Date: Fri, 21 May 93 05:25:10 From: Space Digest maintainer Reply-To: Space-request@isu.isunet.edu Subject: Space Digest V16 #602 To: Space Digest Readers Precedence: bulk Space Digest Fri, 21 May 93 Volume 16 : Issue 602 Today's Topics: About the mercury program Impediments to NASA productivity Murder in space Orion Spacecraft Pat's plan Space Billboards and Low-Cost Access to Orbit Space Marketing would be wonderfull. Super ZIp seperators. Why we like DC-X (was Re: Shuttle 0-Defects & Bizarre? DC-X?) Welcome to the Space Digest!! Please send your messages to "space@isu.isunet.edu", and (un)subscription requests of the form "Subscribe Space " to one of these addresses: listserv@uga (BITNET), rice::boyle (SPAN/NSInet), utadnx::utspan::rice::boyle (THENET), or space-REQUEST@isu.isunet.edu (Internet). ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Date: 20 May 1993 14:54:58 GMT From: Pawel Moskalik Subject: About the mercury program Newsgroups: sci.space Slayton finally flew on Soyuz-Apollo mission. It was in 1975. Pawel Moskalik ------------------------------ Date: Thu, 20 May 1993 14:33:21 GMT From: kjenks@gothamcity.jsc.nasa.gov Subject: Impediments to NASA productivity Newsgroups: sci.space,talk.politics.space I know some folks on Usenet have some strong opinions about this topic, so I thought I'd share this with you. As usual, my Usenet posts represent only my opinion, not anything official on the part of the Space Shuttle Program Office, JSC, NASA, the Executive Branch, the President, the Federal Government, or the American people to whom I am ultimately respnosible. (I feel compelled to state that explicitly because of a recent e-mail exchange I had with an amateur astronomer who was worried that my ideas for space advertising represented some kind of official NASA position.) I received the following note, forwarded from my boss, asking for input: FROM: [A mid-level JSC official, who did not explicitly give me permission to use her name] SUBJECT: Impediments to JSC productivity The Vice President has established a National Performance Review activity which is looking at federal regulations (e.g., Brooks act, GSA regs, OMB regs, GPO regs etc.) and the impediments to productivity to the agencies that the regulations pose. NASA is establishing a working group to review the inputs [from] the agency and coordinate with the VP's National Performance Review activity. [NASA Headquarters organization] Code J has given us the opportunity to identify any [barriers] to JSC productivity not only [from] the Federal regulations but also form INTERNAL NASA regulations, procedures, or lack thereof! We need to provide the preliminary JSC list on 5/21/93. Please provide ANY inputs to me no later than COB 5/20/93. Please cover not only the barrier, but also let me know if it is internal or external and precisely how it is impeding your productivity. If you have proposed solutions feel free to share those too! Remember, this is our first cut.. through our JSC representatives to the NASA working group JSC would have plenty of opportunity to refine. NOW IS YOUR CHANCE TO FORMALLY PROVIDE YOUR INPUTS TO THE GOVERNMENT!!! Here was my response: Inputs to National Performance Review regarding Impediments to JSC productivity Ken Jenks, NASA/JSC/GM2 05/18/93 I have a great deal of skepticism that we, as an Agency or as a Nation, will have the will to make the hard choices necessary to even begin to improve our efficiency. In order to improve our efficiency in any reasonable way, we must (1) measure our current efficiency, (2) determine changes which will increase that efficiency, (3) implement those changes, (4) determine the effects of those changes on our efficiency by returning to step (1). I am skeptical that we will ever measure our current efficiency. To do that, we need to define "efficiency" -- a slippery concept at best -- then establish a systematic method for measuring this nebulous quantity across the Agency (or at least across JSC). For the sake of this discussion, I'll assume that "efficiency" is defined as "amount of work done" divide by "number of dollars spent." We probably can't get two people to agree on the definition of the term, much less agree on a numerical measurement of what our current efficiency is. I am skeptical that we will ever determine changes which will increase our efficiency. Most of the inefficiencies I have observed at NASA are the result of management decisions, and it is difficult (at best) to convince a manager that his organization is inefficient, since this carries the implication that the manager has failed in some way. Any suggestions to increase efficiency must begin by admitting that current efficiency is less than optimal. In addition, change costs money. It will cost us time