Date: Tue, 25 May 93 05:08:40 From: Space Digest maintainer Reply-To: Space-request@isu.isunet.edu Subject: Space Digest V16 #622 To: Space Digest Readers Precedence: bulk Space Digest Tue, 25 May 93 Volume 16 : Issue 622 Today's Topics: About the mercury program DC-X test soon?, also DC Article ELEVEN G-forces during atmospheric reentry??? Hey Sherz! (For real!) Cost of LEO How do the Soviets retrieve boken satellites? Interesting DC-X paper I cama accross. Neil's words - an analysis (was Re: Neil's first words) Soyuz and Shuttle Comparisons Space Marketing would be wonderfull. Update of SSTO language for Authorization white paper specifying the DC-X followon: SX-2 Welcome to the Space Digest!! Please send your messages to "space@isu.isunet.edu", and (un)subscription requests of the form "Subscribe Space " to one of these addresses: listserv@uga (BITNET), rice::boyle (SPAN/NSInet), utadnx::utspan::rice::boyle (THENET), or space-REQUEST@isu.isunet.edu (Internet). ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Date: Mon, 24 May 1993 16:50:42 GMT From: Gary Coffman Subject: About the mercury program Newsgroups: sci.space In article <1993May24.004013.23225@sfu.ca> Leigh Palmer writes: >In article <1993May22.161634.5931@ke4zv.uucp> Gary Coffman, >gary@ke4zv.uucp writes: >>I think it's wrong to blame the astronaut for this failure, at least not >>totally. Instead the PI screwed up in mechanical design. A look at his >>3 year old's Jack in the Box would have showed him how to make a box with >>a hand crank that even the clumsiest little vandal couldn't easily break. > >A real apologist for the astronaut! > >Do you suppose he broke the handle in rehearsal? Is it possible he didn't >rehearse? Would it have been wise for him to have rehearsed? It would have been wisest to design the box so it could cope with ordinary forces. It's not like the astronaut was exerting all his strength here. Simple prudence says that laboratory equipment should be designed to withstand ordinary handling unless there is some reason *critical to the experiment* for making it extraordinarily delicate. There's no indication that that was the case here. As to a rehearsal, I suspect that if the PI had even bothered to have a grad student turn the crank, he would have found out how faulty his design was long before an astronaut became involved. Remember, it wasn't the crank that broke, it was the box, dumping it's contents into the capsule. That capule was going to experience 12 G deacceleration on landing. Care to speculate on the fate of that delicate box during re-entry if the astronaut had been *real* gingerly in turning the crank? Gary -- Gary Coffman KE4ZV | You make it, | gatech!wa4mei!ke4zv!gary Destructive Testing Systems | we break it. | uunet!rsiatl!ke4zv!gary 534 Shannon Way | Guaranteed! | emory!kd4nc!ke4zv!gary Lawrenceville, GA 30244 | | ------------------------------ Date: Mon, 24 May 1993 18:23:11 GMT From: Mike Butts Subject: DC-X test soon?, also DC Article Newsgroups: sci.space Forgive my late return to this group, but I infer that a real DC-X test is really impending. Am I right? What are the details? Also there is a very good summary article including diagrams and specifics in the current issue of Analog Science Fact/Science Fiction. Thanks, and Go DC-X! -- Mike Butts mbutts@qcktrn.com Research Engineering Mgr. 503-685-1302 Quickturn Systems, Inc., 8005 SW Boeckman Road, Wilsonville, Oregon 97070 My opinions are my own, and aren't necessarily shared by Quickturn Systems. ------------------------------ Date: Mon, 24 May 1993 17:19:05 GMT From: fred j mccall 575-3539 Subject: ELEVEN G-forces during atmospheric reentry??? Newsgroups: sci.space In <1tol6oINN1et@rave.larc.nasa.gov> C.O.Egalon@larc.nasa.gov (Claudio Oliveira Egalon) writes: >A friend of mine has written that Gus Grinson, during his >suborbital flight of the Mercury program, was subjected to >acelerations from 0 to ELEVEN g's, within 32 seconds, when >he was reentring the atmosphere!!! Although I can not recall >the phisiological tolerance to g-forces 11 g's seems darn too > high for me. Most likely it is well above the value that >anyone can tolerate. So my questions are: >1) What is the g interval that a human being can tolerate and Somewhere in the neighborhood of 6-9g continuous is about all a typical pilot can be expected to take for prolonged periods and remain functional (i.e., able to continue ACM). At 9+ g, GLC onset tends to be close to instantaneous (when it happens). At lower g, pilots will experience 'wash-out' of vision (loss of color) and/or tunnel vision prior to loss of consciousness. This is why aircraft like the F-16 are more hazardous to fly at high g; the pilot will receive few or no cues that it's time to 'unload' prior to losing consciousness. Note that this is all assuming that the individual is basically in a reclined sitting position