government space activities must be recognized as potentially having great effect on commercial space ventures. This article is included as some of the policies being discussed may have substantial impact on commercial launch systems.] There have been two recent reports produced by advisory groups to the US National Space Council. For the last several months, there has been an activity to reexamine the US government's space transportation policies and attempt to lay out a roadmap for future space transportation developments. Groups focusing on the industrial base for space activities and on US government space transportation needs have recently released their reports. The group examining the US industrial base required to support future space activities made several recommendations of importance for commercial space activities. Their fundamental finding was the US space industrial base is adequate to fulfill US government requirements, but caveated that conclusion for the future as assuming NASA and DoD adequately support space technology development, and upon the on-going industry restructuring being done efficiently in order to continue to provide core industrial capabilities. They identified that US commercial launch firms could see trouble in the next several years. As the report states: "If it was a poor idea for U.S. firms to have to compete against the U.S. government in the case of the space shuttle, it is a poor idea for those same firms to have to compete against the Russian and Chinese governments..." Specific recommendations for the US government to maintain the commercial space industry included: - complete a "rules-of-the-road" pact with Europe on acceptable business practices for launch contracts. These would serve as an international standard for firms from non-market economies. - reduce export restrictions on space items with non-critical defense technologies like communications satellites - encourage multiple small government programs rather than a single large one - continue government procurement reform to encourage commercial bidding for space-related contracts by emphasizing performance requirements rather than design specs, funding risk-shared technology demonstration programs, and increasing the use of commercial business practices and components. The second panel, which looked at US government space transportation requirements, called for replacing current US space transportation systems with a single new, low-cost expendable core launch vehicle. The primary reason claimed was to integrate a completely new technology launch vehicle to be the "most efficient, effective, reliable, safe and cost competitive space launch concept that our technology is capable of providing". Pete Aldridge, CEO of Aerospace Corp. and chairman of the study, said current systems are capable of meeting the basic needs of launching government payloads into space, but a new modular launch system for use with manned as well as unmanned missions was needed to provide "future U.S. competitiveness" and to reduce costs and risks for space launch. 2002 was suggested as a reasonable target date for initial operational capability for this system. The proposed new launcher, called 'Spacelifter,' could have "a cost to launch of a factor of two below comparable existing launch vehicles", according to Aldridge, and the new vehicle would be "the key to future commercial competitiveness, allowing the U.S. industry to undercut the price of most foreign competition." In conjunction with a manned personnel launch system and an unmanned cargo transfer and return vehicle, Spacelifter was claimed to support the continued operation of the Space Station. Aldridge said his panel could not find the requirements to justify the development of a heavy lift launch vehicle in the near term, but did recognize heavy lift capability will be required sometime in the future. To fund Spacelifter, Aldridge's panel identified a number of programs to kill and transfer funds from. Specifically identified were: reducing Shuttle operations, slowing Titan production, terminating the (ASRM) program, killing the MLV-3 competition and killing Shuttle production capability. To run the new effort, Aldridge's group recommended establishing a new single space launch authority within the government to be responsible for the planning, integration and coordination of space launch programs across all government agencies. Aldridge stated this organization would then delegate the management of the space launch program to selected government agencies. Shortly thereafter, USAF Maj. Gen. Donald G. Hard, director of space and Strategic Defense Initiative programs, was reported in the industry literature to be pushing for a USAF FY 94 new start for Spacelifter in the DoD budget, if the 2002 target availability goal is to be met. As reported in the trade press, if the Air Force become the single space launch authority and takes over Spacelifter development, Gen. Hard would request clean-sheet, fully competitive proposals from industry, going through the normal DoD procurement cycle starting with competitive Phase 1 concept exploration studies. All technical approaches for 'Spacelifter' would be considered -- including rejecting the USAF/NASA STME engine which was the core of the NLS development effort. Gen. Hard said preliminary USAF estimates put the Spacelifter development program at about $10 billion, down from NLS's $14 billion estimate. These cost reductions are primarily due to not man-rating the vehicle, and not building manned launch facilities. The Spacelifter concept used for the preliminary estimates was a single cryogenically fueled core, with solid- propellant strap-on rockets added as needed to increase launch performance. If a man-rated version was desired, Hard stated, NASA would be responsible for funding and developing it. Gen. Hard was reported as saying the commercial potential of a 20,000-pound class space launcher would be a big selling point on Capitol Hill, and eventually he could see the companies that build the rocket launching Air Force payloads on it as a commercial launch service provider. [Commentary: The National Space Council has been pursuing a space transportation systems strategy study for several months now. Exactly how this strategy will play in the new Space Council under a Clinton/Gore administration is unknown. But these two reports provide some key recommendations which will be used in formulating any new government space launch strategy. The first report, on the industrial base for commercial space launch operations, reiterates several strategies which have been pursued by US commercial space supporters. The report provides a good packaging of strategies and ties them into providing the base for future commercial launch firm viability. In my opinion, it is was an excellent overview report, and the strategies here should be pursued. The second report, which calls for development of 'Spacelifter', also really doesn't present a fundamentally new strategy. The US DoD and other organizations have been pushing for a new vehicle to replace the expensive Titan-IV for some years. However, supportable technical requirements for such a system have been elusive, and