and money to implement changes to increase our efficiency, and there is no funding budgeted for this. Our ridiculous tradition of a "straight-line budget" for each NASA organization gives no incentive to efficiency, and no room to spend money to increase efficiency. When we desire to decrease an office's (or a Program's) budget, we never manage to fund the changes which can increase efficiency; we just cut the budget. Since efficiency cannot increase in this environment, we end up with less work getting done. It is even more difficult to implement changes in the existing, entrenched managerial structure due to the usual inertia of organizations -- "We've always done it that way," "That may be a good idea, but it won't work here because..." and "But that would put people out of work," are all phrases which come to mind. Every time a change is proposed, our NASA culture has taught us to shoot holes in it, inventing reasons why the change will not work. (For numerous examples, examine our JSC Employee Suggestion Program, where less than 10% of the suggestions are implemented. It seems to be our natural inclination to look at a new idea and come up with a list of reasons why it won't work, when the real reason is that we don't want to try.) Even in those few instances when changes are implemented which may increase efficiency or productivity, we never "close the loop" and measure the increase. As W. Edwards Deming says with regard to quality, "if you can't measure it, you can't manage it." And we at NASA have never measured our efficiency. It's likely that we never will. Even though I'm skeptical that we will ever implement a rational program to improve NASA's efficiency, I am willing to contribute the following thoughts. Federal regulations which define the efficiency of each Governmental body and which mandate the measurement of that efficiency in reports to Congress would be a great improvement on the current system of efficiency improvements by guess and by golly. Each Agency would be expected to define the criteria by which their efficiency is to be measured. For NASA, that might include number of patents, number of Shuttle flights which land, number of scientific articles published in refereed scientific journals, amount of useful scientific data returned from space, number of planets explored (in terms of pixels, square kilometers, and image resolution), number of test flights of experimental aircraft, or other measures of our productivity, divided by our annual budget. Each productivity metric could be given a value in dollars which gives a measure of its value to the country. Any time the value of an avenue of exploration is less than the amount of money spent on that avenue, its budget and metrics must be reviewed. Even without Federal regulations, NASA or even JSC could implement an across-the-board system of measuring its own efficiency. We absolutely must measure our efficiency before we can make any rational attempt to improve it. How else will we know that we have succeeded? Without efficiency metrics, I can propose several changes in our present NASA/JSC regulations which will increase our efficiency by 257%, guaranteed. In order to achieve our visions and missions within our allotted budget, we must work with Congress to reform procurement, personnel and payroll practices at NASA and the rest of the Federal government. One of the personnel management problems we must address is how to promote leaders as opposed to managers and bureaucrats. 1. Procurement NASA procurement is a mess. In efforts to prevent waste and fraud, to promote special interests (minority-owned small businesses), and to promote supposed open competition, Congress and OMB have passed a bewildering array of laws and regulations which hinder procurement. To help us find our way through this tangle of paperwork, we employ procurement officials who understand the maze, but who don't have any technical background. In trying to accomplish NASA's goals in space science and technology, we must procure complicated, high-tech equipment. This leads to a conflict: procurement officials don't understand what equipment the engineers need, and engineers don't understand the intricacies of the procurement process. For example, our office submitted a request for printers for our networked IBM PC's. A procurement official changed the paperwork to allow printers for Macintosh computers. If we hadn't caught the error, we might have received printers incompatible with our computers simply because the procurement official didn't understand the technical requirements. We must change the process. We must either employ technically astute people in our procurement office (unlikely for a variety of reasons) or we must simplify the paperwork so that engineers can understand it without years of training. In estimating the duration of information system development projects, the duration of any procurement activities is the longest single duration of any activity, and the most variable. Procurement actions can "rush" through the system in as little as two weeks, but we have seen some last literally years. This delay -- and the uncertainty in the length of the delay -- causes uncounted inefficiencies in all high-tech projects. 