with a g-suit. Other positions may allow greater or lesser g-tolerance; more reclined would cause it to go up, more upright or taking 'negative g' will cause it to go down. >2) What was the maximum acceleration that a Mercury >astronaut was subjected to. I don't know for sure, but I understand that peaks were fairly high, so g-forces in the 'teens don't sound particularly unreasonable for short periods of time. It is possible to take what seems like incredibly high g so long as the duration is short. -- "Insisting on perfect safety is for people who don't have the balls to live in the real world." -- Mary Shafer, NASA Ames Dryden ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Fred.McCall@dseg.ti.com - I don't speak for others and they don't speak for me. ------------------------------ Date: Mon, 24 May 1993 16:41:54 GMT From: fred j mccall 575-3539 Subject: Hey Sherz! (For real!) Cost of LEO Newsgroups: sci.space In <1tpt1o$mq4@hsc.usc.edu> khayash@hsc.usc.edu (Ken Hayashida) writes: >Mr. Sherzer originally posted that he felt >>As a rough guess I would say that in 10 years Shuttle has delivered >>to LEO about as much as Saturn V did in 4 years. >I have been criticized for not making an appropriate comparison. >I would remind you that I retracted my statement about STS delivering >the most mass to orbit. I have not heard Mr. Sherzer retract his >statement made above. Why should he retract it if it is true? >I am attempting to ascertain the validity of this statement in >an objective manner. A basic tenet of the scientific method >is to approach issues as objectively as possible. Several of >you appear unprepared to drop your subjectivity in this >analysis. Let me get this straight. You're a doctor criticizing engineers over their objectivity when looking at the engineering of various vehicles? >I have defined how I will be determining the amount >of material the Saturn V delivered to LEO and >the amount of material which the Space Transportation >System has delivered to LEO. Inclusion of the S-IV-B stage >is reasonable and important. The upper stage of the Saturn >V was clearly delivered to LEO by the Saturn V vehicle. >Josh Hopkins corrected my inclusion of the escape tower in >the Saturn calculation. I would point out that in the >grand scheme of things, the tower's mass would probably >cause a minimal change in the total mass which the Saturn >program delivered to Low Earth orbit. >Inclusion of the orbiter in the STS calculation is clearly >indicated because the orbiter reaches LEO. Both reach >orbit. Both are relevant in order to ascertain the validity of >Mr. Sherzer's statement. Neither is relevant. Delivery of *the vehicle* to LEO is only reasonably countable if the vehicle you are talking about is intended to go higher from there. Otherwise, you are not talking about 'payload', per se, except in the sense that you have to keep boosting the whole Shuttle as a 'lab' because you keep bringing it back down for no good reason. One can always predetermine the 'winner' by selectively choosing an appropriate measure, whether that measure is meaningful or not. >In the future, I hope more people will publish on sci.space >their own sources, references, and calculations in order that >all may understand the way they have reached conclusions. >I also find it strange that so many shuttle critics would snub >the issue of mass return while attempting to tout the >importance of space commercialization. The true >commercialization of space will be when travel is to and >from LEO. Shuttle is currently the best vehicle at achieving >this mission. How much of the mass that the Shuttle has returned has been stuff that needed to be returned to fulfill mission? It returns *itself* -- we would be better served to leave the 'lab' on orbit. It returned the LDEF; that was sort of necessary for study. There is no important return requirement for most things, and much of what else needs to be returned is more economically brought back by simply sealing it in a can and dropping it. >Shuttle critics choose to downplay and underestimate the >importance and difficulty in the historic missions which the >orbiter has flown to service and recover multi-million dollar >satillites. While some may argue the economics of these >achievements, they usually choose to ignore the difficulty in >flying these missions. They also choose to belittle the >demonstrated capabilities of the orbiter to successfully >accomplish these important missions. In another note, you criticize a comment Pat made because he couldn't understand the technical difficulty or degree of complexity of developing a new medical treatment, yet here you are, a doctor telling engineers that you understand their field better than they do. >Mr. Spencer, if you would like to start publishing your own >calculations supporting your views of the shuttle program, >I'd enjoy reading