the best argument seems to be as a "generational change" to embody a full portfolio of new technology to reduce DoD operating costs. But such a generational change comes with a hefty price tag ($ 10 B or so), and is very vulnerable from a cost-effectiveness argument to a lower-cost incremental improvement strategy for current ELVs. Furthermore, the costs of "man-rating" the system are specifically excluded from the program, and it is assumed that NASA will pick up those development costs and the costs of any new manned-operations related facilities, as well as the costs of a new manned personnel launch system and a new cargo return system needed to fully replace the shuttle system. This is another cost which has to be factored in is such a new development is to be pursed. To increase the justification for the Titan-IV replacement 'Spacelifter', the argument is being made that such a system would allow US firms to compete more effectively for commercial launch contracts in the international market. This assumes the development costs for such a launcher would be sunk (absorbed) by the US government, and only the operational system turned over to a US commercial launch firm to compete with. While this government sunk development cost approach is being used in Europe (Ariane), and in Japan (H-2), I expect it will encounter great resistance in the US. There are several competitive US space launch firms. If a single firm is given a $10 B sunk cost advantage to get a "factor of two" reduction in recurring costs, other commercial firms will operate at a market disadvantage. With such a large differential in costs, other US firms will probably be driven out of business, whereas government subsidized international competition will match prices. At a minimum, other US firms will strenuously object to the selection of a government-subsidized domestic competitor. At a minimum, turning Spacelifter over to a single commercial operator will be challenged as 'restraint' of trade. To paraphrase the industrial base study: "If it was a poor idea for U.S. firms to have to compete against the U.S. government in the case of the space shuttle, it is a poor idea for those same firms to have to compete against U.S. government in the case of 'Spacelifter'." I believe this issue has not yet been completely addressed in the National Space Council launch strategy review, and should be addressed under the new administration before any strategy is implemented. And the impact of new technologies looming on the 2000-2010 horizon such as NASP or SSTO can't just be ignored in any future national space launch strategy. If commercial launch benefits are the key "selling point" for Spacelifter, I believe a FY94 new start for Spacelifter is premature, and should be delayed until commercialization issues are resolved. Other national security and budgetary issues may force the Spacelifter program forwards, but a government investment of $10 B should be well thought out before committing to to single approach including laying out a path to effective commercialization. There are several strategies which can be taken to commercialize such a system -- including a consortium approach for development and operation, a very serious technology development and tech transfer program to existing systems to level the playing fields, and a purely commercial launch services approach in which equivalent government development funds are made available to competing systems with a "fly off" to select an annual winner of government launch services contracts. The commercialization issue for 'Spacelifter' will continue for some time... And since it will set the framework for future commercial US launch competitiveness, I will continue to follow it. Stay tuned ... As a side note, I find this 'Spacelifter" discussion rather amusing, in sort of a morbid way. Some years ago I worked on a USAF/NASA funded contract to define the next generation, low cost launch vehicle. Our team came up with a single cryogenic core, with strap on solids to get minimum cost. (Sound familiar?) We also said we didn't need the STME, and that reopening production lines of Saturn-era engines would be the most cost-effective approach, and we didn't need a lot of fancy technology development rather than application of manufacturing technologies. Our team lost the next round to fully-modular, all cryogenically fueled systems as we weren't "high tech enough" to justify the new development programs which were the real reason for the program. Oh well, now the USAF is now pushing something very similar to our proposal from several years ago... Whatever goes around comes around... ] FINAL NOTES - There should be a couple of quick columns following this one. I still have enough semi-processed information to produce another column at the end of this one. And finally, I have put together the data to generate a generic commercial space market index, which will be the topic of a subsequent issue. As always, I hope you folks find this stuff useful and interesting -- Any and all comments are welcome. ------------------------------------------------------------------ Wales Larrison Space Technology Investor "Ex abusu non arguitur ad usum" P.O. Box 2452 Seal Beach, CA 90740-1452 ------------------------------ Date: 8 Jan 93 17:52:10 GMT From: Mike Smithwick Subject: Contacting Pete Conrad Newsgroups: sci.space [] Does anyone know how I could get in contact with Pete Conrad? I have a couple of questions regarding Apollo 12 I need to get answered. mike -- This message brought to you by the Happy Fun Ball! It's Happy! It's fun!! It's the HAPPY FUN BALL!!! (Still legal in 16 states) *** Mike Smithwick - mike@rahul.net *** No disclaimer is necessary since I only work for myself, HA! HA! HA! HA! ------------------------------ Date: 8 Jan 93 17:32:24 GMT From: "Edward V. Wright" Subject: Stupid Shut Cost arguements (was Re: Terminal Velocity Newsgroups: sci.space In <1993Jan06.171601.10077@eng.umd.edu> sysmgr@king.eng.umd.edu (Doug Mohney) writes: >It's time for the periodic reality check: > A) Alan will fight for Freedom and favor it over renting space > on Mir, yet Freedom has yet to be launched. Mir Exists. > B) Alan will fight to shut down the 4 Shuttles, a multibillion > dollar program ) and replace them with a > Soyuz sitting on a U.S. booster. Which hasn't been launched, but > with a few hand-waving tricks, manages to respark the whole > U.S. aerospace industry. >What is wrong with this picture? Actually, there's a certain logic to that. As long as NASA continues to operate the Shuttle as a "national space transportation system," it will continue to wage guerilla warfare against anyone else who seeks to get into the launch business. On the other hand, there is no space-station business, so Freedom doesn't compete with anybody yet. And although Freedom will cost ten times what it should, it will return some benefits. And if NASA focuses its attention on Freedom, it will have less time to spend defending its sacred cow, the Shuttle, against potential competition. You may agree or disagree with these reasons, but there's nothing inconsistent. ------------------------------ End of Space Digest Volume 16 : Issue 025 ------------------------------