2. Personnel The skill level of NASA personnel is highly variable. There are some highly skilled, highly motivated people at NASA. These people are motivated by more than just money and benefits; they care about the space program, and they are driven by their passion to make a difference. There are also people here at NASA who are here just to receive a paycheck, who contribute the minimal amount necessary to retain their jobs, and who don't give a damn about the space program. There's a third group of people: those who are highly skilled, highly motivated, and who care about the space program, but they can't get a job at NASA because the slackers are taking up space. Our personnel regulations don't allow supervisors to get rid of people who don't contribute in favor of newcomers who will. If we are really committed to improving efficiency at NASA, we would change our regulations to encourage supervisors to FIRE people who will not work to make room for folks who care. 3. Payroll NASA has made some improvements in the area of employee compensation, but it is still not at parity with industry. I know of one computer expert who was hired away by the petrochemical industry with a 20% increase in pay, performing roughly the same job as she was doing for NASA. This inequity in pay between Government and Industry almost guarantees second-rate personnel in Government positions. Some of us value things other than monetary compensation, like job satisfaction and contributing toward a cause we believe in. But we have families to feed and mortgages to pay. If NASA seriously desires to maintain a top-notch work force, we must arrange top-notch pay and benefits. 4. Contractor vs. Civil Service Expertise We have evolved a system whereby overworked, underqualified Civil Servants supervise technically challenging work which is done by Contractors. Frequently, the Civil Servants lack the technical expertise to even understand what the Contractors are doing, much less evaluate the Contractors for efficiency and performance ratings. We need to put in place policies which require that Civil Servants have the necessary technical skills to operate our Programs even if the Contractors disappear overnight (which happens more often than is necessary, causing more inefficiency). Using Civil Servants to perform technical tasks should logically be more efficient than paying a Contractor, his manager, his Human Resources department and his security guard to perform the task. We frequently contract out tasks which could more efficiently be accomplished by Civil Service personnel simply because it's easier to do the paperwork to hire a Contractor than it is to hire (or temporarily transfer) a Civil Servant. This is a barrier to efficiency. 5. Training NASA must improve its training programs across the board. One example of the need for training is the poor quality of many meetings at NASA. Meeting chairmen are not being properly trained to run meetings; this results in gross, hidden inefficiencies across the whole Agency. It is often impossible to tell a manager (or anybody else for that matter) that he needs training; people take that as an insult. I propose a mandatory, monthly training day, where all NASA employees (with few exceptions) would either give or receive training. This would eliminate the most frequent excuse for not attending training: "I'm so busy doing my job, I don't have time to learn to do it better." 6. National Space Goals NASA must find new ways of cooperating with Congress and the President to develop good national and international policies for the utilization and eventual colonization of space. If we define efficiency in terms of getting the job done for the least amount of money, we must be sure we define the job carefully. At an Agency level, this means that we must work with Congress to determine valid, reasonable, useful goals for the Agency, and then measure our progress in achieving those goals. Any NASA program which does not measurably contribute to those goals should be scrapped. As an Agency, we have been drifting since the end of the Apollo Program without clearly-defined goals or a reason for existence. If our goal is to produce aeronautics and space technology, we must be able to measure how much of that technology we are developing and distributing to our customers. If our goal is to inspire students to careers in science and engineering, we can use surveys to measure our success in doing so. If our goal is to colonize the solar system, we must establish benchmarks and measure our progress in accomplishing this. We should propose a list of Agency goals to Congress and the President, and request their help in ensuring that these goals match what our ultimate customers, the American people, want out of NASA. We should establish mechanisms for measuring our progress in achieving these goals, and for reporting that metric back to Congress. Only in this way can we re-establish the credibility of this Agency with Congress and the public. 