them. The challenge of poking holes in >your or Mr. Sherzer's papers (and vice versa) should allow >non-posters the opportunity to better assess their positions >relative to ours. While I don't know Henry personally, I will tell you what anyone who has been around the net for any length of time will tell you. If you find yourself in substantive disagreement with Henry Spencer, you should prepare yourself for the discovery that you are wrong. >Mr. Sherzer, since you are such a critic of the shuttle >program and tout the DC-Y's performance. Please start >to publish the vehicleUs developmental cost, payload to >orbit, recovery time and cost, cost of manufacturing the >vehicle, if anyone really knows. If any of these are >unknown, are you really that different than those who >erroneously believed the shuttles would fly once per week? I do know Alan personally (we used to work at the same facility down here). While I am of the opinion that some of his costing measurements for Shuttle costs vice the costs of some expendables are somewhat unfair in how they elect to measure, I would say that his engineering is sound; particularly when compared to that of a doctor of medicine. One can look at the two systems (Shuttle and DC) and see the difference immediately. Shuttle is *designed* to require extensive refurbishment after each and every flight and pushes its design to the limits. DC does not do those things. So you tell me what's reasonable to believe when comparing the two. -- "Insisting on perfect safety is for people who don't have the balls to live in the real world." -- Mary Shafer, NASA Ames Dryden ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Fred.McCall@dseg.ti.com - I don't speak for others and they don't speak for me. ------------------------------ Date: Mon, 24 May 1993 16:45:59 GMT From: fred j mccall 575-3539 Subject: How do the Soviets retrieve boken satellites? Newsgroups: sci.space In "William F. O'Dell" writes: >All of this STS vs. Soyez got me wondering. >How do the Soviets retrieve scewed up satellites?-Or do they? >Just curious. They don't. It's more economical for them to deorbit the old one (or boost it) and launch a new bird. Even given our much higher costs to orbit, this is usually cheaper for us, as well. -- "Insisting on perfect safety is for people who don't have the balls to live in the real world." -- Mary Shafer, NASA Ames Dryden ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Fred.McCall@dseg.ti.com - I don't speak for others and they don't speak for me. ------------------------------ Date: Mon, 24 May 1993 18:38:07 GMT From: "Allen W. Sherzer" Subject: Interesting DC-X paper I cama accross. Newsgroups: sci.space 29 April 1993 WHAT'S AL THE WORRY ABOUT A CRASH The need for a win-win public relations strategy by Steve Hoeser Introduction: The SSTO/SSRT opponents have us on the defenseive and we're letting them put us there. I see us falling back into the standard practice of defending our program when we should be on the offensive. This is a formula for disaster. Background: The opposition first used the tactic of saying that we couldn't build the DC-X and that it was a stunt. But their actions to kill it showed instead that they were deathly afraid that we might do. Showing that you can build some very impressing hardware fast and cheap, took a big chunk out of the establishment's credibility. Failing the kill technique, the opposition is now posturing to exploit a crash. They will not only pounce on us when we're down they will send in a full nuclear strike. Conclusion: It is time to take the offensive with a public relations strategy capable of claiming victory regardless of the DC-X test. Recommendation: The entire SSTO/SSRT support structure adopt the position that, _breaking the DC-X is and always was part of the plan._ _This must start now_ lest we give the opposition the weapon of plausible denial by waiting until after a crash. Discussion: A preemptive and sustained public relations bombardment is needed to take away the opposition's ammunition. Key support factions and the public at large need to clearly understand that X-Vehicle programs break things because that is what they are supposed to do. Most importantly, this may very well include crashing the vehicle. * It has always been an accepted fact that the DC-X would break and could even crash (somehow it seems that people working the program have forgotten this). Part of developing operations procedures is that things break and things get fixed. Test airplanes crash, get repaired, and fly again. _I can think of no more devestating a blow to the opposition than to crash this beast, fix it and fly it again._ "We never could have done that after a command destruct!" * X-Vehicle programs push to find the limits. This is what saves money ad makes the prototypes and operational vehicles work. * We need to prepare responses