7. Commitment Our nation lacks commitment for our space program. Although we've had many successes, we've also had an embarrassing number of failures. We landed on the moon half a dozen times, then we slunk home with our collective tail between our budgetary legs. We flew the world's first space station, the we allowed it to burn up because we couldn't -- wouldn't -- reboost it in time. We proposed an efficient, fully reusable Space Transportation System with dozens of launches per year, then we scaled it back to the use-and-refurbish Space Shuttle with eight launches per year -- if we're lucky -- and a standing army of 20,000 people to support it. We proposed an international space station, then we redesigned it into oblivion. We agreed with President Bush to go "back to the moon, back to the future, and, this time, back to stay," then we gutted the funding for the Space Exploration Initiative. We backed out of a rendezvous with Halley's comet. We cancelled the OMV. And each time we change direction, we waste millions -- even billions -- of dollars and years of work from our best and brightest. We need to establish a firm direction for our space programs, then force ourselves to stick to it. We need the whole-hearted cooperation of Congress, and more discipline than Congress has ever been willing to demonstrate. We must -- absolutely must -- be 100% honest with ourselves, with Congress, with the American people, and with our international partners. Our record for accurately estimating the cost of gargantuan projects is abyssmal. Every time we mouth such an estimate, we tell a lie. This is a barrier to our efficiency, because we grossly underestimate the number of dollars required to do a job. Even when NASA and/or the President establishes a firm goal, Congress does not agree, and we end up changing horses in mid-stream. Or Congress decides we need an Advanced Solid Rocket Motor, despite our objections, and more inefficiency prevails. This must end immediately. If we can't agree on goals in space, maybe we shouldn't be there. 8. Multi-year funding Congress must face up to the undeniable fact that space travel is different from every other Federal expenditure. Our large programs require a long, consistent financial commitment, or vast inefficiencies result. The present redesign of the Space Station Freedom Program is evidence of the inefficiencies introduced by constantly changing budgetary requirements. NASA's administration fights almost continuous battles for our annual budget, which obviously reduces the amount of time they can spend on accomplishing technical work and managing the Agency efficiently. A multi-year budget for NASA would improve NASA's ability to maintain long-term commitments made with Congress, Industry and the International Partners, and improve our administration's ability to concentrate on the job at hand rather than continual skirmishes on Capitol Hill. 9. Communication NASA does not communicate well internally. We have research and development projects which overlap to a huge extent, but the researchers either don't know about the other projects or simply don't care. NASA must improve its internal communications to reduce duplication of effort. As an example of the duplication of effort, there are dozens of software development groups in NASA who rarely, if ever, communicate. There are at least a dozen "electronic library" projects at work across the agency. There are hundreds of NASA databases, including scheduling, document production and action item tracking, only a meager handful of which can share data. Just glancing down the organization charts at each of the NASA Field Centers reveals the extent of the duplication of effort. If we had an organized method of allowing every Agency employee to keep abreast of the work in every section and office, we could allow those employees to identify inefficiencies and overlaps between projects and to work actively to reduce those inefficiencies. I propose that the NASA Internal Communications Office use NASA technology to develop an electronic bulletin board which contains the annual strategic goals and weekly activity reports from all NASA organizations. We have the technology to implement this today; I can demonstrate it to anyone who is interested. I further propose that the work of the Inter-Center Council on Computer Networking be given a higher priority, a permanent staff, and a budget suitable for the task at hand. Computer communication is a large part of this Agency's future, and their efforts to improve that communication must be made one of the highest priorities for this Agency. Computers which cannot talk to each other are a barrier to efficiency. 10. Management NASA management has a bad reputation. Because of its large, multi-year programs, tight budgetary requirements, and international scope, NASA should be at the cutting edge of innovative management practices. This is far from the truth. NASA manages its space programs with all the grace of a sumo wrestler. Our supervisors manage by fear and intimidation or are ineffective whiners. Our Project Control practices are worse than useless. Our Budget Offices can't even tell us how much money we spent last year, much less how much we'll be able to spend a year from now. Our Personnel department is required to hire people with lesser qualifications simply because they are minorities and match a "hiring goal" (which they steadfastly refuse to call a quota). Our Public Affairs Office is filled with incompetents who could never land a job on Madison Avenue, and who lack even a basic scientific background. And anybody who dares to point out shortcomings in Management is rebuked, refuted or ignored. How efficient is our NASA management? We have no hard data for answering the question, only anecdotal evidence. But that evidence suggests to me that good managers are few, and those who manage efficient organizations are passed up for promotion in consideration of managers who govern large, inefficient empires. Aside from gripe sessions and baseless grousing, we really do not know how efficiently NASA manages. Again, we have no metrics. If NASA desires to become efficient, or to eliminate barriers to becoming efficient, we must first gather information documenting our efficiency. We must institute a program for continually measuring and improving the quality of NASA management. NASA managers tend to be engineers who have been given more responsibility, but who are rarely formally trained in management skills. Lack of management skills is a barrier to efficiency. If we're serious about efficient management, we need managers who are not just engineers who are marginally qualified to be managers; we need highly skilled professional managers who have the high degree of technical knowledge required to run our aeronautics and space programs. Given that most of our working troops are engineers with no training in management, we must train these engineers to become superb managers. We can't do this training part-time. I recommend that we mandate a formal college degree program in management for every NASA manager, this degree to be completed within five years of his promotion to management. Managers who do not complete the degree will be demoted. We have developed a pattern at NASA of promoting people who can manage (at least marginally), but disregarding people who lead. If NASA wants to develop leadership skills, we must learn to reward leaders for their actions. Anybody who can run a Scout troop can be a manager at NASA today. It takes true imagination, strong interpersonal skills and persistence to lead technical specialists from diverse backgrounds in our high-tech pursuits. Leadership can be taught, but today's NASA culture actively discourages leadership. We must change this. We need people who can lead, not just run the office and push papers. 11. Quality NASA's efforts at Total Quality Management are deplorable. We pay lip service to W. Edwards Deming's teachings, but we refuse to make the large organizational changes necessary to truly embrace the TQM philosophy. Although we at JSC spent more than $1M in this last year on TQM training, and we have dozens of so-called quality teams, we have little to show for it. We don't know what our current quality is, much less how to go about improving it continually. Most of our organizations have never identified their customers, their products, and their processes. Our procurement regulations require us to reward contracts based on price alone, disallowing any consideration of the quality history of the supplier. We rely on inspection in almost all of our processes, rather than designing quality into the design of those processes. Our organizations are full of fear. Our management can manage, but they can't lead they way. We have huge, never-mentioned