for the following conditions: -- _The vehicle breaks (minor damage)_: Well we figured it would break, now we can find out the best ways to fix it. -- _The vehicle crashes_: Well we planned to break it and we did a bang-up job. Now we'll get a chance to check out how tough the beast really was and see if we can make her fly again. -- _An inherent design flaw is discovered in test_: We find out from data that under certain flight conditions there is a high probability that the vehicle could crash. We must identify the design problem, determine a fix, then announce termination of the flight test program. Its stupid to wreck the hardware when we don't have to. Besides, it will look a lot better in the Smithsonian's Air and Space Museum in one piece than in a big pile. (((Kyger comment: It's also vendication of _flight test_ as the means of obtaining real world data, as opposed to analysis and paper shuffling -- even if the data are negative.))) -- _The vehicle successfully completes the entire initial test series_: We met our initial test objectives. We could have flown (or would have liked to fly) more but we're out of money. But enough is as good as a feast and it would be little more than grandstanding to fly more.. -- +---------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | Lady Astor: "Sir, if you were my husband I would poison your coffee!" | | W. Churchill: "Madam, if you were my wife, I would drink it." | +----------------------23 DAYS TO FIRST FLIGHT OF DCX-----------------------+ ------------------------------ Date: Mon, 24 May 93 16:54:13 EDT From: "Darryl O. Cottle" Subject: Neil's words - an analysis (was Re: Neil's first words) Having just seen (and heard) the clip in question yesterday afternoon I'd like to kick in a few farthings worth. Initially the question was "...a damn step" vs "...a big step" vs "...a giant step" (the correct version). Thence we proceeded on to whether Neil said "for a man" or "for man." One poster stated that the "a" WAS said but too softly for the radio equipment to pick it up. This explanation doesn't wash for reasons I'll lay out in a moment. If my memory serves Neil himself was the FIRST one to say that he had not said what he had intended to say. (As worded the implication was "one small step for man(kind) a giant leap for mankind" which, of course, is redundant!) As to the question of it being more correct to say "a giant leap for (a) man - a small step for mankind" that doesn't wash either. Our species evolved over how many thousands of millenia? The number keeps getting bigger all the time. Yet all this one man had to do was step off the LEM's ladder down to the surface. (It was more than just a small step if your legs were short!) Contrast this with all that had to happen before a member of our species was ABLE to be in a position to take that "small" step and it truly is a GIANT leap. Now to the question of whether or not Neil said "for a man." I'm not a speech pathologist (far from it) but I work with international students and have often had to explain nuances of pronunciation to people whose first language isn't English (or even 2nd or 3rd in some cases) and have come to appreciate the various positions the jaw, lips, and tongue have to be in to make certain sounds. Anybody can try this themselves if they doubt my conclusions. We tend to miss the significance of this matter when "reading" quotes once we get past the point of "mouthing" the words. To follow the word "for" with the word "man" very little repositioning of anything except the lips is required. To say the word "a" in the middle, however, requires a shift of the jaw, tongue, and lips all three. True this doesn't take much time but it DOES take a perceptible pause for it to happen. We say "for", perform the shift, say "a", then perform another shift to say "man." As I said at the top, I saw (and heard) the clip again yesterday after- noon (on the discovery channel's "Amazing Space") and I'll now reproduce my interpretation of what I heard. "That's one small step" "for man" "a giant leap for mankind." Now I'll repeat it as the poster who claimed "a" WAS said would have us believe it happened, using CAPS to indicate volume sufficiently high to be picked up with Neil's radio. "THAT'S ONE SMALL STEP" "FORaMAN" "A GIANT LEAP FOR MANKIND." ^^^^^^^ If this radio had been like a voice actuated recorder I could see where the word "a" might have been too low to be picked up - but this was a "real time" transmission. If Neil had paused long enough to shift his tongue, jaw, and lips to say "a" and then shifted them again to say "man" then the interval between the words would have been noticeably longer (not vastly longer but DEFINITELY perceptible). Try it yourself. You can come closer to closing the gap if you say "uh" rather than "a" but still the gap would be there! I propose that Neil didn't say "for