barriers between our organizations. Our traditions of "design by committee" and "committee by consensus" are barriers to individual pride in workmanship. And we have some people who give lip service to "improving efficiency" but who don't recognize all of Deming's teachings at a glance. The biggest barrier to improving efficiency at NASA is ignorance. We don't know what efficiency is, we don't know how to measure it, we don't know how to manage it, we don't know how to improve it, and we won't know when we're done. Our next biggest barrier to efficiency is the organizational inertia and individual pride which will resist the changes required to improve that efficiency. Our third biggest efficiency hurdle is our fear of change. We must be willing to embrace change, not simply tolerate it. For only through constant change can we move our Agency back to the peak of high-technology, where we can use our aeronautics and space technology to fuel the dreams of this country. -- Ken Jenks, NASA/JSC/GM2, Space Shuttle Program Office kjenks@gothamcity.jsc.nasa.gov (713) 483-4368 "It is mankind's manifest destiny to bring our humanity into space, to colonize this galaxy. And as a nation, we have the power to determine whether America will lead or will follow. I say that America must lead." -- Ronald Reagan ------------------------------ Date: Thu, 20 May 1993 15:23:11 GMT From: Harri P J Tavaila Subject: Murder in space Newsgroups: sci.space Dear Sirs Though this is not entirely space matter: Who and by what law will convict a person that has committed a murder on Federal soil - eg. onboard a ship sailing under US registration on in an aeroplane. As some states still allow death penalties this would seem to be a matter of some importance - at least to the person in question. H Tavaila ------------------------------ Date: Thu, 20 May 1993 11:34:13 -0400 From: Kevin William Ryan Subject: Orion Spacecraft Newsgroups: sci.space In reply to the ------------------------------ Date: Thu, 20 May 1993 15:30:50 GMT From: fred j mccall 575-3539 Subject: Pat's plan Newsgroups: sci.space In 18084TM@msu.edu (Tom) writes: >I said; >>>When I have to page through 150 lines of flame to get to one or two >>>lines of actual discussion... >Fred replies; >>Perhaps things would cool out if you could keep your fine Italian hand >>out of it. Not like you're exactly an unbiased observer, is it, >>Tommy? >How's that? I'm not sure what's more confusing here, that you think I'm >Italian (a reference I've missed, apparently) or that your actions >depend so heavily upon mine. Take a course in English idioms (re: 'fine Italian hand'). Then take one in logic (re: everything else). That should help you with your confusion. >I'm trying to be an unbiased observer. All I said was that it would be a >lot easier, if there was a greater discussion/emotionalism ratio. Except that given your past interactions and motivations here, this is rather like the person throwing gasoline on a fire claiming they were trying to put it out. Sorry you got so upset about my remarks about Nick Szabo, ever so long ago, Tommy, but that's the way it is. All the nattering in the world on your part isn't going to change it. Now go away. I've quit accepting mail from you, which I disliked doing in case you might actually say something worthwhile (unlikely as that seems). I would dislike flushing you entirely for the same reason, but by all means, suit yourself. -- "Insisting on perfect safety is for people who don't have the balls to live in the real world." -- Mary Shafer, NASA Ames Dryden ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Fred.McCall@dseg.ti.com - I don't speak for others and they don't speak for me. ------------------------------ Date: 20 May 93 15:37:04 GMT From: Sheaf Subject: Space Billboards and Low-Cost Access to Orbit Newsgroups: sci.space,sci.astro,talk.politics.space In article yamauchi@ces.cwru.edu (Brian Yamauchi) writes: > >In the latter case, suppose we have a dozen billboards in LEO which >have to replaced every two weeks -- that's nearly one launch per day, >enough business to support a (small) fleet of Delta Clippers. If >DC-1s are built and drastically reduce cost-to-orbit, they will open >up other markets as well -- possibly including space tourism. > >So, the question I would put the anti-billboard people is whether they >would be willing to put up with a dozen of these things, each visible >for a few minutes during twilight, in exchange for the ability to >personally visit LEO some time in the next 10-20 years... >-- I think "visiting LEO" would be still be wishful thinking in 100 years, let alone 10-20... especially if the only technology we're talking about developing here is how to put stuff in orbit more cheaply. A commercial launching venture is not going to put money into R&D for spacetravel, which still has major, possibly insurmountable technological barriers. (I'd also like to know... can't I be against space-billboards without being an "anti-billboard person". Why do "right-wing conservatives" always feel they have to resort to steroetyping everyone who disagrees with them like they are all part of some big movement ? It sounds either very childish or very paranoid...) ------------------------------ Date: 20 May 93 15:20:15 GMT From: Sheaf Subject: Space Marketing would be wonderfull. Newsgroups: sci.environment,sci.astro,sci.space,rec.backcountry,misc.rural,misc.headlines,k12.chat.teacher In article <1993May19.175403.748@ucsu.Colorado.EDU> fcrary@ucsu.Colorado.EDU (Frank Crary) writes: >In article rwd4f@poe.acc.Virginia.EDU (Rob Dobson) writes: >>>compute the period of a 108 mile orbit. But assuming 90 minutes >>>is a reasonable guess, and a circular orbit and assuming the >>>Earth's own rotation will keep the thing in view a bit longer, >>>the billboard will only be visible for about four and three >>>quarter minutes per orbit, or 38 minutes per twelve hour night. > >>>This doesn't sound like a nuisance or an abomination to me. > >Is five minutes a night a "nuisance"? And how, exactly, would >a dawn event have anything to do with the _night_ sky? > Once again, again... why would anyone built ONE billboard that could only be seen at dawn or for 5 minutes at night from one particular location, that costs millions (?)... The obvious answer is that no one would. Any intelligent businessperson would put up enough of them so that they would be seen for the maximum time, by the maximum number of people, at the best possible time (which would be, in this case, after dark, between dusk and 2 Am, just like prime time ad time on television.) So, for the last time, I don't think most people would consider one billboard a terrible compromise, but anyone who thinks that a business could justify that is crazy... I can't beleive that any of the so-called capitalists that have been supporting this venture have commented on that fact...they just go on and on argueing that one object is insignificant seemingly oblivious to the fact that both the rest of us as well as the advertisers have to believe that one or two is then not worth the trouble. (That is, of course, not even addressing the "power of American Capitalism" wackos who have suggested that east european factories belch out pollution, whereas American factories belch out "a display of our superiority". Whatever you call it, it still turns your lungs black...) (BTW, I really wanted to end this debate, but with people who are so oblivious to the real consequences of these aspects of the issue, I can't help myself. Maybe they've been in academia too long... I know I've been wasting my time writing these responses for too long.) S. Sheaffer ------------------------------ Date: Thu, 20 May 1993 15:09:55 GMT From: fred j mccall 575-3539 Subject: Super ZIp seperators. Newsgroups: sci.space In <1tb36t$rv@access.digex.net> prb@access.digex.net (Pat) writes: >For those who are interested. Lockheed sells their patented >Contamination free seperator. Now I know fred's mind is too >small to accept this. But i've handled the hardware. It's Gee, Pat doesn't do 'flame bait', no sirree Bob. Right, Pat. And I still believe in Santa Claus and the Easter Bunny, too. >essentially 2 clevis joints, scored w ith an acial >sealed tube, which contains teh explosive. THe tube expands >and breaks teh clevis's open along a score line. >No gas products, no scrap metal. no contamination. >-----/\------ > @ >-----\/------- >The bad ascii graphic shows the sperator. The at sign >is the explosive tube. When the tube expands it breaks >the scores shown. neat, clean, simple. >I realize that at least one person on the net, won't believe >this, but if anyone else is interested, I can try to go >into further detail. Good God! Real facts! (finally) Even if they're still larded with his usual flame bait, this may be a miraculous change. Where did I put my calendar? Where's that red pen? Ok, now on to the next 'problem' with using these, since you've now actually posted something other than sheer assertion and convinced me that it's reasonable. Who drills the holes in the bottom of the HST to attach these things into? Keep in mind that you're going to have to drill those holes out again the next time you reboost it. Oh, and another question occurs to me. You spoke about trim weights being adjusted on the ground. Assuming that we have good enough mass balance figures on HST to be able to do this, does this imply that you are essentially talking about a one-shot kick motor here rather than a real 'orbital tug'? This starts