a man" because the record of the statement doesn't provide a sufficient time interval for it to have been said. Further I believe him when HE said that he didn't say what he intended to say. NASA is responsible for the confusion since they decided to make the "official" record say ^^^^^^^^ what Neil MEANT to say, rather than what he actually said. You've perhaps heard the quote "I know you believe that you understand what you think I said. However I'm not sure if you are aware that what you think you heard is not what I meant!" Seems applicable in this situation. The quote as it was meant to be said is really great and I honor the man who meant to say it! QED The lurker at the threshhold. +- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- -+ | (snail mail) |"I don't know what I'm doin'!| (voice) | |*Darryl O. (Doc) Cottle | If I ever DO figure it out,| 606-257-7577 | | Agricultural Economics | I'll prob'ly go HIDE!!" | or | |*431 Ag Engineering Bldg 2| "Brother" Dave Gardner | 606-231-6675 | | University of Kentucky |-----------------------------|--------------| |*Lexington, KY 40546-0276 | "Where were you born?" | | - - - - - <> - - - - - - | "Oh, are you one of them astrology dudes? | |* = short form of address | I'm a Cancer with a bad moon risin'!" | |--------------------------| Cheech Marin (Born in East L.A.) | | (electronic) +--------------------------------------------+ | docottle@ukcc.bitnet or else try docottle@ukcc.uky.edu | +- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- -+ ------------------------------ Date: Mon, 24 May 1993 17:46:20 GMT From: Frank Crary Subject: Soyuz and Shuttle Comparisons Newsgroups: sci.space In article <26956@ksr.com> clj@ksr.com (Chris Jones) writes: >> The Soyuz is launched on the Soyuz (the >>Soviet press named launch vehicles after the first spacecraft >>they launched...) aka SL-4 aka "Type A-3" launch vehicle. >The Soyuz was not the first vehicle launched by this booster. The two Voskhod >flights used this launcher, as did their (and Soyuuzes) unmanned precursors >flown under the Kosmos banner. I don't know what was the first use. I think the Voskhods used the SL-2, but I suspect the Soviet press criteria wasn't very exact: They probably used the first launch they reported (Kosmos imssions usually aren't) not the real first launch... Frank Crary CU Boulder ------------------------------ Date: 24 May 93 18:16:13 GMT From: Jane Beckman Subject: Space Marketing would be wonderfull. Newsgroups: sci.environment,misc.consumers,sci.astro,talk.environment,talk.politics.space,sci.space,rec.backcountry,misc.rural,misc.headlines Of course, I doubt that folks have allowed that if they can put a billboard in space, they probably can also put a billboard-killer in space, send up something that would turn the orbiting advertisement into small shreds of debris. I'm sure you could find LOTS of people willing to donate a few hundred dollars to such a good cause! It could give a whole new aspect to the concept of monkey-wrenching. Finally, a *good* use for "star wars" technology! Seriously, though, I think that the Perseid meteor shower could wreck some serious havoc on the Great Sign, too. Or any other floating chunks of space rock that normally bombard the earth of a regular schedule. We're talking about fairly fragile materials, not like tough, compact satellite materials. -- Jilara [jane@swdc.stratus.com] "Every now and then, a big rock falls out of the sky, and everyone has a *very bad* day." --from the PBS "Dinosaurs" special. ------------------------------ Date: Mon, 24 May 1993 18:35:24 GMT From: "Allen W. Sherzer" Subject: Update of SSTO language for Authorization Newsgroups: sci.space,talk.politics.space Draft Report Language -- For Inclusion in the FY '94 DoD Authorization Bill Single Stage Rocket Technology (SSRT) Program Of all the dual-use spacelift technologies currently targeted for operation within a decade, reusable, Single Stage to Orbit (SSTO) rockets offer the highest potential for radically reduced costs and increased safety, reliability, and operability. According to recent studies performed for the Air Force and NASA, SSTO's have the potential of reducing the operational cost of delivering payloads to low Earth orbit by an order of magnitude, restoring U.S. competitiveness. The Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO) is carrying out a well-planned Advanced Technology Demonstration (ATD) program to demonstrate the availability and cost effectiveness of Single Stage Rocket Technology (SSRT). The SSRT program is structured to rapidly prototype and fly experimental vehicles of increasing size and performance to demonstrate the feasibility of single stage reusable rockets one step at a time, within budget, and in a short time. The SSRT program is important because it will provide the DoD with a demonstrated SSTO technology option for