to look like it has even less possibility of being a net win than I originally had thought. Consider. instead of simply flying up the Shuttle, matching with HST, get hold of it and bring it down onto the appropriate 'stand', and boosting the whole works up and letting it go, we have the following: 1) Develop Pat's new 'kick motor'. (Big Bucks) 2) Load it on the Shuttle (along with all its fuel) and boost it up to match orbits with HST. (No real mass savings here that I can see) 3) Rig HST for attachment of the motor. (Much EVA work, assuming we had room for all the EVA gear and EDO pallets after we loaded the motor, its fuel, plus all tools we need.) 4) Attach same, taking care of potential problems with the solar arrays, etc. (More EVA work) 5) Watch it fly up, then hope and pray that it separates correctly. Your approach just doesn't seem to make sense, Pat, unless you can develop something that can be left on orbit (this can't -- balance weights have to be adjusted by hand on the ground, remember?), refueled on orbit (more technology development, but we need this capability anyway), easily attached to spacecraft (either force spacecraft to have standard 'reboost' fittings or else we need a much more generalized grappling facility for the tug, preferably one that doesn't require EVA (we know how hard that is going to be to make work) -- I regard the 'exploding bolts' idea as a net lose, since you then have to clear the remains of the bolts from the attachment points the next time you want to reboost the spacecraft, and a mission demand for more than just one or two uses every several years in order to pay for things. -- "Insisting on perfect safety is for people who don't have the balls to live in the real world." -- Mary Shafer, NASA Ames Dryden ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Fred.McCall@dseg.ti.com - I don't speak for others and they don't speak for me. ------------------------------ Date: Thu, 20 May 1993 14:53:00 GMT From: fred j mccall 575-3539 Subject: Why we like DC-X (was Re: Shuttle 0-Defects & Bizarre? DC-X?) Newsgroups: sci.space In <1tb2al$sof@access.digex.net> prb@access.digex.net (Pat) writes: >In article <1993May18.132929.18902@mksol.dseg.ti.com> mccall@mksol.dseg.ti.com (fred j mccall 575-3539) writes: >> >>>Considering the magnitude of loss of life in both the Moro Castle >>>and Titanic disasters, I can't believe you can be so blithe >>>there fred. >> >>Can be blithe as all get out, Pat, because neither of those sinkings >>killed much in the way of bystanders and if the engines just quit on a >>ship, nothing much bad even happens to the people on it, usually. Now >>try that with a 747. >Unless, of course, the engines quit during heavy weather. >Don't assume Benign Failure Modes! Even then, this is not a disaster (yes, I've been there and had it happen). If you can't get restarted you have a problem, but otherwise you just get beat up some. >And besides why are you >SO concerned about Bystnaders and not PAssengers and cargo. Because passengers and the people booking cargo have presumably analyzed the risks involved and elected to be aboard. Bystanders typically aren't given that opportunity. Plus, there are a hell of a lot more bystanders than there are passengers. Just think about how range safety works, Pat. When do they blow up the bird (including passengers plus cargo)? >THe point of the ship may be to Haul a $1G cargo, don't you think >that if the ship screws up and losses it, that that may be worth something? Certainly. That's what 'insurance' is for. However, insurance money doesn't replace people. That's why I differentiate between monetary loss and loss of human life. Are you saying that you do not? >PS I don't know about 747's but there have been several cases >of Total Engine failure in Passenger Carrying Long Haul jet aircraft. >Results have been mixed. THere was the Midlands 737? The Gimli >767, SOmebody had a DC-9 bulk flame out. plus at least >60? incidents of all engines power loss due to Volcanic ash >ingestion. Even a747 has a respectable glide ratio, unless >it loses power at low altitude, the pilot retains a fair degree >of control authority. All nit-picking, Pat. The only response that comes to mind is, "so?". Or do you dispute that the potential for loss of life among 'innocent bystanders' from a major aircraft failure is lower, or at least no higher, than that of a shipping accident? -- "Insisting on perfect safety is for people who don't have the balls to live in the real world." -- Mary Shafer, NASA Ames Dryden ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Fred.McCall@dseg.ti.com - I don't speak for others and they don't speak for me. ------------------------------ End of Space Digest Volume 16 : Issue 602 ------------------------------