consideration as a next generation spacelift system. The first ATD vehicle, the DC-X1, is on schedule and within budget, and positive conclusive results are expected by the end of fiscal year 1993. The second ATD vehicle, the DC-X2,is scheduled to begin development in fiscal year 1994. Successful flight testing of the DC-X1 and DC-X2 will provide the confidence necessary to proceed into initial development of a full-scale operational SSTO system. The Committee is concerned that the SSRT program is only budgeted at $5,000,000 in fiscal year 1994, and questions the level of funding support available within SDIO for completion of the DC-X2 ATD. Based on the expected positive results from the DC-X1 flight tests, and because of the significant potential that single stage rockets promise for reduced costs and increased reliability and operability, the SDIO is directed to begin development of the DC-X2 in fiscal year 1994. The Committee also directs SDIO to evaluate the feasibility of transitioning the SSRT program in fiscal year 1995 to appropriate new management commensurate with its dual-use nature, such as the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) or the Technology Executive Officer (TEO) structure within the Air Force, and to provide its recommendations to the Committee by August,1993. The Committee directs that $75,000,000 be authorized in fiscal year 1994 for SDIO to proceed aggressively with the SSRT program, including development and flight testing of the DC-X2 ATD. -- +---------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | Lady Astor: "Sir, if you were my husband I would poison your coffee!" | | W. Churchill: "Madam, if you were my wife, I would drink it." | +----------------------23 DAYS TO FIRST FLIGHT OF DCX-----------------------+ ------------------------------ Date: Mon, 24 May 1993 18:37:15 GMT From: "Allen W. Sherzer" Subject: white paper specifying the DC-X followon: SX-2 Newsgroups: sci.space [This is the paper I promised to post a while ago. Sorry for the delay. It gives some specifics of the current thinking for a DC-X followon.] -Allen White Paper SX-2 Advanced Technology Demonstrator (ATD) Program Col. Worden, SDIO The Single Stage Rocket Technology (SSRT) program will begin flight testing the DC-X vehicle this summer. Currently, SDIO is not budgeting funds for any other effort other than $5 million in FY94 to compllete the DC-X flight testing. SDIO is encouraging other DOD agencies (ARPA and USAF), the Department of Energy (Sandia and Los Alamos National Laboratories), NASA, or a combination of the above to support a joint follow-on ATD program run from SDIO or another agency. This paper recommends a Fast Track ATD program that is well defined and for which independent government cost and schedule estimates exist. _SX-2 Program Definition:_ The follow-on program would build and fly the SX-2 (Spaceplane Experimental) ATD within three years. The SX-2 uses the same RL-10A5 engines as the DC-X with performance enhancements provided by subcontracts with the Russian rocket engine company Energomash. The vehicle operates out of the same basic facilities and uses the same ground-based crew and control center used to fly the DC-X. Airframe construction will demonstrate the identical composites and unit weights needed for follow-on suborbital and Single Stage to Orbit (SSTO) vehicles. Maximum altitude for the SX-2 is 600,000 feet providing four to five minutes of microgravity time in space. Like its predecessor, the DC-X, the SX-2 will push even further toward demonstrating the feasibility of rocket powered "aircraft-like" operations, support, reliability and associated recurring flight costs in the only credible way -- by doing it. The SX-2 like the DC-X, uses oxygen and hydrogen to support all propulsion and power needs, and offers an environmentally benign exhaust product -- water. With clean exhaust, manageable noise levels and no staging debris, the SX-2 is an environmentally friendly system that can help set the standard for all 21st century launch systems. _Why SX-2:_ The rationale for funding the SX-2 program centers around five military/commercial "dual use" thrusts: 1) enabling the construction of follow-on suborbital and orbital vehicles providing vastly less expensive commercial spacelift services and fundamentally new strategic and tactical military capabilities, 2) assuring that the American aerospace industry is the first to commercially exploit low cost, highly reliable space access, 3) providing dual use technology spinoffs to the commercial and military sectors, 4) bolstering the aerospace industrial base by opening profitable new commercial opportunities, and 5) developing American-Russian cooperative ventures. _Funding Requirements:_ The SX-2 program is envisioned as a competitive procurement in which three prime airframe contractors have expressed an interest: Lockheed, McDonnell Douglas and Rockwell International. Total program cost as estimated by both the government and the McDonnell Douglas industry wide team is $450 million. The fiscal year breakout is $75, $185, $180 and $10 million through FY94 through FY97 respectively. The first year of design will focus on reducing the program cost as far as possible towards a self-imposed $300 million Design-to-Cost goal. Just as completing the DC-X significantly reduced the cost and uncertainty of proceeding with the SX-2, the SX-2 program will provide accurate, low risk estimates of the cost of proceeding with follow-on suborbital and orbital vehicles. NEXT PAGE... ADDENDUM Rationale For SX-2 Program A successful SX-2 program will directly enable a family of military, civil and commercial derived vehicles. From cheap suborbital rockets identical to the SX-2 for university and commercial research, to inter- continental ballistic transport vehicles able to deliver cargo globally within minutes, to tommorrow's SSTO launch vehicles, a successful SX-2 program will conclusively show that such vehicles can be built and allow credible estimates of their operating costs and reliabilities. Moreover, if the SX-2 flies as cheaply as the DC-X is designed to operate today, by the turn of the century follow-on vehicles could begin reducing operating costs by up to an order of magnitude over the $10 billion the U.S. spends annually on space launch. Even highly subsidized foreign launch vehicles can't compete with such radicaly reduced operating costs. Beyond space launch, such aerospace vehicles can provide an important complement to tommorrow's military force structure. Their ability to respond globally from central CONUS with the speed of an ICBM and the flexibility of a modern aircraft could form an important pillar of the Air Force's emerging 21st century "Global Reach -- Global Power" strategy. As far back as the 1986 National Commission on Space, and every national assessment since, the need for fundamentally lower launch costs has consistently been cited as the seminal barrier to the growth of commercial space enterprises. The SX-2 takes a measured step which will quantify the magnitude of potential cost savings and develop a host of commercially useful technologies ready for new dual use military and commercial application. Technology transfer to the commercial sector can be expedited by a focused program to transition key technologies to American and Russian commercial enterprises. For example, light weight composite materials usable from cryogenic to room temperatures have potential applications ranging from comercial aviation to the automotive industry; high temperature superalloys and composites can enable more efficient engines of all kinds; and hydrogen generation and handling equipment, fuel cells and power units will take a significant step towards a 21st century economy based on hydrogen, electric cars and pollution free hydrogen fueled automobiles. Building the SX-2 in conjunction with an aggressive technology transfer program will allow America to beat the Japanese at their own game -- be the first to spin-off state-of-the-art (but off-the- shelf) technogies to commercial applications. Beyond technology spin-off, the SX-2 provides a focus for high technology American-Russian cooperation and will bolster the declining American aerospace industry with contracted work in many of the 50 states, but focused in Alabama, California, Colorado, Florida, Missouri and New Mexico. With Russian provided propulsion enhancements it's likely the SX-2 will eventually break the X-15 speed record of Mach 6.7. Once its initial flight test objectives are achieved, the SX-2 can be used for many experiments and high speed technology development for the next century. Low cost, routine access to the hypersonic flight regime can expedite high speed technology development. Experiments flown on the SX-2 can benefit many key technologies including base burning, actively cooled structures, heat pipes, high temperature materials, durable flight controls, hot structures, advanced cryogenic tanks, slush hydrogen, triple point oxygen, advanced avionics and rocket augmented flight. The vision enabled by the SX-2 program can provide a focus for America's youth encouraging higher education and fundamentally new commercial industries on America's space frontier. But the first step unquestionalbly must be development and flight of a proof-of-concept demonstrator like the SX-2.. -- +---------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | Lady Astor: "Sir, if you were my husband I would poison your coffee!" | | W. Churchill: "Madam, if you were my wife, I would drink it." | +----------------------23 DAYS TO FIRST FLIGHT OF DCX-----------------------+ ------------------------------ End of Space Digest Volume 16 : Issue 622 ------------------------------